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With growing academic interest on “grand challenges”, i.e., highly significant but 
potentially solvable problems like poverty, hunger, climate change, etc., several business 
organizations have started to adopt different social and environmental missions. Social 
enterprises are a form of business organizations that pursue both social and financial missions, 
thus aiming to address certain grand challenge. While prior studies reveal valuable insights on 
social enterprises, there are still several gaps in our understanding of these organizations. For 
example, we do not fully know about the nature of organizational processes or founding 
resources that help in the successful establishment of social enterprises or the sustenance of their 
dual missions. Moreover, there are limited studies that describe social entrepreneurship in low- / 
low-middle-income countries (sometimes referred to as developing economies). Given the 
institutional limitations and resource constraints in these contexts, social enterprises may 
encounter different challenges in these regions. This dissertation is a study of key aspects of 
social entrepreneurship related to their establishment, sustenance, and the resources and practices 
that facilitate their success as hybrids in low- / low-middle-income countries. 
To understand the sustenance of the social and financial missions of social enterprises, I 
analyze B-Corp certified social enterprises in South Asia. Through qualitative inductive analysis, 
I identify the changes that these firms undergo during B-Corp certification, and how these 
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changes enable the firms to maintain their financial and social missions. My study throws light 
on category clarity in social enterprises. To understand how social enterprises are established in 
low- / low-middle-income countries, I examine the phenomenon of reverse migration, i.e., 
migration of individuals from high-income countries to low-income ones with the goal to 
establish a social enterprise. I use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA; fsQCA) and 
resource mobilization framework to identify the resource combinations that lead to successful 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Several scholars in business have advocated for a problem-oriented and impact-focused 
approach to organization studies (Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Stern 
& Barley, 1996). Building on this problem-oriented and impact-focused approach, researchers 
call for studies on grand challenges, i.e., “highly significant yet potentially solvable problems” 
like poverty, hunger, climate change, etc. (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016). In other 
words, grand challenges are significant social and environmental issues at the global level. They 
have potential or actual adverse effects on a substantial number of people and the planet (George 
et al., 2016). A wide range of actors, including policymakers, governments, researchers, 
institutions, and intergovernmental authorities, have started to recognize grand challenges and 
take collective action to address them. Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein (2016) describe 
grand challenges as those that affect a large number of people and are typically complex. The 
COVID-19 pandemic, which can be considered a grand challenge, highlights the importance and 
impact of such challenges and their potential solutions. Studies that illustrate scholarly attention 
and interest in grand challenges include those by Colquitt & George (2011), Ferraro, Etzion, & 
Gehman (2015), and Mair, Martí, & Ventresca (2012). 
Scholars have studied several grand challenges such as climate change (Ansari, Wijen, & 
Gray, 2013; Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, & George, 2014; Wittneben, Okereke, 
Banerjee, & Levy, 2012), labor and work conditions (Crane, 2013; Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 
2007), poverty (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012), and natural 
calamities (Williams & Shepherd, 2016). However, despite the recent work in this area of 
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research, there is still a need to deepen our understanding of how organizations can act towards 
grand challenges (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015).  
Several scholars describe business ventures’ potential to address grand challenges (Dacin, 
Dacin, & Matear, 2010; McMullen & Warnick, 2016). Both scholars (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Bansal & Sharma, 2015) and practitioners (e.g., Bersin, 2018; Deloitte, 2018) show that 
business ventures targeting social causes are increasing in number. However, the literature lacks 
a systematic understanding of the mechanisms that link grand challenges with their potential 
solutions and their implementation (Padget & Powell, 2012). In this dissertation, I aim to 
uncover the mechanisms and pathways whereby entrepreneurship3 can act towards one or more 
social and/or environmental issues that constitute the grand challenges.  
For several decades, scholars have studied the scope of organizations’ response to social 
and environmental needs and the different ways in which they address social issues. A large 
body of literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) studies the various forms of 
stakeholder-oriented firm actions such as charitable contributions, environmental protection, 
transparency, and others (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Margolis, 2009) and their relationship with firm-
level outcomes such as financial performance (Campbell, 2007; Rowley & Berman, 2000), 
shareholder returns (Flammer, 2015), firm valuation (Henisz, Dorobuntu, & Nartey, 2014; King 
& Lenox, 2001), customers’ willingness to pay (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), and reputation 
(Waddock, 2000). 
                                                          
3 In this dissertation, I use the definition of entrepreneurship described by Gartner (1990). Entrepreneurship includes 
the starting of new ventures and is concerned with those activities associated with becoming an owner-manager of a 
new firm.  
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In responding to social and environmental issues, firms often report their 
social/environmental performance in different ways, such as by declaring their Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI) (Hawn, Chatterji, & Mitchell, 2018), Corporate Equality Index 
(Cohen, Mohliver, & Hawn, 2020), B-Corp certification (Gehman, Grimes, & Cao, 2019) and 
other forms of environmental and social ratings (Avetisyan & Hockerts, 2016). Thus, firms 
adopting CSR or some form of social and environmental action declare their positive impact on 
society. However, in practice, such initiatives often differ from commercial activities in terms of 
work and skills involved in other firms’ activities. In corporate settings, corporate philanthropy 
or CSR teams may be isolated and separate from the commercial firm activities (Bode, Singh, & 
Rogan, 2015). Thus, in most commercial organizations, there is some distinction between the 
firms’ for-profit or commercial action and its socially-oriented action. However, this distinction 
is blurred with the emergence of organizations that aim to pursue both commercial and social 
action as a whole and not as separate intra-firm units.  
Taking firm action beyond CSR and declaration of social and environmental impact, 
Porter and Kramer (2011) emphasized the need and importance for business organizations to 
create “shared value.” Shared value refers to policies and operating practices that enhance a 
firm’s competitiveness while advancing the social conditions of the affected stakeholders. Porter 
and Kramer (2011) describe that by addressing social causes through viable business models, the 
form of business organizations called ‘social enterprises’ create shared value, and not just social 
or economic benefit. Battilana and Lee (2014) refer to social enterprises as market-based entities 
that pursue both social and financial missions. In other words, social enterprises attempt to fulfill 
their social goals through the business models and processes of commercial enterprises (Szegedi, 
Fülöp, & Bereczk, 2016). Thus, social entrepreneurship is different from CSR in that the 
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organization aims to address a social/environmental mission as its core function. In this 
dissertation, I study social entrepreneurship seeking to address social or environmental issues, 
through commercial means, i.e., while attempting to maximize profitability.  
In this chapter, I first describe social entrepreneurship through an overview of its 
literature. After that, I describe the context of my study and its relevance. I also introduce the gap 
in the extant literature, the broad areas that I study, and their importance. 
1.1. Social Entrepreneurship  
Battilana and Lee (2014) define social enterprises as market-based entities that pursue 
both social and financial missions. As described by Miller et al. (2012), social enterprises use 
commercial, market-based methods to address social and environmental issues. Thus, social or 
environmental missions are at the core of the organization’s purpose of existence, making them 
different from organizations pursuing CSR or those organizations that adopt social missions 
later.  
Several authors describe that the founders of social enterprises, i.e., social entrepreneurs, 
have played a key role in enhancing human development (e.g., Mair & Noboa, 2003; Martin & 
Osberg, 2007) through their ventures that may address poverty (e.g., micro-finance institutions), 
climate change (e.g., organizations addressing pollution, waste disposal, etc.), and others. These 
firms also bring about worldwide transformations by launching new organizations that serve a 
range of social needs (e.g., Elkington & Hartigan, 2008; Lasprogata & Cotton, 2003; Leadbeater, 
1997). Addressing social missions has traditionally been associated with non-profit or 
philanthropic organizations, while commercial or profit-seeking missions are associated with for-
profit firms (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Hsu, Hannan & Kocak, 2009). Thus, because social 
enterprises combine the missions of different pre-existing organizational forms, they are also 
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referred to as ‘mission-hybrids’ or ‘hybrid organizations’ (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana, 
Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012).  
An important point to note here is that literature describes several different forms of 
organizational hybridity. Organizations combining social and commercial missions are one form 
of hybrids. However, hybrids are not limited to firms blending commercial and social missions. 
Other forms of hybrids include public-private partnerships that incorporate elements from state, 
market, and civil societies (Jay, 2013) and institutions incorporating educational and industry 
logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010). Smith and Besharov (2019) describe how organizations can 
combine different identities, forms, and other core elements, making them hybrids. Battilana and 
Lee (2014) describe that independent organizations can combine activities, structures, and 
processes, making them hybrids. However, in this dissertation, I specifically refer to hybridity in 
the sense of combining social and commercial missions, i.e., mission hybridity (e.g., Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Kurland, 2018; Pache & Santos, 2013) within a single firm. Therefore, I use the 
term ‘social enterprise’ to refer to hybrid organizations of this form, referring to the same form 
of organization, i.e., an organization pursuing both financial and commercial missions 
simultaneously as defined by Battilana and Lee (2014).  
By using commercial market-based methods to serve social needs, these organizations 
blend the profitability motives of traditional for-profit firms with the social mission of non-
profits (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012). Scholars argue that social entrepreneurship is 
spreading and gaining prevalence in modern societies (Kraatz & Block 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). 
However, the existence and functioning of these organizations pose several questions in strategy 
research. For example, social enterprises pursue social and financial missions that are not 
entirely compatible by their very nature (Besharov & Smith, 2012). This incompatibility may 
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challenge their functioning or create questions about their legitimacy (Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 
2001).  
Prior research has attempted to uncover several dilemmas faced by social enterprises. For 
example, Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis (2011) suggest that hybrid organizations may have to 
incorporate antagonistic and incompatible practices. A supportive ecosystem may not exist for 
such organizations (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012). Different coalitions of employees 
favoring either social mission or financial mission may arise, leading to organizational breakup 
(Glynn, 2000; Pache & Santos, 2010). The presence of dual missions can negatively affect how 
audience members, i.e., employees, job seekers, investors, clients, and other direct stakeholders, 
evaluate firms (Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Hsu, 2006). Despite these challenges that arise from the 
pursuit of dual missions, social enterprises are present and growing in number across the world 
(Economist, 2009; Kraatz & Bock, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2013).  
The growth and prevalence of social enterprises have attracted the interest of scholars 
who study how organizations successfully strike a balance between the missions they combine. 
For example, Battilana and Dorado (2010) find that social enterprises may create a common 
organizational identity combining the dual mission to handle the tensions that may arise due to 
the missions. Gehman and Grimes (2017) find that the firms may promote their organizational 
category, i.e., their belonging to a certain pre-existing organizational form, differently depending 
on the distinctiveness and familiarity of the pre-existing categories. Kurland (2018) studies the 
different ways in which an organization adopts social missions to become a hybrid. Sharma, 
Beveridge, & Haigh (2018) describe how organizations change their practice configurations and 
the factors that explain the changes in practices. While these studies reveal valuable insights on 
social enterprises, there are still several gaps in our understanding of these organizations. For 
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example, we do not fully know about the nature of organizational processes or founding 
resources that help in the successful establishment of social enterprises or the sustenance of their 
dual missions. This dissertation is a study of key aspects of social entrepreneurship related to 
their establishment, sustenance, and the resources and practices that facilitate their success as 
hybrids. In other words, I study how social entrepreneurs establish and sustain dual missions.  
Another key gap that this dissertation addresses is the dearth of study of social enterprises 
in low- / low-middle-income countries. Most of the prior literature on social entrepreneurship 
pertains to these organizations in high-income countries. There is little information about such 
firms in low- / low-middle-income countries where social enterprises are equally, if not more 
important, given these countries’ social and economic needs. By studying social enterprises in 
low- / low-middle-income countries in different parts of the world, I describe the key factors and 
mechanisms that explain the establishment and sustenance of social enterprises and their dual 
missions.  
In the next section, I will explore the context of low- / low-middle-income countries and 
the need to study hybrid firms in these contexts.  
1.2. Low- / low-middle-income countries4 
Seminal research describes how “institutions determine the performance of economies” 
(North, 1990), implying that the presence of efficient institutions is key to the superior economic 
performance of firms (Schrammel, 2013). Efficient institutions address problems associated with 
                                                          
4 To describe countries as high-income, low-income, or low-middle-income, I use World Bank Country and Lending Groups 
classification and the World Bank Atlas method. Low-income economies are defined as those with a gross national income per 
capita of $1,035 or less. Low-middle-income countries are those with GNI per capita between $1,036 and $4,045. High-income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,536 or more. Prior literature (e.g., Cunha et al., 2013; Garud et al., 2013) refers 
to low-income and low-middle-income countries as ‘developing economies,’ and high-income countries as ‘developed 
economies.’  
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measuring and enforcing costs and rules in the markets which govern enterprises. Therefore, the 
presence or absence of established institutions impacts firms’ establishment and functioning.  
Mair and Marti (2009) describe that firms in low- / low-middle-income countries have to deal 
with shortcomings in the local institutions that enforce rules to facilitate profitable markets. 
Therefore, social enterprises in low- / low-middle-income countries may have different means 
and approaches than those in high-income countries.  
Other scholars describe several other characteristics associated with low- / low-middle-
income countries and how they affected firms. According to Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha (2005), 
low- / low-middle-income countries are a challenging context for entrepreneurial ventures. These 
contexts are characterized by resource constraints (Cunha et al., 2013; Garud et al., 2013). 
Further, limitations in supporting systems for economic activities can affect the establishment of 
new ventures (Choi, Lee, & Williams, 2011). Ahlstrom and Burton (2006) suggest that 
undeveloped markets pose limitations in entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain resources, thus 
aggravating the resource constraints in these regions. These limitations can affect firms, 
especially during their founding and early-stage development.  
At the early stages of establishment, new ventures face significant resource constraints 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Zahra & Bogner, 2000). Moreover, at early stages, firm success largely 
depends on the entrepreneur’s ability to obtain and deploy resources (Penrose, 1959).  The 
resource constraints, undeveloped markets, and institutional limitations common in low- / low-
middle-income countries pose significant challenges for enterprises. These challenges can affect 
social enterprises perhaps more significantly than they affect other enterprises because of their 
dual missions. These differences between the contexts of high-income and low- / low-middle-
income countries highlight the importance of studying social entrepreneurship in low- / low-
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middle-income countries. Moreover, the phenomenon of social entrepreneurship is relatively 
new and less recognized by business actors and audiences in low- / low-middle-income 
countries, and also less studied by academic scholars. This dissertation addresses this gap in the 
literature by making an inquiry on issues such as:  How do entrepreneurs establish social 
enterprises in low- / low-middle-income countries where institutional frameworks and resources 
may not be easily available?  What processes and practices enable social enterprises to address 
both social and financial missions in low- / low-middle-income countries? By answering these 
questions, the studies in this dissertation throw light on the key issues of this phenomenon in 
understudied contexts. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I will review the 
literature that drives my research. To understand hybrid firms’ establishment and sustenance, I 
will first describe the literature pertaining to the challenges that social enterprises face. I will 
then describe the methodology that I use in my studies. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will present the 
analysis and results of two studies that explain the different ways by which social enterprises 
address these and other challenges in low- / low-middle-income countries. In Chapter 5, I will 
summarize key findings and suggest themes for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
For most of the twentieth century, commercial or for-profit organizations were associated 
with the private sector, while public organizations and charities aiming to address societal needs 
were associated with the public or non-profit sectors. Thus, these two types of organizations, i.e., 
for-profit and non-profit organizations, were considered distinct (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
However, over the last three decades, the boundaries between these organizational forms have 
become blurred with the emergence of social enterprises which aim to fulfill profitability goals 
as well as certain societal needs (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012; Hoffman, Badiane, & 
Haigh, 2012). These organizations combine the financial and social missions of these different 
organizational forms. These hybrid firms combine elements such as efficiency in the use of 
resources and market-based tactics from conventional for-profit firms and values and social 
impact creation from non-profit or philanthropic firms (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012). 
For example, Stonyfield Farms, a for-profit firm, takes environmental sustainability into account 
in developing its organic dairy product. One might question whether it has more in common with 
Cargill, a conventional for-profit firm, or with the Rainforest Alliance, a non-profit aiming to 
promote sustainable agriculture (Hoffman, Badiane, & Haigh, 2012). Scholars consider these 
firms to be “both market-oriented and mission-centered” (Boyd et al., 2009).   
2.1. Challenges Arising from Dual Missions 
As described above, a combination of “market-orientation” and “mission-centricity” 
involves combining the missions, values, and tactics from organizational types that have been 
considered distinct historically. By combining these missions, social enterprises span two
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separate organizational categories that constitute the shared understandings of two social 
domains, i.e., an understanding of how different stakeholders interpret the firm’s purpose, 
intentions, and actions (Hsu, Hannan, & Kocak, 2009). Several scholars find that the category-
spanning nature can lead to a range of challenges inside and outside social enterprises. In other 
words, these firms combine the categories of different forms of organization but are not a well-
defined category yet. The lack of consensus of these firms’ category leads to difficulties in 
accessing resources from external actors and gives rise to internal challenges. In Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, I study one of the ways whereby firms can address such challenges. In Section 2.1. 
of Chapter 2, I review the literature on challenges related to the organizational category in 
section 2.1.1.  
2.1.1. Organizational Categories 
Vergne and Wry (2014) define organizational category as a socially constructed 
partitioning of organizations based on an understanding among external and internal stakeholders 
of a firm about its material and symbolic resources. These scholars argue that categories impose 
coherence on the social world by partitioning items into groups (Vergne & Wry, 2014).  Hsu, 
Hannan, and Kocak (2009) define categories as the shared understanding of the market that 
channels perceptions and actions of firms. They argue that actors and audiences rely on category 
boundaries to identify and interpret the actions of firms. In other words, organizational categories 
are "meaningful conceptual systems" that group organizations based on their shared attributes 
(Navis & Glynn, 2010). Category clarity occurs when there is a clear and meaningful consensus 
about the firms' features as understood and expected by its audience (Durand & Paolella, 2013), 
which includes its internal and external stakeholders. In this study, I use this definition of 
category clarity, and category ambiguity refers to the absence of a clear and meaningful 
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consensus about a firm’s features among its audience. Category ambiguity can give rise to 
significant tensions within a firm and between a firm and its external audience. To highlight the 
importance of organizational categories and the consequences of category ambiguity and related 
tensions, I review prior literature that studies these constructs. 
Organizational categories play an important role in firms’ economic life as they drive 
beliefs and expectations about organizations’ characteristics and behaviors (Durand & Paolella, 
2013). Categories shape the allocation of attention among various organizations (Zuckerman, 
1999; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). They also facilitate comparisons among firms in the same and 
different categories (Hsu & Hannan, 2005) and can be a source of strategic value (Granqvist, 
Grodal & Wooley, 2012). Firms may want to fit into a certain category to acquire social approval 
and resources (Zuckerman, 1999). For example, new ventures may associate themselves with 
existing categories to establish legitimacy (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Vergne (2012) shows 
that organizations manipulate how they signal their category to avoid a stigmatized identity. 
Zhao, Ishihara, & Lounsbury (2013) find that signaling membership in legitimate categories can 
offset penalties. Thus, there is scholarly evidence describing firm actions in response to category 
membership. 
While scholars describing the relationship between organizational categories and firm 
behavior highlight the importance of categories, a related set of studies describe the effect of 
organizational categories on audiences. Much like the term ‘stakeholder,’ ‘audience’ refers to a 
group of individuals or organizations related to the organization (Vergne & Wry, 2014). 
Audience members may provide an opinion about a certain industry as a whole, which can affect 
investor decisions, thus affecting the resources available to an entire category of firms (Hsu & 
Hannan, 2005). Association with certain controversial industry categories such as weapons, 
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tobacco, etc. (Jensen, 2010) can prompt outgroup members to keep their distance from firms to 
avoid penalties (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012). Bowers (2015) argues that category 
membership affects audiences’ evaluation outcomes contingent on the process of category 
evaluation. 
Clear organizational categories are important because the absence of category clarity 
leads to significant tensions within and outside the firm. The importance of category clarity lies 
in the resolution of tensions, which I study in Chapter 3. By category ambiguity, I refer to the 
absence of a clear organizational category through which audience members can interpret firm’s 
purpose, actions, and behavior. The relevance of category clarity is also evident in the literature 
that studies ambiguous categories and the tensions they entail, which I review below.  
Hsu (2006) suggests organizations having multiple goals have ambiguous categories as a 
result of which they may be less appealing to their audiences. Thus, ambiguous organizational 
categories and the tensions that arise within firms lead to several challenges within firms.  
Overall, if a firm’s organizational category appears ambiguous, the firm will find it difficult to 
draw support for its mission. The lack of support imposes a serious consequence as the firm’s 
performance may fall short of both social and financial goals.  
Prior literature shows that audiences have difficulty understanding categorical misfits or 
organizations that belong to multiple categories (Hsu, 2006; Whetten, 2006). As a result, 
audiences ignore firms (Zuckerman, 1999) or devalue firms that cannot be assigned readily in a 
system of existing classifications (Hsu, 2006; Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007). Firms with 
ambiguous categories receive less attention and legitimacy (Dobrev, Kim & Hannan, 2001).     
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The challenges arising from category ambiguity apply to social enterprises whose dual 
missions span pre-existing organizational categories (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2015), 
thereby making their categories ambiguous. Several scholars suggest that the category defined as 
“social enterprises” is not yet established and that they are constituents of incompatible pre-
existing organizational categories (Hsu, 2006; Pache & Santos, 2013; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 
2005). Their mission hybridity can generate conflicts over their organizational identity as 
understood by internal and external audiences (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Thus, social enterprises 
are subject to category ambiguity, i.e., lack of a clear and meaningful consensus about the firms' 
features as understood by its audience (Durand & Paolella, 2013). 
Indeed, scholars identify many challenges within social enterprises that can be traced to 
their category ambiguity. Subgroups within organizations can hold distinct values and beliefs 
(Besharov, 2014) associated with the different organizational categories. Pache and Santos 
(2010) describe how competing coalitions (i.e., separate coalitions representing the social 
mission and financial mission) may emerge in hybrid firms. Such coalitions can cause internal 
conflicts between organization members (Glynn, 2000), which then compromise organizational 
functioning (Fiol, Pratt & Connor, 2009), lead to decision-making paralysis (Pache & Santos, 
2010), and also organizational demise (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011).  
Organizations may resort to different solutions for these challenges, such as compromise 
(Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010), framing (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hersch, 2003), and 
creation of an organizational identity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Pache & Santos (2013) 
describe how firms use structure and practices to selectively couple aspects of social missions 
and commercial missions. Battilana, Sengul, Pache, and Model (2015) find that negotiation can 
mitigate conflict by enabling employees responsible for different missions to work through 
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disagreements. Jay (2013) describes sense-making that navigates different understandings of 
firm performance towards dual missions. Formalization and collaboration also serve as means to 
mitigate internal category conflict (Ramus, Vaccaro, & Brusoni, 2016). Besharov (2014) 
describes the processes of identification and dis-identification with an organization’s values that 
enable managers to mitigate conflicts.  These studies describe short-term responses to internal 
challenges arising from category-spanning nature.  
Apart from internal challenges, social enterprises face external challenges when they span 
categories.  Investors might view a social enterprise as risky because the management may 
prioritize the social mission over commercial goals (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Social enterprises 
may not be able to target their customers’ needs and may be poor fits with customers’ 
expectations. For example, Hsu, Hannan, & Kocak (2009) find that firms spanning multiple 
categories do not appeal to customers and ‘specialist’ firms that clearly belong to one category. 
Further, scholars also find that the pursuit of dual missions can cause organizations to succumb 
to ‘mission drift,’ i.e., domination of one mission over another (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; 
Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012).  
There are different means to overcome the external challenge associated with the 
category-spanning nature. Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair (2014) emphasize the role of 
organizational governance and governing boards to address conflicting goals and maintain the 
dual missions. Scholars find that firms often refrain from promoting category membership 
despite their efforts to obtain the membership (Carlos & Lewis, 2015; Delmas & Grant, 2014). 
Gehman and Grimes (2017) study promotional forbearance, i.e., organizations’ choice of not 
publicizing its category membership that it can make. They find that organizations selectively 
promote or avoid promoting their category depending on the category’s contextual 
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distinctiveness within the broader category, i.e., firms promote their category membership when 
the membership allows an organization to stand out among its peers. In other cases, when 
promoting membership makes their category more ambiguous, firms refrain from promoting the 
membership. Thus, promotional forbearance and selective promotion can serve as a means to 
address challenges associated with the category-spanning nature in social enterprises (Gehman & 
Grimes, 2017). Organizations may also leave or join categories to address concerns associated 
with category-spanning nature (Negro, Hannan, & Rao, 2010). Entering lenient categories, i.e., 
categories that allow for a broader range of fit, is another way to address challenges associated 
with category-spanning nature (Pontikes & Barnett, 2015).  
Another way to address challenges arising from category-spanning nature is to seek 
certifications. Certification serves as a salient means to denote category membership (Gehman & 
Grimes, 2017). Often, firms ‘self-categorize’ through claims to convey their membership into a 
certain category, thereby declaring ‘who they are’ as a firm (Kennedy, 2008; Pontikes, 2012). 
Third-party certifications are a means to clarify an organization’s category, which provides a 
more credible signal than self-categorization (Gehman & Grimes, 2017).  
As described earlier, category clarity” occurs when there is a clear and meaningful 
consensus about the firms' features as understood and expected by its audience (Durand & 
Paolella, 2013), which includes its internal and external stakeholders. Certifications can offer 
legitimacy and category clarity (Rao, 1994; Terlaak & King, 2006; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & 
Graffin, 2006) because through third-party certification, a firm’s efforts to belong to gain a 
semblance of objectivity (Gehman & Grimes, 2017; Vergne & Wry, 2014).  
While prior literature describes the challenges associated with category-spanning nature 
and means to address it, much remains to learn about the mechanisms that lead to category 
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clarity. Specifically, we do not know whether and how category membership and certification 
can help to alleviate tensions arising from the pursuit of dual goals. In this dissertation, I study 
how social enterprises address their category ambiguity through certification and the underlying 
mechanisms that lead to category clarification. I investigate how the processes underlying 
certification help firms address the conflict between the dual goals and allows them to be 
effective in their financial and social missions simultaneously. I describe the design and 
outcomes of this investigation in Chapter 3.   
2.2. Establishment of Social Enterprises in Low- / Low-Middle-Income Countries 
The rate of emergence of social enterprises varies across the globe. Social enterprises in 
low- / low-middle-income countries face special challenges. Given that these economies are still 
developing, their social needs can differ significantly from those in high-income countries. 
Social entrepreneurs have identified and devised innovative solutions to exploit the opportunities 
in low- / low-middle-income countries in profitable ways (Zahra et al., 2008). Social 
entrepreneurs may create or discover business opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) that 
balance social and economic interests (Elkington & Hartigan, 2008). In doing this, social 
entrepreneurs have played a key role in bringing about transformations in low- / low-middle-
income countries worldwide (e.g., Elkington & Hartigan, 2008; Lasprogata & Cotton, 2003; 
Leadbeater, 1997). In launching new organizations in low- / low-middle-income countries, social 
entrepreneurs serve various social and environmental needs, thereby enhancing human 
development (Mair & Noboa, 2003; Martin & Osberg, 2007).  
With the growth of social entrepreneurship to low- / low-middle-income countries, an 
emergent stream of literature describes the business context for these economies. Low- / low-
middle-income countries present the firm with resource constraints (Cunha et al., 2013). These 
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constraints create challenges for entrepreneurial ventures (Khanna, Palepu. and Sinha, 2005). For 
example, access to factor markets may be limited (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010). Similarly, Choi, 
Lee, and Williams (2011) suggest that market imperfections and limitations in the supporting 
systems for economic activities affect new ventures in low- / low-middle-income countries. 
Traditional market solutions may be impractical, costly, or complicated because of the depth and 
persistence of social problems (Zahra et al., 2008) in these contexts. As described in Chapter 1, 
the presence of institutional limitations and less developed factor markets aggravate the 
challenges involved in venture establishment. These conditions can negatively affect the chances 
of a prospective venture’s survival and success (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1977).  
Despite these challenges, we know that social enterprises are growing and spreading in 
low- / low-middle-income countries (Mair & Noboa, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009). With this growth 
and spread, social entrepreneurship and its globalization have emerged as important research 
topics. Zahra et al. (2008) identify the key factors that contribute to the global spread of social 
entrepreneurship include: global wealth disparity; the corporate social responsibility movement; 
market, institutional, and state failures; and technological advances. Barendsen and Gardner 
(2004) suggest that increased exposure to social and environmental problems around the world 
also contributes to the growth of international social entrepreneurship. With the knowledge that 
social problems and opportunities are often co-located with poverty, entrepreneurs seek to 
achieve to provide solutions (and create profits) by locating or operating near the regions of these 
problems (Zahra & George, 2002).  
 Researchers use different theories to frame their explanations of the international spread 
of social entrepreneurship. For example, Zahra et al. (2008) rely on regime theory (Krasner, 
1983) which asserts that when there are limitations in local institutions, social actors rely on their 
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shared understanding of the common concerns, needs, and norms of the region to create social 
ventures. Other scholars like McMullen and Bergman (2017) and Bacq and Alt (2018) use 
prosocial theory to explain social entrepreneurship and its outcomes in different parts of the 
world. This theory emphasizes the role of the altruistic agent in positively affecting the lives of 
others (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998).  
Regime theory explains why developing countries provide arenas for social 
entrepreneurship in developing countries. The prosocial theory explains why social entrepreneurs 
act with some level of altruism. While each theory informs my research, neither theory fully 
addresses the issues created by the joint pursuit of financial and social goals. Similar, neither 
theory directly considers issues related to the mechanisms involved in the spread of social 
entrepreneurship from high-income countries to low- or low-middle-income countries. 
2.2.1. Reverse Migration 
Business scholars have largely overlooked the phenomenon of migration of entrepreneurs 
from high-income countries to low- / low-middle-income countries. "Reverse migration" is a 
term that I use to refer to describe the migration of individuals (more specifically, entrepreneurs) 
from high-income to low- / low-middle-income countries. Scholars in economics have written 
numerous books and book chapters on migrant entrepreneurs (e.g., Yeung, 2002; Yokohama & 
Birchley, 2018, 2020; Kim, 2003). Migrant entrepreneurs from high-income countries have 
founded several social enterprises in low- / low-middle-income countries across Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa. Several authors in the popular media have also described this phenomenon 
(e.g., Dalai, 2015 and Areddy, 2019 in The Wall Street Journal; Wassener, 2012 in The New 
York Times). These studies provide compelling details about these firms. They provide limited 
insight into how these founders, or their firms, address the challenges of hybrid identity.  
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Highlighting the prevalence of entrepreneurs migrating to low- / low-middle-income 
countries is a study conducted by an impact investment fund called Village Capital. This 
investment fund found that 90% of the capital invested in East Africa in 2015-2016 went to 
businesses having one or more North American or European founders (Peacock & Mungai, 
2019). Several trade associations also manifest the prevalence of this phenomenon (e.g., 
InterNations, Korean-Mongolian Business Association, French Partners' investment platform for 
French entrepreneurs in South East Asia). Other resources available to these migrant 
entrepreneurs include Beeleev online media and networking platform, Special Education 
Network and Inclusion Association, and The Expat Lifeline (International Diagnostic Solutions, 
2020).The rapid growth and transformation of low- / low-middle-income countries (Seguino, 
2000) portend a growing role for reverse migration. Hereafter, I refer to the term “reverse 
migrant” or “RM” to refer to migrants from high-income countries who have founded social 
enterprises in low- / low-middle-income countries. 
Although there has been little research on RM-entrepreneurship, Zahra et al. (2008) 
discuss some insights on entrepreneurs, regardless of their origin, locating in high-income 
countries. They suggest that the limitations in the availability of local resources impede social 
entrepreneurs from locating solely in the developing world. Safety, educational opportunities, 
and standard of living considerations can discourage social entrepreneurs and their staff from 
migrating to low- / low-middle-income countries (Zahra et al., 2008). However, despite these 
considerations, RM-entrepreneurs have not only migrated to the low- / low-middle-income 
countries but also established successful ventures. Improved telecommunications infrastructure 
like the internet may help overcome the challenges of location and serve as a bridge between 
entrepreneurial individuals and the low- / low-middle-income countries (Zahra et al., 2018).  
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In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I present a study of RM-founded new social ventures. 
Social entrepreneurship can refer to ventures started by independent entrepreneurs or by 
corporations (Prahalad, 2006). York and Lenox (2014) refer to these two types of enterprises as 
de novo firms, i.e., ventures started by independent ventures started by entrepreneurs, and de alio 
firms, i.e., ventures started by diversifying incumbents. In this study on reverse migration, I am 
specifically referring to de novo social enterprises established by independent entrepreneurs.  
RM-founded social enterprises lack any prior connection with a previously existing incumbent. 
Thus, these firms face challenges of conventional new ventures (liabilities of newness), as well 
as other challenges that may arise in low- / low-middle-income countries (liabilities of 
foreignness) and due to their mixed missions (liabilities of hybridity). In the following sub-
section, I review the literature on the Resource Mobilization framework that helps explain the 
establishment of new ventures.  
2.2.2. Resource Mobilization 
New ventures face significantly more resource constraints than resource-rich incumbents 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Zahra & Bogner, 2000). These constraints are especially relevant for de 
novo enterprises as they lack parent organizations that might provide resources (York & Lenox, 
2014). Particularly in the incipient stages, firm success largely depends on the entrepreneur's 
ability to deploy resources (Penrose, 1959), mainly financial capital, human capital, and social 
capital (Bourdieu & Richardson, 1986). I describe these in further detail below.  
(i) Financial capital: Financial capital includes financial and physical assets that are convertible 
to cash (Bourdieu & Richardson, 1986; Bates, 1990). Entrepreneurs often use their personal 
wealth to fulfill the need for financial capital at the early stages of venture establishment 
(Chandler & Hanks, 1998). Firms may resort to bootstrapping techniques to mitigate the need 
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for financial capital (Bhidé, 1992; Ebben and Johnson, 2006). Seeking investments from 
financiers is a common way to acquire financial capital (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986; 
Watson, 2006). Impact investment funds (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011), governments 
(Wang, Li, & Furman, 2017), benefactors (Howell, 2019), and philanthropic foundations 
(Moore, 1999; Zhao, 2012) provide other sources of financial capital available to social 
enterprises.  
(ii) Human capital: Human capital resides within individuals. Education, professional 
experiences, and personal talents contribute to human capital (Becker, 2009; Autio, Sapienza 
& Almeida, 2000). Founders often gain relevant skills, knowledge, or experience before 
venture formation, which then helps them run the venture (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Segal, 
Borgia, & Schoenfeld, 2010). A founder’s work experience in the local region can be a 
valuable source of human capital (Mata & Alves, 2016). Employees and co-founders are other 
avenues to obtain human capital (Aldrich & Kim, 2007).   
(iii) Social capital: Social capital is the sum of the actual and potential resources derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). Birley (1985) suggested that informal ties, including friends and families, and formal 
ties, such as banks, accountants, etc., play significant roles in new venture creation. Incubators 
can serve as a source of connection with the relevant industry and stakeholders (Lasrado et al., 
2015). Universities and alumni networks can also serve as sources of social capital (McAdam, 
Miller, & McAdam, 2016). Emphasizing the role of social capital, Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) 
argue that entrepreneurship is “embedded in the networks of continuing social relations.”  
Collectively, each of these three forms of capital not only forms the foundation of firms’ 
long-term strategy (Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998), but they are also essential for the firms’ 
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survival (Venkataraman, Van de Ven, Buckeye, & Hudson, 1990). Prior studies suggest that in 
order to survive, firms must rapidly acquire or develop each of these forms of capital (Freeman 
et al., 1983; Mens et al., 2011; Clough et al., 2019). 
 RM-founders need financial, human, and social capital to establish social enterprises.5 
Additionally, they may need “cultural capital” which consists of the “cultural habits and 
dispositions” (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979) embedded in the host countries. The non-nativity of 
RM-founders in the local context may affect their access to these resources, as has been the case 
for immigrant entrepreneurs who establish firms in high-income countries. The literature on 
immigrant entrepreneurs suggests that immigrant entrepreneurs establish ethnic enclaves, i.e., 
immigrant groups that organize enterprises serving their own ethnic market or population 
(Portes, 1981), or work with other co-ethnic immigrants (Uzzi, 1997; Aldrich et al., 1985). But 
unlike immigrants from developing countries (Portes, 1981), RM-founders have few ethnic 
enclaves or co-ethnic immigrants in host countries. Thus, the solutions available to 
conventionally studied immigrant entrepreneurs may not apply to RM-entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
they may lack other forms of resources from their host countries or other limitations arising from 
their non-native status. These challenges make the phenomenon of reverse migration distinct and 
suggest a need to understand how these social entrepreneurs mobilize resources. 
Resource mobilization by RM-entrepreneurs provides the path to overcoming the 
prevailing resource constraints (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Cunha et al., 2013), market 
imperfections (Choi, Lee, & Williams, 2011), and limitations in the factor markets (Ahlstrom & 
                                                          
5 My use of reverse migrants defines the reverse migrants as founders moving from high-income nations to low-
/low-middle-income countries. These founders may lack direct experiences in the developing country and may have 
be from different ethnic backgrounds. This is in contrast to some definitions which refer to reverse migration as the 
process of immigrants to high-income countries returning to their country of origin. 
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Burton, 2010) inherent in the developing context.  Despite these challenges, RM-
entrepreneurship is present and sometimes successful across the world. I use the resource 
mobilization framework to provide insight into how RM social entrepreneurs attain entry and 
success.  
In connection with the resource mobilization framework, Bhagavatula et al. (2010) note 
that social capital or human capital alone cannot completely explain the entrepreneurial 
mobilization of resources. Interactions between different forms of capital need to be explored to 
understand the establishment of enterprises more holistically. In the study described in Chapter 
4, I take into account each of these three forms of capital and their interplay to analyze differing 
resource configurations for successful social ventures. I measure their success based on annual 
revenues.  
With this study, I investigate the strategies of firms founded via reverse migration and 
uncover a mechanism that contributes to the spread of social entrepreneurship. I also address a 
gap in the literature regarding the conditions that contribute to the spread of social 
entrepreneurship. Researchers have not described in adequate depth the kinds of resources and 
their configurations that enable social enterprise success in emerging economies. By 
investigating these resources and their configurations, I contribute to literature highlighting the 
growing global reach of social ventures.  
In the following section, I describe the research methodologies that I use to conduct the 
research on the topics mentioned above related to social entrepreneurship in low- / low-middle-
income countries.  
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2.3. Research Methodologies 
The phenomenon of social entrepreneurship is relatively new in low- / low-middle-
income countries. Theory building helps us understand novel and understudied phenomena 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Corley and Gioia (2011) suggest that in organizational study, informed 
theory building is as important as theory testing in explaining organizational phenomena. Prior 
scholars have used qualitative research to develop theory about a wide range of topics (e.g., 
Weick, 1993, Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), such as organizational structuration in sense-making 
the effect of an organization’s image on individuals’ motivations. Similarly, this dissertation 
aims to explain social entrepreneurship by comparing prior literature with field data (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989). This analytical process enables the identification and discovery 
of relevant concepts that can then guide the creation and validation of constructs.  
Qualitative methods are well suited to reveal concepts and constructs relevant for novel 
contexts (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Therefore, this dissertation employs qualitative 
research for two key purposes, (i) to identify concepts that explain the phenomenon of social 
entrepreneurship in low- / low-middle-income countries and (ii) to identify the inter-relationships 
between these concepts to explain how organizations overcome the contextual challenges 
involved in social entrepreneurship.  
In this section, I will first provide an overview of qualitative methodologies and their 
relevance. Then, I will explain the two qualitative methods that I use in this dissertation, namely 
(i) inductive analysis and (ii) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). I will also highlight key 




Qualitative methods are well suited to answer the ‘how’ type of questions (Barley, 1990) 
and to uncover underlying mechanisms that explain organizational processes. I combine different 
qualitative methods (explained later) with “grounded theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which 
provides detailed theoretical descriptions of concepts from prior literature. By capturing the 
concepts from prior literature, grounded theory helps discover and develop the other novel 
concepts and their inter-relationship to explain organizational phenomena (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). To understand the organizational phenomena of social enterprises, I collect qualitative 
data from founders, employees, and other relevant stakeholders of social enterprises. The 
primary source of data for this type of research often comes from interviews (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013). I use interview data to develop case studies and then combine this data with 
other sources such as archival information from websites, social media pages, and publicly 
available documents and videos (Eisenhardt, 1989). With the help of analytical methods that 
provide systematic conceptual and analytical discipline, I interpret the data and use the insights 
to explain the underlying processes and mechanisms (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Social 
enterprises address and resolve the key challenges they face.  
These analytical methods are explained in the sub-sections below.  
2.3.1. Inductive analysis 
In Chapter 3, I present a study of how social enterprises obtain the benefits of clarity 
despite their hybrid organizational category and how they address the conflict between the dual 
goals. To uncover the concepts, relationships, and mechanisms that enable category clarity, I use 
qualitative inductive methodology (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Straus & Corbin, 1998) described 
by Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2013). This method captures concepts relevant to human 
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organizational experience in a systematic, inductive manner, using grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This method of inductive analysis provides a holistic 
approach to inductive concept development that balances concept development as well as 
analytical rigor (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).  
This method was first described by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) and then by Gioia, 
Thomas, Clark, and Chittipeddi (1994) and Gioia and Thomas (1996). Later, several other 
scholarly works such as Nag, Corley, and Gioia (2007), Harrison and Corley (2011), and Nag 
and Gioia (2012) refined the initial descriptions. In this dissertation, I conduct the inductive 
analysis as per the descriptions of Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2013), which is the most recent 
description of this method.  
This method builds on the assumption that the people who construct the organization and 
its processes are knowledgeable agents, i.e., the individual actors can explain their thoughts, 
actions, intentions, and activities. Thus, the researcher’s task involves giving voice to the 
informants and reporting the concepts. This method also relies on the researcher's ability to 
interpret and find patterns in the data (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).  
The inductive analysis depends on the use of multiple data sources to answer the 
specified research question. Semi-structured interviews are at the core of this process as they 
serve as a useful means to obtain both retrospective and real-time information from the people 
involved in the phenomenon being studied (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
suggest that the interview protocol be revised as research progresses which may even imply 
revising the research question. I followed these suggestions and revised the protocol during the 
data collection stage. I iterated between theory and data several times before I finalized the firm 
sample and research question (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Moreover, I tried to overlap data 
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analysis with data collection as recommended by seminal works in qualitative research (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Van Maanen, 2006). This overlap provides a headstart in data analysis and 
facilitates revisions in the data collection protocol (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, I collected data 
until I reached “theoretical saturation,” i.e., a point where no new themes emerged upon the 
collection of additional data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Following data collection, the process of inductive analysis takes place in three stages, 
which involves collecting additional data as required (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). In the 
first-order analysis, the researcher allows the data to convey the important categories (Suddaby, 
2006). As many as 50 to 100 categories may emerge from the data. These categories are referred 
to as “first-order concepts,” which largely constitute the same terms and phrases used by the 
informants. Further, in the second stage of the analysis, called the second-order analysis, the 
researcher looks for similarities and differences among the first-order concepts (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) and looks for broader concepts within the theoretical realm (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013). With a particular focus on nascent concepts that may not have referents in prior 
literature (Corley & Gioia, 2004), the researcher clusters similar concepts into “second-order 
themes.” The culmination of the concepts and themes is attained once the researcher reaches the 
theoretical saturation explained above (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Then, by situating these themes 
into the study’s overall narrative, including prior literature and theories, the researcher distills the 
second order themes into fewer “aggregate dimensions” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Gioia, Corley, 
& Hamilton, 2013).  
Upon completing first-order concepts, second-order themes, and the aggregate 
dimensions, the researcher builds the “data structure.” The data structure is a configuration of the 
data that explains the progress from informant terms to the themes used for analysis (Pratt, 
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2008). It also represents the progressive abstraction from the raw data to the themes and 
dimensions that explain or build theory. Then, the contents from this data structure are used to 
build the “grounded theory model” that shows the dynamic relationships between the themes and 
dimensions that explain the phenomena and data-to-theory connections (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013). Finally, the researcher explains the results depicted in the grounded theory 
model with the help of the interview and other qualitative data. This involves explaining exactly 
what was communicated by the informants and how it led to the induction of concepts, themes, 
and dimensions (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).  
This methodology was used to study social enterprises and how they address the 
challenges related to their category ambiguity. In Chapter 3, I explain this study in further detail 
and describe the findings on how social enterprises clarify their category and address dual 
missions simultaneously. 
2.3.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)   
 In Chapter 4, to increase our understanding of social entrepreneurship, I study social 
enterprises founded by RM-entrepreneurs. I examine how RM-entrepreneurs mobilize resources 
required to establish social ventures in low- / low-middle-income countries. Further, I describe 
which resource combinations allow them to be successful. Again, within the domain of social 
entrepreneurship, reverse migration is a novel phenomenon. This suggests the need for a 
qualitative study to build theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007). Qualitative data allows the researcher to gain a deep understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the challenges faced by each company, the founders’ capabilities, and 
the way the social enterprises form and evolve. In this study, because I am interested in 
identifying the resource combinations leading to a specific outcome, i.e., firm success, I choose 
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qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), which reveals configurations leading to a certain 
outcome. I explain this method in further detail below. 
QCA reveals relationships among variables that combine in complex ways to explain an 
outcome and model equifinality, i.e., the principle that multiple solutions can lead to a particular 
outcome (Fiss, 2007). This is an important consideration because RM-entrepreneurs may have 
different approaches to mobilize resources, and multiple resource combinations may lead to 
similar outcomes. QCA allows for this possibility.  QCA is different from conventional linear 
regression in its objectives and means (Misangyi et al., 2017). Linear regression assumes 
linearity, additive effects, single paths, and competing explanations among independent variables 
to isolate the independent effects of individual variables. 
In contrast, QCA reveals synergistic relationships among variables that combine in 
complex ways to explain an outcome (Ragin, 2000; 2008; Fiss, 2007). These relationships are of 
particular interest in this study since RM-founders have different resources, different methods to 
overcome their constraints and use resources in varied ways. There may be many paths to the 
establishment of a social enterprise. 
QCA accounts for the distinctive nature of each case without looking for central 
tendencies in the data (Ragin, 2000; 2008). Thus, it enables the study of each case separately 
while comparatively analyzing the different resource combinations. Further, because QCA is a 
Boolean algebra-based method, it is useful for moderately sized samples (Rihoux & Ragin, 
2008) that were available for this study. 
Conducting QCA begins with calibration of set membership, i.e., separating cases into 
meaningful groups (Ragin, 2008). Based on the values of the outcome variables, the researcher 
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assigns different values between 0 (indicating absence of the condition) and 1 (indicating 
presence of the condition). The next step in QCA is identifying factors or explanatory conditions 
that might lead to higher (or lower) levels of the outcome. By studying each case in-depth, the 
researcher assigns values to the explanatory conditions ranging between 0 (indicating absence of 
the condition) and 1 (indicating presence of the condition). QCA takes into account all the 
possible combinations of the explanatory conditions. Therefore, the addition of each explanatory 
condition increases the number of combinations exponentially (i.e., 2k, where k is the number of 
conditions). A very large number of explanatory conditions complicates the analysis. Therefore, 
the researcher must identify the most important explanatory conditions from existing theory and 
data (Misangyi et al., 2017). After coding all the explanatory conditions and the outcome, the 
researcher creates the “truth table,” which describes all the possible combinations of the 
explanatory conditions, to find the configurations that may be associated with the outcome 
(Ragin, 2000; 2008). Then, the fsQCA algorithm reveals the combinations of explanatory 
conditions associated with the desired (or undesired) outcome (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; 
Ragin, 2000; 2008). Finally, the researcher describes these results with the help of prior research, 
theories, and data. 
This methodology helped me identify how RM-entrepreneurs entering low- / low-middle-
income countries mobilized resources and the resource combinations relevant to firm success. 
Chapter 4 explains this study in further detail and describes the findings about resource 
mobilization for social enterprise establishment.
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CHAPTER 3: 
CHALLENGES IN SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: CATEGORY AMBIGUITY 
 
Abstract 
There has been increasing scholarly interest in hybrid organizations that seek to address 
dual, i.e., social and financial missions. As these organizations span the categories of for-profit 
and non-profit firms, they can encounter several internal and external tensions related to the 
fulfillment of the missions. Literature does not fully describe whether, and if yes, how 
certification might help firms clarify their organizational category to resolve these tensions. This 
chapter describes the changes that organizations undergo as they become certified as “B Corps” 
for their social/environmental action.by B-Lab, a US-based non-profit.  
Using qualitative inductive analysis and multi-case study methodology, I study the 
organizational-level and individual-level changes triggered by B Corp certification. I find that 
several process changes and perception changes occur at the level of (i) the founder, (ii) the 
employees, and (iii) the external audience comprised of the prospective employees, 
clients/customers, and investors. These changes lead to firm characteristics that enable category 
clarity and reinforce the synergy between the financial and social missions. These post-
certification attributes help in the resolution of internal and external tensions.  
I explain how the certification helps create firm behaviors that lead to internal and 
external category clarity. I contribute to the literature on organizational categories by describing
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how certification can reduce category ambiguity and the literature on social entrepreneurship by 
suggesting how certification can help them attain dual missions.  
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3.1. Introduction 
Historically, pursuits of social and financial missions have been considered incompatible 
(Galaskiewicz & Barringer, 2012) because these missions have been associated with distinct 
organizational categories for non-profit and for-profit firms, respectively (Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Hsu, Hannan & Kocak, 2009). Categories are defined as the shared understandings of the market 
that channel perceptions and actions of firms (Hsu, Hannan & Kocak, 2009). Audience members 
use categories to evaluate and assign an identity to firms (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). But social 
enterprises that pursue both social and financial missions span these two categories (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014). This created category ambiguity because a distinct organizational category for social 
enterprises is not established yet (Gehman & Grimes, 2017; Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
This category ambiguity can be a source of several tensions for social enterprises (Glynn, 
2000, Pache & Santos, 2013). Because these organizations lack a distinct category of their own, 
they seem less valid than organizations in well-defined categories, and are less likely to be 
ignored (Zuckerman, 1999) and may be under-valued (Hsu, 2006; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005) 
by their target audience. They can be less appealing to their audience (Hsu, 2006) and lack 
legitimacy (Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999). The category-spanning nature 
also increases a firm’s risk of competition (Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001). They may be 
mismatched with their audience's expectations (Hsu, Hannan, & Kocak, 2009). For example, 
external audience members such as profit-seeking investors may view social enterprises as a 
risky investment (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Thus, organizations with ambiguous categories face a 
range of challenges in relation to their external audience.  
An organization’s ambiguity can also lead to several internal tensions. Employees can 
hold different values and beliefs. The pursuit of dual missions causes the employees to 
35 
subdivide, with subgroups valuing these missions differently (Besharov, 2014). Prior research 
finds that competing coalitions favoring each mission arise (Pache & Santos, 2010), leading to 
conflicts between members (Glynn, 2000). These conflicts can hamper organizational 
functioning (Fiol, Pratt, & Connor, 2009) and decision-making (Pache & Santos, 2010) and 
potentially lead to the organization’s failure (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Sometimes, these 
organizational conflicts cause one mission to dominate over another, thereby creating a ‘mission 
drift’ which threatens the survival of a firm as a social enterprise (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; 
Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012). In sum, these internal and external challenges can 
become so dramatic that scholars describe social enterprises as “arenas of contradiction” (Pache 
& Santos, 2013) and as a “locus of disorder” (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
Despite the challenges arising from the category-spanning nature, social enterprises are 
gaining prevalence across many economies (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Interesting questions face 
scholars as they study the social entrepreneurship’s rise in prevalence. How do these firms 
manage these tensions? How do firms clarify their category? The term “category clarity” applies 
to an organization when there is a clear and meaningful consensus about the firms’ features as 
understood and expected by its audience. Clear categories allow audiences to navigate better 
across firms (Durand & Paolella, 2013). This paper aims to identify how third-party certification 
help resolve the problems faced by firms that lack the benefit of category quality due to their 
hybrid nature.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I will first review the literature on how 
some firms address issues related to category ambiguity and the potential role of firm 
certification in addressing category ambiguity. This leads to the research question that I address 
in this study. Then, I describe the methods and the context of my study, followed by the data and 
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analysis. Finally, I describe the results. I conclude with the discussion of the results from my 
analysis.     
3.2. Literature Review 
Several scholars describe how some social enterprises overcome these challenges. For 
example, organizational governance and governing boards can play a crucial role in maintaining 
dual missions and addressing category ambiguity (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). In this 
case, governing bodies monitor forms of tension that might arise and provide a mechanism for 
minimizing the impact of the tension. In other cases, organizations selectively leave or join 
categories (Negro, Hannan, & Rao, 2010) and selectively promote their category (Gehman & 
Grimes, 2017). In a sense, these organizations obscure the perception of ambiguity through the 
selective use of information.  
Scholars also show that certifications enhances the credibility of a social enterprise. 
Vergne and Wry (2014) discuss how a firm’s efforts to belong to a certain category create 
perceptions of objectivity and increase audience acceptance when a third-party endorses the firm.  
While certification can enhance credibility and legitimacy (Wade et al., 2006) within some 
spheres of social activity and thereby lead to firm growth (Terlaak & King, 2006), we do not 
know the specific mechanisms by which certification decreases category ambiguity for internal 
and external audiences. In this paper, I examine how earning certification affects organizational 
processes, which then create clarity for that organization.6  
                                                          
6 It is important to recall that the term “an organizational category” is one in which the set of organizations act in 
similar ways. It is the homogeneity of practices that assures understanding and acceptance of the practices by 
internal and external audiences. Identification with the set of practices creates the clarity. Social enterprises have not 
achieved a state of homogeneity, which creates the condition of organizational ambiguity. Some firms within this 
category dominated by ambiguity reduces the impact of the ambiguity via certification, which creates clarity of that 
organization (but not for the full set of organizations engaged in social enterprise).   
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I focus on B-Corp (“Benefit-Corp”) certification as a means of reducing the impact of 
category ambiguity associated with the hybrid nature of social enterprises. Certified B 
Corporations are for-profit social enterprises verified by B Lab, a non-profit organization 
headquartered in the US. B Lab certifies firms based on the value they create for non-
shareholding stakeholders, including their employees, the local community, and the environment 
(Hiller, 2013). The B Lab sets a multi-dimensional threshold for the firm’s social performance, 
tested through the B-Impact Assessment. Firms that seek to be “B-Corp Certified,” i.e., to 
become “B-Corps,” undergo this B-Impact Assessment, which requires completion of a 
questionnaire involving detailed questions about the firm and its activities. If the firm scores 80 
or above on a scale of 200, they become eligible for certification (B-Corporation - Certification 
Requirements, 2020). Then, the firm needs to pay a certain fee to become a B-Corp (Kim, 
Karlesky, Myers, & Schifeling, 2016) and commit to incorporating multiple stakeholders' 
interests. Thus, although this certification is solely for for-profit firms, B-Corp certification 
emphasizes the fulfillment of social and environmental missions more than commercial missions. 
The firms are not required to measure or report their shareholder value except through their B 
Impact Assessment scores. The firm commits equal attention to the pursuit of profit and specific 
forms of social goods.  
Prior studies show that B-Corp certification can alter firm practices and routines for 
firms. Certification influences firms’ evaluation of their prosocial activities and opportunities 
(Conger et al., 2017). Firms become endorsed for their prosocial impact through B-Corp 
certification (Sharma, Beveridge, & Haigh, 2018). Kurland (2018) studies how a corporation 
adopts new social missions when transitioning from a traditional purely for-profit model to a 
benefit corporation model. However, these papers study the changes in traditional for-profit 
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firms which become social enterprises by adding social missions to the profit mission. These 
studies do not describe the changes that result from B-Corp certification for firms that adopt 
social missions before they became B-Corp certified. Additionally, they do not describe whether 
and how certification processes lead to reduced category ambiguity and resolution of 
organizational tensions. Unlike prior studies, my focus is not on adopting social logics, but on 
the impacts of certification as they might reshape both the social and profit mission for these 
firms. By studying the certification process in the organizations that are already are social 
enterprises, I examine changes that result from the B-Corp certification rather than from the 
adoption of a specific social mission. I study companies that are born social rather than 
companies that become social sometime after their founding. 
Broadly, this study aims to address the puzzle of how social enterprises manage the 
tensions arising from their presence in an ambiguous category. Specifically, I study how third-
party certification, i.e., B-Corp certification, enables a social enterprise to clarify its category 
internally and externally. I aim to answer the research question: how does certification play a 
role in clarifying the organizational category to the internal and external audiences of social 
enterprises? 
This study responds to several calls for research. Gehman and Grimes (2017) call for 
scholars to explore how hybrid organizations respond to the potential opportunity or challenge of 
pursuing dual goals. In this paper, I study how B-Corp certification can enable firms to respond 
to such opportunities and challenges. Battilana and Lee (2014) recommend that scholars 
investigate formalized organizational processes used to balance dual goals. I study the 
formalized certification process and how these contributed to the achievement of a balance 
across dual goals. Battilana and Lee (2014) also suggest that scholars study the role of founders 
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and hybrid firms’ leaders. By studying the founders’ role during and after B-Corp certification, I 
respond to these calls for research. 
3.3. Research Context 
I study how certification influences organizational changes in hybrid organizations in 
South Asia. The setting of emerging economies of South Asia provides new theoretical insights 
for three reasons. First, prior research suggests that firms in low- / low-middle-income countries 
have to deal with institutional limitations that may not fully enforce rules for efficient markets 
(Desa, 2011; Mair and Marti, 2009). Moreover, limitations in the factor markets lead to resource 
constraints in low- / low-middle-income countries because entrepreneurs cannot easily obtain the 
resources they need (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Mair and Marti, 2009). Institutional gaps and 
resource constraints make it difficult for hybrid firms in this region to demonstrate legitimacy 
through institutional means (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This makes certification particularly 
important in South Asia. Conversations with several hybrid organizations, including non-
certified firms, suggest that in this setting, there are few, if any, avenues available for firms to 
clarify their dual missions to internal and external audiences. 
Second, the phenomenon of firms pursuing both financial and social goals is relatively 
new and unestablished in South Asia. For example, one informant from a non-B-Corp hybrid 
firm stated: “Social entrepreneurship or hybrid firms are a new concept here. Most people don’t 
even know what it means.” Another non-B-Corp informant shared that “people often confuse our 
social mission with government-enforced mandatory corporate social responsibility 
investments.” These statements exemplify the nascent state of social entrepreneurship in South 
Asia. In this context, the internal and external audiences, such as employees or investors, will 
have difficulty understanding and supporting the firm. This shows the presence of category 
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ambiguity with regard to social entrepreneurship in the region. Given the limitations in the local 
institutions and resource constraints, organizations in this region may have limited means to 
clarify their category. Therefore, using the context of low/lower-middle income economies is of 
theoretical relevance. This is because studying these contexts sheds light on how firms can 
clarify their category with limited institutional means to do so.  
Third, changes specifically induced by certification are difficult to assess in a mature-
economy setting due to the confounding effects of institutional and social influences. The 
novelty of social entrepreneurship in this part of the world significantly reduces the chances of 
such influences. Also, the number of certified B-Corps in South Asia, i.e., seven (as of 2019 
when the data for this paper was collected), is within the range that Eisenhardt (1989) 
recommends for case study research. These organizations represented the entire population of 
relevant firms. The study includes B Corps of varied sizes across different industries. This 
variation increases the chances that insights about the impact of certification will have validity in 
multiple industrial contexts. The use of a specific geographical context also controls extraneous 
variation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, I limited this study to one region. 
3.4. Methodology 
Given the recent emergence of social entrepreneurship and B-Corp certification in South 
Asia, I analyze the firms qualitatively (Eisenhardt, 1989). Qualitative study lends itself well to 
answering ‘how’ type of questions (Barley, 1990) and building theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Within the theory-building type of qualitative research, 
Sandberg and Alvesson (2020) describe several types of theory, such as explaining, 
comprehending, ordering, enacting, and provoking theories. In this study, I develop 
comprehending type of theory in that I provide a qualified understanding of the organizational 
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phenomenon (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2020) of certification. I examine how the certification 
process affects the organization and relevant internal and external actors’ interpretation of the 
firm. To this end, I use qualitative inductive methodology (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Straus & 
Corbin, 1998) described by Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2013). This method is described in 
detail in Section 2.3.1. Inductive Analysis.  
3.5. Data and Analysis 
3.5.1. Data Collection 
Data collection followed a flexible and emergent path. I collected information from 
various sources (Gephart, 2013; Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013). In-person interviews 
constitute the main source of data. The entire data collection process involved travel to seven 
cities across India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. I received the Mahatma Gandhi Fellowship 
funded by the Carolina Asia Center and UNC Sangam, which I used for this travel. The process 
of data collection took place in three stages described below and in Figure 1.  
The first stage involved “Preliminary Exploration” (See Figure 1). I began exploring the 
overall phenomenon of social entrepreneurship in South Asia. Through personal and professional 
contacts, I reached out to several entrepreneurs, investors, academicians, and professionals active 
in the social and hybrid organizations domain. After 18 early-stage discussions with various 
actors in this space, I confirmed that this was indeed a region where this phenomenon of social 
entrepreneurship was new and not fully understood by most people. The actions of these new 
hybrids were interpreted as acts of government-enforced corporate social responsibility 
(Economist, 2009; Economic Times, 2014) or as philanthropic donations by firms. This novelty 
made it an ideal setting to study how hybrid firms resolved problems induced by category 
ambiguity.  
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During the Preliminary Exploration stage, I defined criteria to ensure that the firms 
chosen are indeed hybrid organizations. I shortlisted firms as candidates for study based on (i) 
announcements of social/environmental mission(s) on the firm's website and social media, and 
(ii) measurement and declaration of social/environmental impact in the public domain (via the 
website, social media, or third-party endorsement). These criteria and the firm selection process 
were especially important given the novelty of hybrid missions for organizations in the region. 
The first criterion indicated commitment towards a certain social/environmental mission as a for-
profit firm (Battilana & Lee, 2014). The second criterion indicated that their missions moved 
beyond mere self-categorization (Vergne & Wry, 2014). I used these criteria to identify firms for 
“Case Selection,” i.e., the next stage of data collection (see Figure 1). 
Using the criteria mentioned above, I identified 45 hybrid organizations across South 
Asia. At this point, I arranged for several in-person meetings and telephonic discussions with 
firm founders and managers across India, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. This step 
involved 38 in-person meetings and 12 phone discussions. During these interviews, I learned that 
most respondents did not associate themselves with a well-defined process, association, or 
certification process. Their firms lacked evidence that confirmed their social impact. For 
example, a firm founder noted: “Our employees don't know about our social missions. They 
don't really care.” Another respondent stated that they were “unable to consistently generate 
social impact and profits each month. It’s either this or that.” Several examples such as these 
demonstrated the ambiguity in the firms’ missions. 
When asked if they were undergoing any activity or initiative to clarify their mixed 
mission to their audience or be recognized for their missions, many firms replied with a negative. 
Most firms lacked the perception of belonging to an ambiguous or new category, such as that of 
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social enterprises or hybrid firms. These negative responses were mainly from non-certified 
firms. However, some firms shared that their employees and the external audience understood 
the value of certifying the hybrid mission for some audiences.  For example, a CEO shared: 
“When people are looking for vendors, they’re probably looking for vendors who are running 
ethical enterprises, and B Corp is a way of certifying it.” A respondent from another certified 
firm stated that “The stories I tell out of the data should validate the claim, reinforce us for being 
certified B Corp.” These and similar comments suggested that B-Corp certification enabled the 
recognition of firms’ social and profitability missions both internally and externally. Therefore, I 
focused on certified B-Corporations in South Asia. 
This focus led me to the third stage of “Final Sample Study” (See Figure 1). In the third 
stage, I used the online B-Corporation directory to identify certified B-Corporations in South 
Asia. The directory listed seven B-Corps in total across India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (as of 
2019, when the data for this study was collected).  I included each of these firms in the dataset. 
Thus, this study examines the entire population of relevant firms, which allows a holistic 
understanding of the hybrid firms and category clarification in this context. 
3.5.2. Sample 
Table 1 describes each firm in the dataset. To preserve the confidentiality of the firms and 
individuals, I changed the names of the companies and individuals.7  
The final sample comprises seven organizations across South Asia. Each organization in 
the study was still in its early entrepreneurial stage, i.e., established less than fifteen years before 
the time of data collection. Each organization was established with a specific social mission, and 
                                                          
7 Given the small size of the sample, and the level of public access to B-Corp certification data, the confidentiality of 
firms is not fully assured by the name changes. 
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so, it self-identified as a social enterprise from the beginning. Each organization was a certified 
B Corp at the time of data collection.  
This sample allowed for significant inter-firm variance. For example, social start-ups 
emerged in different industries, such as venture capital, agricultural technology, information 
technology, and others. These organizations also chose a range of social and environmental 
missions, such as enhancing livelihood in rural areas, providing environmental and regulatory 
consulting, and creating employment opportunities for women. These organizations are also 
varied in terms of their size, ranging from four to 1600 employees. These inter-firm differences 
reduce the chances of industry-specific or other idiosyncratic effects that may confound the data 
analysis. All firms supported this research by providing several in-person and telephonic 
interviews supplemented by archival information. I describe the data sources in the sub-sections 
below.   
3.5.3. Data Sources 
Respondents’ interview statements and researcher field notes are the primary data source. 
I supplemented this primary data with archival information. Table 2 summarizes the data 
sources. The companies have been renamed with Greek letters, and the respondent names are 
given alphanumeric codes.  
I iterated between theory and data collection several times before I finalized the firm 
sample and the research questions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The data collection process 
involved travel to four cities in India, two in Bangladesh, and one in Myanmar. The entire 
process of connecting with firms, selecting and interviewing individuals spanned about seven 
months (March 2019 to September 2019). This step was followed by interview transcription and 
triangulation with other data archival sources (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) to generate a more 
45 
reliable account of the processes at each firm (Jick, 1979). This process lasted the next six 
months. The next step was data analysis, which also involved the collection of additional data 
through phone calls and emails. Below, I describe each data source in further detail.  
Interviews. I interviewed the founders and key employees in person, at the firms’ head 
offices. Wherever possible, I also visited other operating locations of these firms. Informant 
statements constitute a key source of data in most inductive research (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004; 
Williams & Shepherd, 2016). I identified respondents who could provide a holistic 
understanding of the firm, the certification process, and its effects. First, I interviewed the 
founders of four firms, Alpha, Gamma, Epsilon, and Eta, to understand the founding ethos and 
the missions of the organization. These founders served as firm leaders and were involved in 
their respective organization's activities. They were also instrumental in the decision to become 
B-Corp certified. I used a conventional courtroom procedure (i.e., asking respondents to walk us 
through the events, including B Corp certification) to note the time-lines of all events. The 
interview questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1. Further, I asked the founder to connect me 
with other managers involved in implementing the B-Corp certification process within the 
organization. All the interviews were semi-structured and followed a guide (see Appendix for 
details about the interview questions). I also interviewed employees in different departments (for 
example, to understand investors’ responses to B-Corp certification, I interviewed managers 
from the finance department of the firm). I also interviewed recently recruited employees at 
many firms to understand the perspective of job seekers. To understand internal organizational 
processes in relation to B Corp certification, I interviewed managers from the Human Resources 
division. These interviews at multiple hierarchical levels provided a holistic understanding of 
firm processes and individual perspectives. 
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I was unable to interview the founders of Beta, Delta, and Zeta, who are no longer 
involved with the firms’ day-to-day activities. But because the founders of these organizations 
are prominent individuals, I was able to collect additional archival information, such as YouTube 
videos, in which they described the establishment of their respective organization and its early 
stages. I interviewed the current leaders of these firms, i.e., the Managing Director of Zeta, the 
Vice-President of the Beta, and the CEO of Delta. 
The interviews relied on retrospective data that enable the collection of more 
observations and better theoretical grounding of organizational change (Huber, Glick, & Glick, 
1993; Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). All the firms became B-Corp certified between 2016 and 
2018 (i.e., within four years of the interviews in 2019). The respondents were able to recall most 
events during and after the certification process because the certification was a highly significant 
event at the organization, as demonstrated in the firms’ websites, social media handles, and other 
archival sources. To reduce retrospective bias further, I interviewed multiple informants from 
each firm. Because several interviewees shared similar information consistent with the archival 
sources, I could conclude that there was minimal retrospective bias (Bingham, Howell, & Ott, 
2019; Leonard-Barton, 1990). This combination of sources of evidence also facilitated 
triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). 
Interviews were conducted in English and audio recorded. Most interviews took 60 to 
100 minutes. A few interviews on employees’ perspectives took ~20 minutes. The average 
duration was 87 minutes. They resulted in ~36.3 hours of recordings (623 pages of single-spaced 
transcripts). 
Notes and Observations. I met several respondents informally, e.g., for lunch, dinner, 
travel from one office location to another, etc. These meetings were not audio recorded. During 
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some of these interactions, the individuals shared relevant information, which I captured 
immediately following a strict same-day rule (Corbin & Strauss, 1978; Glaser, 1978). I also 
noted some other observations (e.g., signs in offices, inter-personal and team interactions) during 
the visits. This resulted in about 97 pages (single-spaced) of field notes. 
Archival Data. I supplemented the primary data with secondary archival data that 
consists of firms’ websites, LinkedIn pages, online media articles, B-Corp directory webpages. 
Founders’ YouTube videos were important for Beta, Delta, and Zeta. Other sources were: 
(i) Company documents (Alpha and Eta): to understand firm origin and processes  
(ii) Job postings (Epsilon and Eta): to understand category promotion. The archival sources 
provided about 185 pages of information. The total duration of YouTube videos is 97 
minutes. 
3.5.4. Analysis 
I analyzed the data inductively (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) by identifying first-
order concepts, then second-order themes, and finally, aggregate dimensions. The analysis 
resulted in nine aggregate dimensions that contributed to the overall narrative of this study, 
involving prior literature and theories. Then, I asked two coders to classify 25% of the statements 
each to evaluate the reliability of the concepts, themes, and dimensions (LeCompte and Goetz, 
1982; Miles and Huberman, 1984). I gave randomly selected statements from the interview 
responses to each coder, with archival data and field observations. Both coders are doctoral 
students familiar with qualitative research but neutral to the data, literature, and goals of the 
study. I had an 85.32% agreement with the first coder and 78.26% agreement with the second 
coder. I resolved the areas of disagreements by discussion. Then, I used the concepts, themes, 
and data structure to build the data structure described in Figure 2. 
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Using the overall narrative of the study and the data structure, I identified the inter-
relationships between the emergent categories and dimensions. This lead to the inductive model 
grounded in theory and data. I describe this in the Results section below.  
3.6. Results 
Although each firm was already a certified B-Corp at the time of the interview, through 
our interview questions and archival information, I was able to understand key characteristics of 
the firms before the certification. I queried about changes that emerged during certification, and I 
checked whether the changes occurred because of the certification process or independently. In 
most cases, respondents were able to recall the reasons for organizational changes and clearly 
attribute them to the certification. The changes that were not attributed to certification were 
discarded from the analysis. Further, within the certified firms, I paid attention to how each firm 
differed in the way they changed during and after the certification. Using the interview responses 
and other data sources, I studied how the founders and employees at each organization described 
themselves and how their responses reflect their understanding of their organization at different 
stages, namely pre-certification, during B-Impact Assessment and B-Corp certification, and post-
certification. These changes are summarized in Figure 3. Further in this section, I first describe 
the pre-certification characteristics of the sample firms. After that, I provide a deeper explanation 
and analysis of the changes that take place during and after the certification. I explain the 
changes with the help of the inductive model developed from the data structure. 
Pre-Certification Firm Characteristics.  
The interviews with the firm founders and leaders revealed the founders’ aims and 
background experiences. While each firm was founded with a certain social mission, within the 
firms, there were differences in how the social mission was defined as well as in an 
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understanding of the social mission vis-à-vis the financial mission.  The founding team member 
of Alpha shared,  
“We are essentially an investment management firm focusing […] on businesses with some 
positive social impact and environmental impact. […] We are consciously trying to use the 
impact filter to decide which companies we want to work for.” (AL-ID). 
 
In an archival source, the founder of Beta described the origin of the organization:  
“One day, a poor woman came to me […]. Emaciated, torn saree, no chappals [i.e., footwear]. 
I had to say, "No, we don't have funds." […] She looked me in the eye and said, […] ‘Am I 
not poor too? Do I not deserve a chance to get my family out of poverty?’ […] I saw how 
much money they were making in their small businesses. […] That was my idea - to unleash 
capital and put […] into the hands of the poor.” (YouTube video of BE-FO, 2018). 
The founder of Epsilon shared that from the beginning, their vision was “to enable as 
many businesses as possible to move further towards sustainability.” Another firm leader echoed 
the founders’ prosocial inclination and the firm's expectations.  
“[Zeta] was founded in 2007 after the famous lunch between [the co-founders] […] [The co-
founders] said, ‘We should do something together to address the malnutrition.’” 
 Thus, although the firms differed in the nature of their social missions, they all began 
with social missions at their core, and while they also were for-profit firms. Although each 
hybrid organization began as a for-profit social enterprise, the social mission and the financial 
mission were considered disconnected from each other and possibly conflicting.  Thus, because 
of the presence of these dual missions from the very beginning, these social enterprises had 
ambiguous organizational identities that manifested at different levels, i.e., the firm-level, the 
organizational level, and the external audience level. The ambiguity was visible at more than one 
level in certain firms.  
At Alpha, there was ambiguity at the organizational and external levels. The respondent 
from Alpha shared, “A lot of [hybrid organizations] won't even call themselves social enterprises 
[…] because this there is this connotation of […] being okay with not making profits.” (AL-ID). 
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Additionally, Alpha’s respondent also shared evidence of ambiguity within the organization, “As 
the number of people grows, it's very difficult to have that same level of coherence [about our 
missions]. We needed to find a way to communicate what is important to us, to be aligned.” (AL-
ID). This ambiguity experienced by Alpha extended to the external audiences, including the 
prospective employees: 
“If we were doing something else […] say, we were not a social investor […] Say, we were 
monetizing toothpaste. Would we have been different? I don't think so. I don't think that if 
you're making toothpaste or having a social impact really matters [to job seekers]. I don't think 
many [investors] understand [about social entrepreneurship] except the ones from abroad.” 
(AL-ID) 
At Beta, the firm leader expressed the need for a certain mechanism to sustain their goals, 
to address their category ambiguity at the level of their employees. He said that they wanted “to 
make sure that we constantly relook at [the system] and see how we are aligning with it.” (BE-
VP). 
Gamma provided evidence for ambiguity at the external audience level. A statement 
about Gamma’s early stages exemplifies this lack of clarity and the disconnection between the 
firm missions among its external audience:  
“Calling it ‘social’ has adulterated that term, especially in India. You will be [considered as] a 
not-for-profit. And it is the sheer level of ignorance amongst people that they are unable to see 
the scope that the social mission is driven by the financial mission.” (GA-ED)  
At Delta, the respondents did not share evidence of category ambiguity at the founder 
level or the external audience level. However, at the internal, i.e., employee or organizational 
level, they expressed the need for more organizational clarity:  
“We want [the employees] to be more aware of social change that needs to happen in rural 
areas, financial literacy, better healthcare for themselves and their family, better educational 
opportunities, not just to seek the money but [also] the betterment. There is a strong 
expectation that ultimately that’s how we want our employees to behave.” (DE-CE) 
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The founder of Epsilon shared the need to address category ambiguity internally and also 
described the evidence of disinterest among customers:  
“In the field we are working in - social, environmental [reporting], we thought "who keeps us 
in check?" We needed […] a framework that keeps us guided and checked […] The individual 
customers, they never really care whether our company's being socially impactful." (EP-FC). 
Here, it is possible that not caring about firms’ social missions differs from knowing 
about it or not. However, this statement also suggests that the customers of Epsilon did not 
recognize it as a social enterprise. This is significantly different from the post-certification 
characteristics described later.  
At Zeta, the category ambiguity was visible at the level of the founder and the external 
audience, as can be seen in the archival document excerpt below:  
“Although the pair [of co-founders] agreed the social goals of their business should come first, 
the challenge would be to ensure financial sustainability. To do this, [Zeta's parent company] 
had to call into question traditional business models. […] The top priority is to sell yogurt in 
country villages in order to reach the poorest families. However, out of concern for 
profitability, sales are also made in cities. Distribution networks are therefore not the same, 
nor are the sales techniques. A distinction is made between door-to-door sales in villages 
made by “ladies” and […] in cities by “sales assistants.” (ESSEC Business School article, 
2012). 
Substantiating this category ambiguity among the external audience, the firm leader of 
Zeta noted that being a social enterprise was of “no value for them towards customers. Nobody 
here is aware of it. […] Nobody of our stakeholders really understands [social entrepreneurship]” 
(ZE-MD).  
Similarly, Eta’s founders also shared evidence for how they experienced category 
ambiguity at their level, within the organization, and at the external audience level. They 
perceived the dual missions to be disconnected and that the external audience did not understand 
their category as a socially-oriented organization:  
“We need to make a profit because we need first to sustain [co-founder2] and me. […] And, if 
we want to do all these pro-bono activities, we need to have money to do it. So, we need to 
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have some for-profit clients to be able to do pro-bono activities […] when we started, the goal 
was to work on sustainability topics. […] But we realized that the companies here are not 
mature at all […] It’s very difficult to sell sustainability” (ET-CF1) “The people [have] very, 
very limited understanding about the topics we are talking about […] like impact.” (ET-CF2) 
Thus, each firm showed evidence of ambiguity in their model, often at several levels. 
While the founders were clearly pro-socially inclined, the organization audiences (internal and 
external) perceived the social and financial missions as distinct and disconnected. Appendix 2.1 
describes additional evidence of the pre-certification firm characteristics. Overall, there was 
ambiguity within the firms’ internal audience (i.e., employees) and the external audience, such as 
the clients, relevant labor markets, and investors. B-Impact Assessment and B-Corp certification 
affected this category ambiguity in different ways, which is examined in detail. 
With an overview of the aforementioned pre-certification characteristics, I move to the 
focus of this study, i.e., the organizational changes that the B Corp certification entailed. These 
changes are described diagrammatically in the inductive model presented in Figure 4 and in 
detail in the subsequent sub-sections. 
3.6.1. Organizational Changes during Certification 
Each of these firms passed the B-Impact Assessment process and became a B-Corp. 
Because the impact assessment and certification took place in quick succession, I defined this as 
a single phase in the inductive model. All organizations in the sample other than Eta underwent 
significant changes while taking the B-Impact Assessment to meet the threshold score. Some 
other organizations learned some good practices through the B-Impact Assessment, which they 
decided to adopt, although the adoption was not necessary for their certification. In certain other 
organizations, the certification led to unintended and unplanned positive changes. Although the 
reasons or the need to undergo changes varied, depending on the nature of category ambiguity 
they experienced, all organizations did undergo some level of transition during this phase. I 
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found that these organizational changes pertain either to the perception of the individuals within 
or outside the firms or to the organizational processes. I classify these as “Process Changes” and 
“Perception Changes.” These are described below and in Appendix 2 Table (ii). 
The organizations that underwent the most significant and most numerous process 
changes were those that experienced organization level category ambiguity, namely, Alpha, 
Beta, Delta, and Epsilon, followed by those that experienced category ambiguity at the level of 
their external audience, namely, Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Epsilon, Zeta, and Eta. The nature of 
category ambiguity also impacted the kind of process changes that these organizations adopted. 
Founder-level category ambiguity was mainly addressed in the Perception changes described 
later. Below, I describe how each organization changed some of its processes or adopted new 
ones while undergoing the B-Corp certification.  
Process Changes.  
Alpha underwent a significant number of process changes related to the employees and 
their environmental action. The firm leader described changes that he observed:  
“We didn't have a volunteering policy. We got that […] As we go through the responses [of 
B-Impact Assessment], we find gaps. We try to address them. The vehicle actually helps us to 
figure out if we can improve our policies. […] Now, we have a team for tracking water, paper, 
and electricity usage. […] we consume less electricity.” (AL-ID)  
Another employee at Alpha described these and other changes, such as “training,” 
“policies related to gender safety,” and others (AL-BA). These changes related to the human 
resource (HR) practices and the environmental actions affected the firms’ post-certification firm 
characteristics.  Like Alpha, Beta also changed its organizational processes related to HR, 
external communication, and the environment, which reduced ambiguity at the organizational 
level:  
“All our employees in all branches know what B Corp is. Our signages have B Corp logo. 
There has been training on this […] In HR practices - having longer duration for paternity 
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leave, along those lines. […] While we are not an ecologically-based organization, [B-Corp 
certification] gave us a lot of ideas. Like "Can we make all our 250 branches solar 
dependent? Can all our loan officers go on two-wheelers or electric vehicles? Can we look at 
electric solutions for transportation?" […] We now use tablets in the field. There is no 
paper.” (BE-VP) 
The responses from the HR manager of Beta resonated with these observations. New 
organizational departments such as “learning and development,” “project and purpose,” and 
“data analytics” (BE-HR) were set up. These changes suggest that the firm emphasized employee 
training, developed firm missions and produced impact assessments which then affected how the 
employees perceived the organization. The effect of these process changes at Beta (and other 
organizations) will be described in the section on post-certification characteristics.  
The respondents from Delta also showed evidence of change in HR practices triggered by 
B-Corp certification. An employee shared that they “were trying to be more transparent” (DE-
IA). The CEO shared what they found during the B-Impact Assessment exercise and their 
changes to respond to it.  
“We were very gender-biased - so that's one change very recently that we're pro-actively 
trying to see. […]  We're actively trying to get more women because it's the need. We are a 
women-focused organization, but we realized that the numbers weren't showing up because 
we were recruiting a lot of women, but they weren't staying with us for a long time because of 
familial challenges and other social conditions. […] Boys are allowed to go to the nearest 
town to find jobs. The women are not. So opening a center that is closer to them is definitely 
beneficial.” (DE-CE) 
Further, Delta also made efforts towards external communication of their certification as 
noted from the archival source: 
“Our [i.e., Delta’s] recent B-Corp certification validates both our efforts in community 
development and our focus that goes beyond economic returns.” (Entrepreneurs’ Organization 
Inc. – Media article, 2019)  
Epsilon was the other organization that made changes in its HR processes and 
environmental action. Since Epsilon is a very small organization of only four employees, there 
was not much scope to improve the internal communication. However, they extensively 
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communicated about their B Corp certification on their website and through social media 
blogposts (described in Appendix). They also adopted “a week of [paid] voluntary work” and 
“documenting the impact” to “strengthen it” (EP-FC). Another respondent shared:  
“Through B Corp, every single practice has to be marked, and you need to reapply for the 
certification. So now ensure that you don't lose track. […] we knew that B Corp wants us to 
use recycled materials, so now we use recycled paper. […] If there is a job, we ensure that we 
first post it in ‘She Box,’ where they only focus on women who want to restart their career 
after pregnancy. All these values come only because we are B Corp.” (EP-SC).  
These changes in HR processes and environmental action led to certain post-certification 
organizational attributes addressing category ambiguity described in the next section. Another set 
of changed organizational processes occurred in organizations that experienced category 
ambiguity among external audiences such as prospective employees, investors, and customers. 
These organizations are Alpha, Gamma, Epsilon, Zeta, and Eta. These organizations did not 
significantly change their HR processes (except Alpha and Epsilon, which also showed 
organization-level category ambiguity). Still, they improved their internal and external 
communication. Some of them also increased their social and environmental impact through new 
processes.  
As described earlier, the firm leader of Gamma described the external category ambiguity 
by stating that there is “[…] ignorance amongst people that they are unable to see the scope that 
the social mission is driven by the financial mission” (GA-ED). This respondent also noted that 
following B Corp certification, they improved their external and internal communication and 
increased their social and environmental impact. GA-FD shared that following B Corp 
certification, their social impact areas expanded to include the recruitment of “physically 
challenged people” and “environmental protection.” Other changes included training sessions 
and “town-halls” to increase the interaction between the firm leaders and employees (GA-ED). 
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Similarly, the firm leader of Zeta shared the following about how they were broadening 
the range of social and environmental impact they were creating: 
“It forced us into some processes and improving on some points. […] It's helping to improve 
efficiency with social impact. We know that we didn't perform so well on the environment. 
Now, every time that we have the opportunity, we do something oriented towards that. […] 
With the farmers - the way we set the price of the milk – we try to improve and consolidate.” 
The HR manager of Zeta shared another example of process change. Earlier, Zeta had 
priced the product based on the raw material, which was not profitable:  
“Earlier, the product price was set based on the price of milk [i.e., main raw material]. we 
didn't know the income level [of customers], what should be the price of our product. […] The 
consumer group is average or below average [in terms of] our poverty level. Even they cannot 
afford [former product price] for their kids every day. 95% [of the people] are not rich people. 
[To] this 95% we were selling, and we were not profiting […]These are very important things 
that we learned from B Corp when we started B Impact Assessment…..we understand these 
should be our considering points. That way, we were able to make the organization more 
socially effective, and also more financially effective.” (ZE-HR).  
Eta underwent limited changes in that the organization strengthened its internal and 
external communication, but not its HR process, as described by one of the co-founders: 
“So, we are going to do our sustainability report. I'm asking the team, ‘please check the 
criteria of B Corp.’ we use their criteria [for reporting]. It can help us structure. […] Now, we 
are working on what it means to be a respectful workplace, on sexual harassment, 
discrimination, bullying […]. we are trying to write our own policies for these topics.” 
The above evidence describes the different forms of process changes that can be broadly 
described as (i) changes in HR practices, (ii) expansion of impact areas (social and/or 
environmental), (iii) improvement of internal communication, (iv) improvement of external 
communication, and (v) improvements in customer orientation. These changes affected the 
organizational category at the level of the founder/leader, employees, and the external audience.  
In the next sub-sub-section, I describe the organizational perception changes that these 
organizations experienced. 
Perception Changes.  
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A range of perception changes accompanied the process changes as these organizations 
became certified B-Corps. The perception changes were found at each organizational level, i.e., 
founder-, employee-, and external audience levels. These perception changes also affected the 
organizational characteristics certification, as described in the next section. Here, I describe the 
perception changes that the firms underwent and how they are related to the category ambiguity 
at different organizational levels.  
As described earlier, Alpha, Delta, and Epsilon showed evidence of category ambiguity 
at the organizational level as well as at the external audience level. Only Zeta and Eta showed 
significant evidence for category ambiguity at the founder level and external audience level. Beta 
showed evidence for category ambiguity at the organizational level and Gamma at the external 
audience level. Below I describe the perception changes in each organization.  
At Alpha, a respondent described how the adoption of new practices changed her 
perception of the firm. She said, “I really like [one week of paid volunteering annually] because 
it brings in very officially that people are more than their jobs.” (AL-BA). Alpha’s leader also 
added: “There was this huge conversation about paper towels, paper towels being used in the 
toilet. Those conversations will not happen unless you have such initiatives [i.e., B-Corp]." (AL-
ID). Thus, the B Corp certification and accompanying changes affected how the employees 
perceived the firm and its actions. Further, this perception change extended to the external 
audience as well. The firm leader shared that there had been instances where “job seekers 
specifically applied for jobs because [Alpha] was a B Corp.” (AL-ID). Substantiating this 
further, the recently recruited employee who was being referred to in the previous statement 
shared that “In the world of very murky definitions of social impact, B Corp to me, […] is the 
guarantee that investments are […] not just socially responsible, but socially impactful.” (AL-
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SA). Thus, I found evidence of perception changes at the organizational and external audience 
level at Alpha. 
Similarly, at Delta, I found evidence of perception changes related to the employees and 
external audience. Although there was no initial category ambiguity at the firms’ founder or 
leader level, I found evidence related to some leader-level perception changes. The CEO of Delta 
expressed a sense of validation as she said:  “This is exactly what we're trying to be [and] what I 
do.” The CEO shared that “as [they] talk to people, being a B Corp makes [Delta] appear a lot 
more professional.” (DE-CE). Thus, B Corp certification changed the perception of the external 
audience too. For the employees, the role of the certification in improving the understanding of 
goals was limited but present: 
“On a very superficial level, I don't think it does [i.e., that B Corp certification matters to the 
employees]. But the ones that become aware of it start valuing it. It definitely makes a 
difference to them eventually.” (DE-IM). 
At Epsilon also, I found evidence for perception changes among employees and external 
audiences. One of the respondents shared, “Once they [job applicants] get to know about B Corp 
and the values that I work with, they are definitely impressed. […] I'd definitely love to work for 
another B Corp! The whole process [i.e., certification] is very socially empowering.” 
Additionally, the founder described the perception changes at her level too. She shared, “There 
are a lot of practices for which you feel validated, like - this is already recognized.” Thus, 
although there was no initial category ambiguity at the founder level, following B Corp 
certification reinforced the organizational category at the founder/leader level in both Delta and 
Epsilon.  
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At Zeta and Eta, the data revealed evidence for category ambiguity at the founder level, 
and external audience described earlier in this section. However, the perception changes at the 
level of the founder/leader suggested category clarity. Zeta’s firm leader described that: 
“The certification pushes us, as the leaders, to follow some specific [key performance 
indicators] that I didn't. I can be proud that impact is not just a story, but I have been certified. 
[…] It has somehow broadened the scope of the impact that we are following." 
At Zeta, perception change also occurred at the level of the employees. The HR manager 
shared that “They [i.e., employees] felt that [they] were contributing to [social mission]. 
Motivation is increasing as I did very good.” The perception change extended to the external 
audiences, including the customers, in that the “[certification] helps to create consciousness 
about […] about the missions.” (ZE-MD). 
 At Eta, the B Corp certification did not lead to any changes in the HR processes. Thus, 
there was no evidence in terms of whether the certification affected the perception of the 
employees. The employees only shared one example of how their work changed, “Before, I had a 
process, but not systematic. Now I have to do things more systematically.” (ET-AN1). Overall, 
the certification did not significantly change their perception of the organization. However, the 
founder shared some evidence for how the certification contributed to changed perception at 
their level and the external audience level.  
“B Corp certification is a way for us also to demonstrate. We are asking our clients to be 
transparent and to do things related to sustainability and transparency. Being B Corp certified 
is also a way to walk the talk. 
The respondents at Eta shared that they did not undergo any other significant HR changes 
due to the B Corp certification. There were some minor changes, for example, in the 
“documentation of their sustainability report,” where they were incorporating the B Corp 
measures (ET-CF1).  
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At Beta, I found a range of perception changes at the firm leaders’ and employees’ levels. 
While the leaders described a sense of “validation” that they obtained (BE-VP), the employees 
described the “balance” in missions (BE-HR). I also found evidence of the discovery of 
additional benefits of social missions. For example, by stating that “I never thought I could use 
tablets on the field,” the respondent described that the suggestion to go paperless for 
environmental reasons enabled them to process loans quickly. The firm leader described that 
“The loan which used to take seven days in the past, our systems are capable of delivering it in 
seven minutes.” Thus, although there was no specific category ambiguity found at the 
leader/founder level, B Corp certification contributed to the firm leaders’ reinforcing the firm’s 
category. Further, the HR manager said, “When a company is certified, [people] like to work for 
it. Because it has the balance of everything [i.e., dual missions] in the culture.” (BE-HR). Thus, 
at Beta, there were perception changes at the founder/leader level and at the employee level. 
At Gamma, there were several forms of perception changes that took place, particularly 
at the level of the external audience. The firm leader described how the organization became 
more customer-oriented through improved impact assessment: 
“[B Corp certification] has a reinforcing effect because our standard protocol was to do a 
fortnightly measurement of its progress and a bi-annual measurement on social and economic 
metrics. Now, all of this has been made as a critical. Our external stakeholders acknowledge 
that the B Corp blueprint is rooted into transforming businesses to be more inclusive and 
responsible for that inclusivity.” (GA-ED)  
I also found evidence for perception changes described by the founder, who stated, “B 
Impact Assessment helped in designing a new product. Impact not only gives us satisfaction 
through numbers but also confidence for the next step.” An employee described that “I learned 
about the organization and why I do what I do during the B Corp certification.” (GA-IH).  
61 
The above evidences describe the different forms of process changes that can be broadly 
described as (i) validation for dual missions, (ii) improvement of organizational identification 
and employee commitment, and (iii) recognition from the external audience. Collectively, these 
changes affected the organizational category at the level of the founder/leader, employees, and 
the external audience.  
In Table 3, I summarize these process changes and perception changes for each social 
enterprise. These process changes and perception changes describe how the organizational 
change affected or addressed the category ambiguity. For Gamma, the data did not provide any 
evidence for process changes at the founder/leader level. Therefore, the corresponding cells are 
left blank. In Alpha's case, the data did not reveal any significant perception change at the 
founder/leader level or any change in organizational processes involving external stakeholders. 
The corresponding cells for these changes are left blank. In Eta’s case, I found only limited 
evidence for changes within the organization and with the external audience. I found 
insignificant evidence for process changes at the founder level and perception changes at the 
employee level. Thus, Eta underwent limited organizational changes due to B Corp certification 
compared to other firms in the sample.  
The sub-section below describes the post-certification characteristics of the firms.  
3.6.2. Post-Certification Characteristics  
The organizational changes through B-Impact Assessment and certification led to several 
outcomes that enabled the firms to clarify their organizational category internally and externally 
after the certification. These outcomes can be categorized under three dimensions – Goals 
Synergy, Successful Mission Communication, and External Category Promotion. Each 
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organization from the sample showed evidence for each of these attributes, except for Eta, where 
I found relatively less evidence. I describe these outcomes in further detail.  
Goals synergy. Prior literature recognizes that the dual missions in hybrid firms can be 
synergistic (Di Zhang & Swanson, 2013; Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, & Spee, 2015; Smith & 
Besharov, 2019). Smith and Besharov (2019) find that firm leaders perceive “interdependencies 
and synergies” between their social and financial missions. Building on this insight, I found that 
although our respondents described a disconnection between the two firm goals at the early 
stages, they clearly perceived a synergistic relationship between the missions following B Corp 
certification. This recognition of synergy was evident in each firm except in the case of Eta, 
which I explain later. In several respondent statements about the firm attributes after 
certification, I found insights regarding this synergy. I clarified and verified that these changes 
resulted from certification by asking additional questions. The goals synergy was reflected in two 
ways: (i) in statements that described financial benefits through social missions, and (ii) in 
statements describing increased social impact through financial gains. 
At Alpha, the firm leader shared, “Being mindful of the social aspects helps us in the 
financial performance in the long run.” Another respondent described an instance regarding the 
recognition of the financial benefits of social missions soon after it underwent B Impact 
Assessment. 
“I had identified a few […] environmental and social risks. When I went up to [the 
Managing Director], he said, "That's very important even financially. Please incorporate 
it into the profile." Now, it is quite embedded that these [environment, society, and 
governance] are important [in the financial profiling of the investees].” 
Thus, at Alpha, I found evidence of the synergy between the social and financial mission 
in that the organization saw financial benefits in social missions. Beta served as an exemplary 
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case describing goals synergy in which the organization obtained financial benefits from its 
social mission and increased social impact through financial missions.  
“I see that profits help in scalability, growth, which will also bring in the right 
competition and will also cut down [interest] rates in future. With more competition [and] 
regulation, you will become lean too. At some scale, you can also reduce interest rates. 
[…] Our interest rates were at the range of 35% when it began. Now, some of the lowest 
interest rates are in the range of 19.7%. Some are even lower. That's a great achievement. 
That's purely because of profitability and scale.” (BE-VP) 
Beta is a micro-finance company, and having lower interest rates allowed it to become 
more impactful as the loans became more easily affordable to low-income groups. It also helped 
the firm become more profitable than before. Beta’s use of tablets in the field (described in the 
Process Change in the previous sub-section) to improve their environmental impact increased 
their operational efficiency by reducing their loan processing time. These are clear examples of 
goals synergy at Beta following the certification. 
The case of Delta proved similar to Beta when the founder described that financial and 
social missions were mutually reinforcing.  Their presence in a rural area to address their social 
missions kept their costs low, enabling profitability. Their financial mission of being a for-profit 
made them more professional as they learned to “train and develop the skills” among rural 
women (DE-CE).   
“I actually work as a proper business, which means the quality of our work and services 
have to be world-class […] That [i.e., being a for-profit] is bringing in a level of 
professionalism […] Our cost tends to be low because we're in [rural] area where the staff 
and overhead expenses are low.” (DE-CE) 
Similarly, the founder of Gamma explained the synergy between the dual missions by 
describing how they obtained financial value through social impact:  
“If a poor farmer, as a consumer, can pay for [Gamma's product], it is impact. […] If they 
can recognize the [financial] value as a repeat customer, I'll do more investment in 
creating more value to them and the firm. […] Impact to them, and [financial] value to us 
go hand in hand.” (GA-FD). 
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Similarly, Epsilon also described a “mutually reinforcing” (EP-FC) relationship between 
the social and financial missions.  
“I feel validated that social and profit [missions] are not mutually exclusive. It’s not like 
if you’re doing social, you can't be profitable. It’s about the market and meeting their 
need. That’s what B-Corp suggests.” (EP-FC). 
Further, I found evidence to Goals Synergy at Epsilon from some of its archival sources: 
“The benefits that businesses derive by being a part of the exclusive B Corp Club are: It 
helps you to take more environmentally convincing decisions; It increases access to 
private investment capital; Helps you to build a more socially responsible business; B-
Corp label creates a positive reputation among stakeholders; B-Corp businesses attract 
like-minded people who collaborate and achieve greater heights” (Blog article on 
Epsilon’s website, 2018). 
Another archival article from Epsilon described the following: 
“B Corp certified companies attract new customers/employees/investors/PR etc. along 
with the capacity to inspire other businesses to adopt sustainable practices.” (Blog article 
on Epsilon’s website, 2018).” 
The respondent from Zeta described how their employee evaluation process changed 
after B Corp certification. She described that they included social impact-related variables in the 
key performance indicators of their employees, as a result of which employees became more 
conscious of their decision-making and its impact on Zeta’s social performance. She also added 
how the dual missions had a positive effect on the organizational activities:  
“[Following B Corp certification] You always have to balance between what is your 
mission and what you're supposed to achieve to reach the key performance indicators 
from your mission. You need to take into account the impact, and it has to be profitable. 
So I would say it's a positive tension. Yes, it's contradictory, but that gives you the 
constraints to think differently.” (ZE-MD) 
Another example shared by the respondents from Zeta described the financial benefits 
they obtained by targeting the social impact.  
“We did not know what is the income level [of customers], and what should be the price 
of our product. These are very important things that we learned from B Corp when we 
started B Impact Assessment. At the time we understand these should be our considering 
points. That way, we were able to make the organization more socially effective, and also 
more financially effective. […]” 
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Thus, Zeta’s approach to profit-making created social impact.  
At Eta, I found relatively less evidence for goals synergy. The leaders of the firm did not 
describe any relation between the certification and goals synergy. This follows from the data 
about the Organizational Changes during B-Impact Assessment and Certification, in that the 
organization underwent very few changes during the certification. However, Eta showed some 
other Post-Certification outcomes described in subsequent sub-sections.  
Overall, at each firm, depending on their industry and goals, the firms adopted different 
activities to fulfill their dual missions. New processes and learnings allowed the firms to explore 
novel ways to reinforce their financial and social missions synergistically. This goals synergy 
and the reinforcement of one mission through another contributed to preventing the “conflict” or 
“incompatibility” in the missions of hybrid organizations described in the literature (Pache & 
Santos, 2013). Respondents from the firms either denied the presence of any conflict between the 
goals (e.g., Gamma, Delta, Epsilon) or shared that the presence of dual missions led to novel 
means of problem-solving (e.g., Zeta), or that social mission had long-term financial benefits 
(e.g., Alpha, Beta). Overall, in each of these firms (except Eta), the certification-related 
organizational changes were associated with goals synergy. This goals synergy contributed to 
category clarity amongst the internal audience and helped in preventing internal conflicts due to 
goals conflict (Pache and Santos, 2013). 
Successful Mission Communication. Prior literature describes the importance of firm 
leaders and organizational governance in aligning firms with their missions (Cornforth & Brown, 
2014; Drucker, 1989) to avoid “mission drift” (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). Several of our 
respondents describe the importance of B Corp certification in “aligning the firm” (AL-ID; B-
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VP; EP-FC) with their missions. I found that Process Changes and Perception Changes 
contributed to aligning the organizational missions. These changes are broadly described as (i) 
goals alignment, (ii) improved understanding about the firms, (iii) structural changes, and (iv) 
organizational identification.  
Alpha’s firm leader described: 
“If you say that we are a B Corp […], they [i.e., employees] connect all of this [i.e., the 
dual missions]. They’d say, “look, it seems that these guys are not just concerned about 
profit-making. There is a larger mandate to whatever they’re doing.” (AL-ID) 
At Beta, structural changes accompanying the certification also facilitated the transfer of 
mission along with improved internal communication: 
“There was a major change in adding more departments and people in senior 
management, which brings experience as well as expertise. We had an event where the 
CEO presented about [B Corp]. We also had corporate communication about the impact 
assessment.” (BE-HR). 
 Gamma’s respondent described how they improved their internal communication 
following B Corp certification: 
“[After B Corp certification], you put your money where your mouth is. […] I've been 
advised to introduce town halls […] on a quarterly basis to give information to all the 
employees about the most recent developments [for] employee-employer engagement.” 
(GA-ED)  
At Delta, they were trying to increase employees’ rural engagement after the certification, 
which facilitated the internal communication and an understanding about the firm: 
“Since the time we became certified, we wanted [our employees] to be more aware of 
social change that needs to happen in rural areas - financial literacy, better health care for 
themselves and their family, better educational opportunities - and not just to seek money 
but actually use it for the betterment for themselves. […] I try to engage them in relevant 
local community activities.” (DE-IM) 
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In Epsilon's case, although the organization is very small and lacks the need for formal 
communication policies as suggested by B Corp certification, I found evidence for improved 
organizational understanding and identification. 
“I know I have been socially compliant, but there’s actually even more to it in terms of 
reaching our missions. […] B Corp is creating awareness in me that I should not stop 
here, but I can go and take the next step, then next step. Every day is a continuous 
improvement process when you’re a B Corp because the standards are so high.” 
Zeta also organized regular sessions between the leaders and employees, including van 
drivers who distribute the product to village households.  
“These van drivers are among the least paid employees at the firm […] We have big 
meetings two times a year with all [including] the van pullers. Every time we have a 
session, we go back to why we are in [the region], what we are doing, the mission and so 
on.” 
At Eta, there were very limited organizational changes that took place during 
certification. Consequently, the respondents did not share any significant evidence about whether 
the certification changed communication of the organization’s mission and how the employees 
interpreter the firm’s mission.  
Overall, while I found that the organizational process changes and perception changes 
contributed to a stronger communication of the mission within the firms. These changes also 
translated into the alignment of employees with the goals, and their understanding about the 
firm’s actions and mission. In absence of major organizational changes, I found that the post-
certification firm outcomes were not as evident in Eta, although the organization made some 
efforts to ‘create consciousness […] about contributing to the society’ (ET-CF1).  
External Category Promotin.  Upon becoming members of a certain category, firms 
may promote their association with it by championing relevant labels or cultural artefacts or by 
simply creating awareness about the firm’s connection with the category (Gehman & Grimes, 
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2017). By external category promotion, I refer to these efforts that firms make to inform 
audiences about their B Corp certification. B Corp certification led to some changes in some 
organizational processes relating to external stakeholders. These changes contributed to a clearer 
understanding of the organizational category among the external audience.  
I found that the sample firms differed in whether and how they promoted their 
organizational category. On the one hand, Beta and Zeta listed their certification and their social 
missions in their employees’ email signatures and other official communication (BE-VP; ZE-
MD). Epsilon published several online blogs about their B Corp certification (Epsilon’s website, 
2020). Gamma's leader described that they wanted their sister organization to become a B Corp 
too (GA-ED). On the other hand, firms like Delta did not make any significant effort to promote  
their category externally. Each of these firms received some response from their external 
audience that contributed to external category clarity. Below I describe the (i) efforts to diffuse 
the organizational category, and (ii) recognition from external audiences that contributed to 
external category clarity of the sample firms.  
At Alpha, a respondent who interfaces with investors and job candidates shared that one 
of their job candidates, who is now an employee, “reached out to [Alpha for a job] because it was 
a B Corp.” (AL-ID). When I spoke to this employee, she shared that, “In the world of very 
murky definitions of social impact, B Corp to me, […] is the guarantee that investments are […] 
not just socially responsible, but socially impactful.” (AL-SA). The firm leader also shared that 
their investors “understand [what B Corp certification is] because most of [their] investors are 
from abroad.” These insights suggest that B Corp certification and the related announcements 
clarify the firms’ category to an external audience.   
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At Beta, I did not find evidence for external category ambiguity at the initial (pre-
certification) stage. However, the organization still made efforts to communicate its category 
after the certification because of the benefits they received from B Corp certification. The firm 
leader shared, “I recommend any organization which targets double or triple-bottom-line to 
target B Corp. I have another organization [Beta’s sister concern] in the process [of becoming a 
B Corp].”  
As described earlier, Gamma had provided evidence for significant category ambiguity 
among the external audience. However, after being certified, the organization received 
significant recognition and made several efforts to promote and clarify its category externally. 
An archival document in the media that released soon after the Gamma’s certification 
exemplifies category external clarity:  
“[Gamma], a for-profit social enterprise fueling job creation, prosperity, and livelihoods 
for India’s poorest communities, is the country’s first company to become a certified B 
Corp. This prestigious designation is awarded to companies that use the power of 
business as a force for good, meeting the highest standards in performance, transparency, 
and accountability to solve social and environmental problems.” (Next Billion, 2016).  
Further, the firm leader also described their efforts to clarify the firm’s category 
externally: 
“I will continue to not only have [Gamma] maintain its B Corp status but also with 
[Gamma’s subsidiary], which is a Swiss Corporation to become a B Corp in Europe. […] 
B corps have led as a bandwagon. That is something that can pick up a revolutionary 
mass effect as we proceed to the new era. It can have a ripple effect if the ecosystem 
starts at adopting certified B corps.”  
The respondents from Delta described category clarity and recognition among their 
prospective clients: “We are participating in developing competencies in the social space, AI 
space. As we talk to people, being a B Corp makes us appear a lot more professional.” (DE-CE). 
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Similarly, the founder of Epsilon described the communication and recognition from the 
audience as evidence of category clarity among their external audience: 
“As a B Corp, you have to report the impact of the organization. We said [to clients] we 
always map the impact, and we know how to enable others. […] Clients who have 
international connections get some trust. First one, and then another [client], approached 
us. They were looking for a B Corp. […] I think by them [i.e., B Lab] suggesting that we 
take the value seriously, and we are certified organization, we are able to provide more 
credibility. It definitely affects our relationships. […] When we look for an investment, 
we’d look for like-minded investors. The first thing that we’d talk about is we are B 
Corp. It’s very fundamental for us.” 
Similarly, Zeta was made efforts to communicate their category after becoming certified. 
They also described the recognition they received, which suggested a clearer organizational 
category among the external audience.  
 “The fact that we are certified by a third party […] is really of value for honesty of how 
we are managing this business. That can give a bit of confidence in people. […] The 
agency which is coming next week is also a B Corp. They are going to help us build 
communication about our purpose. […] we are going to use B Corp in that 
communication.” (ZE-MD). 
Unlike these organizations, I did not find significant evidence for category clarity at Eta. 
One co-founder described that their audiences “are not familiar with the B Corp. We are too 
advanced for the market.” (ET-CF1). The employees “shared about [B Corp] certification on 
Facebook” (ET-CF1), and they “put a sentence in the job announcement. ‘We are a B certified 
Corporation and we use business as a force for good.’ ” (ET-CF1). But apart from that, Eta also 
did not make any major effort to communicate about their certificate to other organizations. 
Thus, we did not find any strong evidence about the recognition of the category from Eta’s 
external category.  
Table 4 summarizes for each firm the post-certification characteristics of each firm. For 
example, in the case of Alpha, I found evidence for category ambiguity at the employees' level 
before certification. However, the data suggests that after being certified, the employees had a 
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better understanding of the firm and were better aligned with the firm’s goals than before the 
certification. Similarly, after being certified, Alpha’s external audience (i.e., job seekers and 
investors) recognized the organization’s category better. These post-certification attributes 
addressed the category pre-certification category ambiguity.  
Overall, the process changes and perception changes triggered by B Corp certification 
improve the category clarity at different levels within the organization. I elaborate on the 
conclusions from this study below.   
3.7. Conclusion 
I began this study seeking to understand how social enterprises clarify their hybrid 
category in a relatively new context to the phenomenon of for-profit firms with a social mission. 
The data revealed that category membership certified by a third party contributes to an improved 
understanding of the dual goals at these organizations. An important point to note here is that the 
firms did not clarify their category directly or merely through B Corp certification. The 
certification and B Impact Assessment encouraged organizations to consider some different 
practices, which lead to process and perception changes. These changes helped in category 
clarification. Thus, B Corp certification had an indirect effect on category clarity through the 
mechanisms of process and perception changes.  
 
Through interviews and analysis, I found mechanisms, i.e., process and perception 
changes, triggered by B Corp certification that enable actors to recognize not only their dual 
missions but also confirm the synergy between them.  
One of the key findings in this study is that the organizations underwent a significant 
number of internal process changes related to their human resource practices, adoption of other 
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social/environmental missions, internal communication, as well as the structure of the firm. This 
is in contrast with the findings of Villela, Bulgacov, and Morgan (2021), who find that 
organizations were not strongly driven to reshape their internal processes to advance their B 
Impact Assessment scores. One possible explanation for this difference in findings is that the 
firms in the study by Villela et al. (2021) sought B Corp certification to improve their external 
reputation with investors, clients, and customers. However, in the study presented in this 
dissertation, the firms became certified because of a “need to sustain dual goals.” As described 
by several respondents, they needed an external mechanism “to keep them in check” (EP-FC).   
Thus, this study extends the findings by Villela et al. (2021) by adding that the process and 
perception changes accompanying B Corp certification depend in part on the intent for 
certification.  
Further, another finding is that firms may not only make “incremental changes” (Villela 
et al, 2021) but may in fact changes in their organizational structure (e.g., Beta), product pricing 
(e.g., Zeta), or adopt other social missions (e.g., Alpha, Epsilon). A possible explanation for such 
changes is that managers may see value in adopting or changing processes either in terms of their 
bottom-line (e.g., Beta), revenue (e.g., Zeta), or in terms of their internal management (e.g., 
Alpha, Gamma).  The adoption of significant changes is also evident in the B Impact scores of 
the sample firms which are fairly higher, i.e., in the range of 91 and 120, than the threshold score 
of 80. Eta, with a score of 81.9 is an exception in this trend. If firms intended to make minimal 
changes to only become eligible for the certification, their scores may have been closer to 80. A 
higher score suggests more significant changes than require to only make the cut. In case of Eta, 
I found that the firm made very few changes, as described above, and suggested from its B 
Impact score. Future research can study the rationale for changes in further depth, to identify the 
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specific reasons leading to incremental changes versus significant changes, and their 
corresponding impact on firm activities.  
One key finding is the extent of differences between the approaches adopted by these 
firms during and after certification. While process changes and perception changes were 
common to each of the sample firms, the organizations differed in the extent to which they 
underwent changes. On the one hand, Beta underwent significant organizational processes 
changes, including structural changes, followed by Gamma, which made significant efforts to 
promote their category externally. These efforts enabled these organizations to clarify their 
category externally. On the other hand, for Eta, I found limited evidence for improved clarity 
despite some organization's efforts to clarify their category externally. The founders described 
that “the market was not mature” and that their employees and other stakeholders did not 
“understand what sustainability or impact means.” Eta was also present in a less developed 
region compared to other regions in the context (United Nations: World Economic Situation and 
Prospects, 2019).  
The data from Eta provides two broad insights. First, benefits that a firm can get through 
certification are contingent upon the development of the market and the understanding of the 
other actors about businesses and their social missions. Second, B Corp certification in itself 
does not enable category clarification in the firms’ external and internal actors. Category clarity 
is achieved through a wide range of organizational changes that are either suggested or forced by 
the B Corp certification. When the organization undergoes B-Impact Assessment, its managers 
either learn about better practices and adopt them proactively or adopt them because they have to 
improve their score to meet the threshold requirement for the certification. Thus, the 
organizational changes in terms of the processes and perceptions lead to the outcomes of goals 
74 
synergy, successful communication of the firms’ goals, and category promotion. These outcomes 
create category clarity among internal and external actors. Eta did not make any significant 
organizational changes but became certified. However, unlike other organizations, it did not 
obtain any major benefit in category clarity because of the less developed nature of the region 
and its stakeholders. The firm leaders also did not adopt any organizational changes, and thus, 
there was limited category clarity despite the certification.  
 For the remaining six firms (i.e., all firms other than Eta), I found that pre-certicification, 
although the firm leaders described their financial and social goals, they described them in a 
distinct and disconnected manner. In fact, even in some of the discussions between the founders, 
the disconnection between profitability and social missions was evident (AL-ID; ZE-MD; 
YouTube videos of ZE-CF1 and ZE-CF2). Even among the external actors, such as clients, 
prospective employees, and investors, our respondents described evidence for category 
ambiguity. The sample firms decided to undergo B Corp certification to “sustain [their] goals” 
(e.g., Alpha, Delta) or to “be guided and checked” (e.g., Beta, Gamma, Epsilon), or because of 
the mandate from their parent company in case of Zeta, which is was founded as a joint-venture 
between two pre-existing firms. Category membership, or undergoing organizational changes or 
the recognition by external actors, was not their rationale for seeking certification. Yet, these 
organizations underwent changes that affected their capability to manage their dual missions. 
Specifically, I found three core attributes that were common among these six firms. First, 
the firms experienced goal synergy. Although each firm described their financial and social 
missions distinctly when referring to the pre-certification stage of the firm, in the post-
certification characteristics, the respondents used terms like “complementarity” (AL-BA), 
“reinforcing” (BE-VP), “mutually reinforcing” (ZE-MD), “strengthening” (EP-SC), 
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“synergistic” (DE-CE), “are the same” (GA-ED, ET-CF1) to describe the relationship between 
the goals. I found several examples wherein a positive financial outcome resulted from the firm's 
broadened social impact (e.g., Alpha, Delta). In some cases, I found instances wherein the firm's 
financial profitability bolstered the firm's social mission (e.g., Gamma, Zeta). Some firms 
underwent both these forms of mutual reinforcement between the dual goals (e.g., Beta). Goals 
synergy thus contributed to the reinforcement of the dual missions and is a factor that might be 
preventing goals conflict (Pache and Santos, 2013) at these firms. 
One could argue that goals synergy need not necessarily result from B Corp certification 
and might be present even in non-certified hybrid firms. However, my respondents described a 
clear disconnection between the goals before the certification among the sample firms. This 
evidence was found in several interviews (GA-ED, AL-ID) as well as in archival sources 
(YouTube video of the founders of Zeta). While discussing the firm’s post-certification 
characteristics, they described the synergies that they recognized through the certification. The 
non-certified social enterprises did not provide any evidence for goals synergy. However, future 
research can examine other antecedents for goals synergy. These findings can throw light on 
what makes social enterprises successful in their dual missions. 
The second core attribute among the sample firms was successful mission 
communication from the firm leadership to the employees. Several process changes that these 
firms underwent led to several activities like “training” for dual goals, restructuring the firm with 
new departments, and increased engagement with the local community (e.g., Beta, Delta, 
Gamma). Often, these resulted in increased interaction between the leaders and the employees. 
Some activities also made the social impact more visible to the employees or incentivized them 
to work towards both the missions. This insight extends the present understanding of potential 
76 
challenges among the logics embodied in hybrid firms (Glynn, 2000) and the means to address 
them, such as creating a common firm identity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Ebrahim, Battilana, 
and Lee (2014) describe the importance of governing boards in aligning conflicting objectives to 
prevent “mission drift.” Along similar lines, I find that third-party certification can potentially 
prevent or delay mission drift by aligning the organization with the founders’ goals. 
The third core attribute characterizing the sample firms was promotion of their category 
membership to external audiences. Gehman and Grimes (2017) explain why organizations may 
promote their category differently. I find that after being certified as B Corps, most of the sample 
firms promote themselves as “B Corps” to their external audiences such as investors, clients, and 
prospective employees. Thus, in addition to supporting the finding by Gehman and Grimes 
(2017), our findings suggest that category promotion can also attain credibility and recognition 
from the external audience. 
One limitation of this study lies in the limited number of interviewees for some firms. For 
a majority of firms (i.e., four firms out of seven), I was able to interview four or more employees 
per firm. However, for three firms, I could interview only two employees each. In these firms as 
well as the others, I supplemented the information from the interviews with archival data from 
their websites, media sources, and other sources to attain theoretical saturation and triangulation. 
However, to understand pre-, during, and post-certification characteristics of the firm, it would 
be very useful to get access to real-time data. To this end, I aim to supplement the findings of 
this study by observing a firm while it undergoes B-Corp certification. I have identified two 
potential firms seeking certification in South Asia. Studying these firms through observations 
and interviews can help strengthen the findings of this study.  
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One could argue that other factors, such as increased awareness about social 
entrepreneurship, might have contributed to the external category clarity. The certification of the 
sample firms and the data collection took place within a relatively brief span of 3 years (i.e., 
between 2016 and 2018). No major event took place in this region that may have made a 
significant difference in the understanding of social entrepreneurship. I confirmed this through 
our discussions with several non-certified social enterprises and other actors like venture capital 
investment firms, accelerators, incubators, and academicians. Future studies can investigate the 
role of other events (e.g., major international investments) in clarifying the category of social 
enterprises.
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CHAPTER 4: CHALLENGES IN SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  
REVERSE MIGRATION AND VENTURE ESTABLISHMENT 
Abstract 
Social entrepreneurship caters to a range of social and environmental needs and enhances 
human development. Through their ventures, social entrepreneurs play a key role in bringing 
about social and economic transformations. In low- / low-middle-income countries, the need and 
scope for addressing the social and environmental needs are more significant than in mature 
economies, given the challenges in these regions such as institutional voids, limitations in the 
factor markets, and resource constraints. Despite these issues, prior studies show that social 
entrepreneurship is increasing and spreading across low- / low-middle-income countries. I study 
a specific phenomenon that contributes to the spread of social entrepreneurship across the world, 
which I refer to as “reverse migration.” 
In this study, reverse migration refers to the migration of individuals from high-income to 
low- / low-middle-income countries. Several reverse migrant (RM) entrepreneurs have 
established successful social enterprises in low- / low-middle-income countries across the world. 
I identify a unique dataset of 14 RM-founded social enterprises in 13 countries across Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America and collect qualitative data through interviews with founders and 
employees. I use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify the resource combinations 
that differentiate high-performing and low-performing social enterprises. This analysis reveals 
the different pathways RM-entrepreneurs use to overcome resource constraints and mobilize 
resources for successful social ventures.
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This study contributes to the literature in strategy, entrepreneurship, and international 
business by analyzing this phenomenon. This study also contributes to the literature on resource 
mobilization by examining the pathways to successful venture establishment.  
4.1. Introduction 
Low- / low-middle-income countries are important settings for social entrepreneurship 
given these regions' social and economic needs and the potential of social ventures to address 
these needs (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Many scholars describe the role played by social 
enterprises in bringing about transformations in low- / low-middle-income countries worldwide 
(e.g., Elkington & Hartigan, 2008; Lasprogata & Cotton, 2003; Leadbeater, 1997; Mair & 
Noboa, 2007). Indeed, social entrepreneurs have identified and devised innovative solutions to 
exploit the opportunities in low- / low-middle-income countries (Zahra et al., 2008).  
Social entrepreneurs create or discover business opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) 
that balance social and economic interests (Elkington & Hartigan, 2008). However, despite the 
scope of such entrepreneurial opportunities in low- / low-middle-income countries, this context 
is challenging for venture establishment. Weak governments and institutional failures make the 
markets inefficient (Zahra et al., 2009). Access to factor markets may be limited (Ahlstrom & 
Burton, 2010). Further, institutional voids and resource constraints (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 
2005) aggravate the challenges in venture establishment.  
Despite these challenges, social enterprises are growing and spreading in low- / low-
middle-income countries (Mair & Noboa, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009). Prior studies suggest that 
several factors, such as the corporate social responsibility movement, institutional failures, 
awareness of social and environmental problems, and technological advances contribute to the 
growth of social entrepreneurship (Barendsen & Gardner, 2004; Zahra et al., 2008). However, 
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prior studies largely overlook the migration of social entrepreneurs from high-income to low- / 
low-middle-income countries. To address this gap in the literature, I study social enterprises in 
low- / low-middle-income countries established by migrants from high-income countries, whom 
I refer to as ‘reverse migrants.’ I use the resource mobilization framework, which identifies key 
forms of capital, namely, financial capital, social capital, and human capital (Penrose, 1959; 
Bourdieu & Richardson, 1986), to understand how reverse migrant (RM) entrepreneurs establish 
social ventures in the host countries. The study of reverse migration and RM-entrepreneurs is of 
relevance to scholars studying entrepreneurship and resource mobilization. By identifying the 
different forms of resources these entrepreneurs bring to the host countries, I highlight how the 
founders’ resources facilitate venture establishment and how they overcome resource deficits.   
I use qualitative methods to study this phenomenon given the limited literature about 
reverse migrants as social entrepreneurs (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Specifically, I use qualitative comparative analysis (Fiss, 2007) to identify the different 
combinations of resources that help RM-entrepreneurs establish high-performing social ventures. 
I measure as firm annual revenue as suggested in prior literature (Dencker & Gruber, 2015). All 
the firms in my sample pursue both financial and social missions. I confirmed their missions 
through the websites, social media, and other publicly available information and verified it 
during the interviews. Although a social enterprise's sustenance depends on its social mission 
and financial mission (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012), I 
study only the financial performance of these firms. Each firm in the sample measures and 
publicly announces its social impact. However, given the diverse nature of the impact these firms 
generate, I did not measure or compare their social impact8. Since the annual revenue indicates 
                                                          
8 The social mission of each sample firm is described in Table 5 
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firms’ financial performance (Dencker & Gruber, 2015), I used this measure as the outcome 
variable.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the literature review, I will describe 
the limited literature that addresses the migration of entrepreneurs to low- / low-middle-income 
countries. Further, I will review the context of low- / low-middle-income countries and their 
characteristics that emphasize the entrepreneur's role in mobilizing resources. This will lead to a 
discussion on the resource mobilization framework. Thereafter, I will describe the different 
sources of capital that entrepreneurs use to obtain resources in low- / low-middle-income 
countries. With this background, I will explain the research methodology used in the study. A 
description of the sample firms follows. I will then describe the data analysis and the findings. 
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results of my analysis.   
4.2. Literature Review 
In the limited academic literature that describes the phenomenon of reverse migration, 
Zahra et al. (2008) describe the role of technological advances in enabling transformative 
interactions between high-income and low- / low-middle-income countries. Barendsen and 
Gardener (2004) describe how increased interactions and exposures have influenced the 
founding of many social ventures, as well as shaped the interest of individuals in high-income 
countries to invest in, donate to, partner with, and buy from organizations that benefit the low- / 
low-middle-income countries (Zahra et al., 2008). There are technologist-turned-social 
entrepreneurs like Bill Gates of Microsoft and Larry Page and Sergey Brin of Google who have 
turned to social problems in low- / low-middle-income countries. This inspired other 
entrepreneurs because many technological innovations are rapidly scalable and globally relevant 
(Shane, 2000; Zahra et al., 2008). Further, entrepreneurs in the developing world know that their 
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worldwide reputations give them access to power centers to engage local institutions for 
collaborative efforts towards social needs. This understanding, coupled with the knowledge that 
many social problems are concentrated in the developing world (Gates Foundation, 2007), 
focuses entrepreneurial attention towards low- / low-middle-income countries. Also, 
entrepreneurs locate near their customers to achieve greater coordination, knowledge, and access 
to suppliers (Zahra and George, 2002). This location near customers in low- / low-middle-
income countries increases awareness of social needs.  
While several factors can attract entrepreneurs to low- / low-middle-income countries, 
deterrents remain. As described earlier and in Chapter 2, institutional voids and resource 
constraints (Cunha et al., 2013; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005) are common. Further, non-
native entrepreneurs need to balance between two or more cultures (Ndofor & Priem, 2011). 
Their firms may face a 'liability of foreignness' because of the founder's low familiarity with the 
cultural, political, and economic differences between their home and host country (Zaheer, 
1995). The limitations in local resources in socially deprived communities may impede social 
entrepreneurs from migrating to the developing world. Entrepreneurs may also have concerns 
regarding safety, educational opportunities, and standard of living (Zahra et al., 2008). However, 
technological advances, especially in the telecommunications infrastructures, and the rise in the 
number of English-speaking individuals in low- / low-middle-income countries lessen some of 
these concerns (Zahra et al., 2008). Lan (2011) describes how the English language serves as a 
form of global linguistic capital for western entrepreneurs in Taiwan and enables them to 
develop economic, social, and symbolic capital. As a result of these developments, there has 
been an increase in the number of social entrepreneurs migrating from high-income to low- / 
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low-middle-income countries. I refer to these social entrepreneurs as ‘reverse migrants’ or RM-
entrepreneurs.  
  Although there have been limited studies on RM-entrepreneurship in business and 
related literatures, this phenomenon has captured the interest of researchers mostly outside the 
stream of management scholarship. Authors from fields like economics have written numerous 
books and book chapters on RM-entrepreneurs from high-income countries (e.g., Yeung, 2002; 
Yokohama & Birchley, 2018, 2020; Kim, 2003).  Authors in the popular media have described 
this phenomenon (e.g., Dalai, 2015 and Areddy, 2019 in The Wall Street Journal; Wassener, 
2012 in The New York Times). Research conducted by an impact investment fund called Village 
Capital found that 90% of the capital invested in East Africa in 2015-2016 went to businesses 
having one or more North American or European founders (Peacock & Mungai, 2019). Several 
trade associations manifest the prevalence of this phenomenon (e.g., InterNations, Korean-
Mongolian Business Association, French Partners' investment platform for French entrepreneurs 
in South East Asia). There are other resources available to these migrant entrepreneurs, such as 
Beeleev online media and networking platform, Special Education Network and Inclusion 
Association, and The Expat Lifeline (International Diagnostic Solutions, 2020). Thus, the 
prevalence and significance of this phenomenon appear in different forms all over the world. 
Yet, there is limited understanding about how RM-entrepreneurs establish successful social 
ventures in low- / low-middle-income countries. I address this gap in the literature by answering 
the question, “Under what resource conditions do RM-founded social enterprises perform 
successfully in their respective host countries?” I identify the resource configurations that lead to 
high- and low-performing RM-founded social enterprises. To answer this question, I use the 
resources mobilization framework (Penrose, 1959; Bourdieu & Richardson, 1986, Bhagavatula, 
84 
Elfring, Van Tilburg, & Van de Bunt, 2010), which describes different forms of resources 
required to establish a venture and how they interact.  
Firm success largely depends on the entrepreneur’s ability to deploy resources (Penrose, 
1959). This is especially applicable for RM-entrepreneurs, given the attributes of low- / low-
middle-income countries described earlier. Moreover, I study the social ventures started by 
independent RM-entrepreneurs, also known as de novo firms (York & Lenox, 2014). These 
entrepreneurs lack prior connections with parent firms. Thus, the deployment of resources by the 
entrepreneur becomes crucial for a firm’s establishment and success. The resource mobilization 
framework elaborated below describes the nature of resources required for a venture.  
The key resources required for venture establishment are financial capital, human capital, 
and social capital (Bourdieu & Richardson, 1986). Financial capital includes financial and 
physical assets that are convertible to cash (Bourdieu & Richardson, 1986; Bates, 1990). Human 
capital is present within individuals. It develops through education, professional experiences, and 
other skills (Becker, 2009; Autio, Sapienza & Almeida, 2000). Social capital is the sum of the 
actual and potential resources derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). These forms of capital not only form the 
foundation of firms' long-term strategy (Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998), but they are also 
essential for the firms' survival (Venkataraman, Van de Ven, Buckeye, & Hudson, 1990). 
The theoretical relevance of RM-entrepreneurship lies in the unique resources they can 
bring to the host countries. For example, RM-entrepreneurs may have access to high financial 
savings from their intitial countries, or their education in their home countries might have 
enabled them significant expertise. These resources can improve our understanding of the forms 
of capital required for venture establishment.  RM-enterpreneurs transfer practices social 
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entreprenseurship practices from their host countries. Given the differences in context between 
their home countries and the venture countries, the practices may require adjustment to fit in the  
Prior studies suggest that in order to survive, firms must rapidly acquire or develop the 
resources available to others in the industry (Freeman et al., 1983; Mens et al., 2011; Clough et 
al., 2019). A common way to obtain resources is through co-founder(s) (Wasserman, 2012). Co-
founders can provide the much-needed human, social, and financial capital. Another common 
way to acquire capital, particularly financial capital, is by seeking investments (Singh et al., 
1986). Firms can also acquire social capital through incubators and accelerators (Totterman & 
Sten, 2005). Other sources of capital may exist for RM-entrepreneurs, such as research grants, 
fund-raising activities, consumer identification with social causes, and government support.  
This study builds on the research on resource mobilization for newly founded firms that 
are purely for profit (e.g., Villanueva, Van de Ven, & Sapienza, 2012; Zorn, Grant, & 
Henderson, 2013;). In this study, I examine how RM-founders address the challenges in low- / 
low-middle-income countries and establish social ventures, thus extending the resource 
mobilization framework to social entrepreneurship and low- / low-middle-income countries 
contexts. Below, I review the literature that identifies the different resources that new ventures 
may require and how RM-entrepreneurs might mobilize them.  
Credibility: foreignness vs. local connection. Non-local entrepreneurs encounter 
challenges beyond those faced by local entrepreneurs. They need to identify opportunities, 
accumulate resources, deliver customer value, as well as maintain a balance between two or 
more cultures (Ndofor & Priem, 2011). Overall, the deployment of each of these forms of capital 
can be more challenging for immigrant entrepreneurs than local ones (Aldrich & Waldinger, 
1990). Moreover, the liability of foreignness may arise as the RM-founders may not be fully 
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familiar with the local environment (Zaheer, 1995). To ameliorate these challenges, RM-
founders may try build some form of local connection to acquire resources and legitimacy in the 
host country (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
There are several ways of building local connections. For example, an RM-entrepreneur 
may have familial ties in the local region or have lived in the host country.  The RM-
entrepreneur may speak the local language and understand the local culture well, enabling 
communication with locals. Support from the local governments and other institutions can serve 
as a source of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Primary stakeholders (Barkemeyer, 
2007), such as customers in the host country, can serve as a source of local connection and 
legitimacy. 
 Lan (2011) notes that "Western high-skilled migrants can exert agency to negotiate their 
positions as non-citizens," and which I refer to as "credibility through foreignness," i.e., the 
benefits that RM-entrepreneur may receive because of being a non-native. The notion of 
“credibility through foreignness” is contradictory to the “liability of foreignness” described in 
prior literature (Zaheer, 1990). The extent of both liability of foreignness and credibility through 
foreignness may differ from country to country. In this study, I accounted for these country-level 
differences based on the responses from the interviewees. For example, the founders of three 
firms, one each in China, Taiwan, and Myanmar, shared that the locals were very receptive to 
non-native entrepreneurs like themselves. From the RM-entrepreneurs in India, I found mixed 
evidence towards their acceptance. For other countries, there was no clear evidence.  
Overall, I found that liability of foreignness was not relevant for RM-entrepreneurs. 
Three firm respondents (i.e., 21% of the sample) described that they were “trusted because they 
were from abroad.” Nine firms (i.e., 64% of the sample) had a local connection through some 
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other means described in the Data Analysis section. Thus, with this credibility through 
foreignness or others with the help of local people or other connections, they were able to obtain 
a local connection. Two firms out of 14 shared that they did not have any strong local 
connection, nor did they receive any credibility through foreignness. Thus, there different 
avenues for RM-founders to obtain legitimacy in the host region. In turn, these paths to 
legitimacy facilitate access to requisite resources. 
Self-financing. An inherent problem that many entrepreneurs face is the need for outside 
capital, which is difficult to obtain given the lack of collateral and sufficient cash flows and 
limited investor experience in evaluating social enterprises (Cosh et al., 2009). While the 
founder’s contribution of initial capital differs across industry types, in most cases, entrepreneurs 
provide the early financial capital required by the firm at least to some extent (Chandler & 
Hanks, 1998). Entrepreneurs in emerging economies may rely heavily on personal sources of 
financing such as personal savings, borrowings from friends and family, etc. Founders make 
extensive use of bootstrapping techniques to mitigate their financial constraints (Bhidé, 1992; 
Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; Ebben and Johnson, 2006). Founders also reinvest their profits to 
provide additional financial capital (Chittenden et al., 1999). I collectively refer to these 
resources of financial capital as ‘self-financing.’ 
External funding. External sources of funding such as venture capital investments are 
important funding sources for enterprises (Watson, 2006; Brown, 2005). Impact investments are 
investments made with the intent to create positive, measurable social and environmental impact 
alongside financial return. Impact investment funds are non-governmental venture capital funds 
that focus on investing in companies or organizations to create a measurable societal benefit 
while still generating a favorable financial return (Maverick, 2020). Several impact investment 
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funds such as Novastar Ventures, GSD Venture Studios, and Upaya Social Ventures target social 
enterprises in low- / low-middle-income countries (Novstar Ventures, 2020; GSD Venture 
Studios, 2021; Upaya SV, 2021). The investments from such impact investment funds are 
another source of financial capital for social enterprises, especially in low- / low-middle-income 
countries (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011).  Local governments may also provide financial 
capital to firms in the form of grants, subsidies, and other funds (Wang et al., 2017; Hong et al., 
2015). Social enterprises can also obtain financial capital from philanthropic organizations 
(Moore, 1999; Zhao, 2012). More recently, some entrepreneurs have begun to seek financial help 
directly from the general public, i.e., the crowd using ‘crowdfunding’ platforms such as 
Kickstarter (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010; Lehner, 2014). Entrepreneurs can also obtain 
significant financial capital by winning different startup competitions (Gaspar & De Pinho, 
2001). I collectively refer to these sources of financial capital as ‘external funding.’ 
Resource Provider(s). RM-founders can partner with one or more co-founders. 
Following prior literature, I consider an individual to as a co-founder when he/she is (i) with the 
company during its initial months, (ii) is titled as a ‘co-founder’ in firms’ communication, and 
(iii) owns equity in the firm (e.g., Wasserman, 2003; Hellman & Wasserman, 2013). Co-
founders bring needed skills, knowledge, or experience and thus serve as a source of human 
capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Gruber et al., 2012). Co-founders can provide social capital 
through their network (Aldrich & Kim, 2007; Vissa & Chacar, 2009). They may also provide 
financial capital by personally funding the business. I consider co-founders as ‘resource 
providers.’ An important point to note here is that some RM-founders may have local co-
founders. These local co-founders may also provide credibility through local connection.  
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Founders benefit from certain other resource providers who may act as co-creators 
(Howell, 2019). For example, core employees may provide valuable social and human capital to 
firms (Roach & Sauermann, 2015; Lopez-Cabrales, Valle, & Herrero, 2006). Benefactors may 
provide different resources to the new venture simply as a favor to the entrepreneur (Howell, 
2019). In some cases, a local partner, such as a local supplier or local supply chain partner, may 
help in the firm establishment and thus provide entrepreneurial resources. I collectively refer to 
these sources of different sources of capital as ‘resource providers.’ 
Related human capital of the RM-founder. The human capital of the founder, namely 
his/her educational background and past professional experience, is associated with the firm's 
success (Segal, Borgia, & Schoenfeld, 2010). Chandler & Hanks (1998) argue that the founder's 
human capital can serve as a substitute for financial capital. They find that founders’ ability to 
recognize and exploit opportunities is related to the human capital they bring to the venture. With 
a stronger ability to identify and recognize opportunities and risks, they need lower capital to 
start the venture. They may also not need to hire experts if they have the experience and 
education (Chandler & Hanks, 1998; Chandler & Jansen, 1992). Indeed, RM-founders may have 
prior educational and professional experience in their host country that might help them start a 
social enterprise in their host country. Work experience in the host country can improve the 
chances of survival of firms founded by non-locals (Mata & Alves, 2016). This relevant 
experience may come from working in non-profit(s) or having other entrepreneurial experience 
in similar low- / low-middle-income countries. Communication skills, domain knowledge, and 
skills in areas that are not directly related to the social enterprise may also be valuable sources of 
human capital for the RM-founder. I refer to these resources as 'Related human capital of the 
RM-founder' or simply 'related human capital' for brevity.  
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Networking assistance. Entrepreneurial support services such as incubators and 
accelerators are becoming increasingly available to firm founders. Although they vary in the 
services and resources they offer, incubators typically provide connectivity to relevant industry 
and community stakeholders (Lasrado et al., 2015). Further, RM-founders may receive support 
from their investor(s) and partner(s) to build their network. Universities’ incubation models, as 
well as alumni networks, serve as a source of social capital for enterprises (McAdam, Miller & 
McAdam, 2016). I consider these different resources whereby RM-founders can build their 
social capital as ‘networking assistance.’  
Innovation. Innovation has been linked to firm survival and performance in many studies 
(e.g., Danneels, 2002; Sinha & Noble, 2008). Innovation can significantly reduce production 
costs, reducing the need for financial capital (Sen & Tauman, 2007). In some instances, 
especially in low- / low-middle-income countries, innovative business models can reduce social 
exclusion, thereby increasing access to social capital (Rotheroe & Miller, 2008). For example, in 
this study, I found that rural transportation adopted mobile phone apps that enabled digital 
money transactions. This innovation reduced the security risk associated with cash. As a result, 
women felt more comfortable taking up jobs. Thus, technology reduced social exclusion. Such 
changes in practices and habits resulting from innovation can avail additional resources to the 
RM-founders. Innovation using such resources can also help an RM-founder establish a social 
enterprise. I refer to these resources collectively as ‘Innovation.'  
Thus, RM-founders can use a range of resources as described above to obtain the human, 
social, and financial capital required to establish their social enterprise in the host country. By 
taking a holistic view of these resources, I study several RM-founded social enterprises across 
the world. This chapter presents exploratory work in that RM-entrepreneurs, social enterprises, 
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and the contexts of low- / low-middle-income countries present a novel (and diverse) context for 
mobilizing resources. In the analysis that follows, I explore the conditions under which it is 
possible to establish a successful social venture as an RM-entrepreneur. I use the qualitative 
research methodology described below.  
4.3. Research Methodology 
The phenomenon of reverse migration is new and understudied; therefore, I use 
qualitative methods for my research (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). As 
noted earlier, my goal is to identify the resource configurations that lead to high and low 
financial performances of firms. I use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA or 
QCA; Ragin, 2000; 2008), which is well-suited to assess resource configurations vis-à-vis firm-
level outcomes such as financial performance (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993). This method 
reveals relationships among variables that combine in complex ways to explain outcome 
variance.  
I discuss my choice of QCA in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. QCA is a match to my research 
question due to: (i) the ability of this method of model equifinality (Fiss, 2007), (ii) the absence 
of the assumption of the linearity and additive nature of effects, (iii) the scope to study the 
distinctive nature of each case without looking for central tendencies in the data (Ragin, 2000; 
2008), (iv) the suitability for moderately sized samples (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008) available for this 
study. The sample for this study meets other criteria for QCA as well, including the presence of 
variance in outcomes (high-performing and low-performing firms) and commonalities across 
firm characteristics. In the following sections, I describe the sample and the analysis, followed 
by the results and conclusion.  
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4.3.1. Sample and Data 
I rely on data from RM-founded ventures in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Using 
connections from earlier studies, I identified several RM-founders. These RM-founders and other 
professional contacts (other firm founders, academicians, and professionals at incubators and 
impact investment firms) helped me identify other RM founders. I supplemented this snowball 
sampling approach by searching online databases (e.g., B-Corporation directory, Beeleev online 
media platform, etc.) as well as the portfolios of impact investment funds, incubators, and 
accelerators. Using these online resources, I identified a range of social enterprises in low- / low-
middle-income countries. Then, I explored the websites of each firm to see the founder(s) and 
his/her/their background(s). I verified the founders are as reverse migrants through their profiles 
on LinkedIn. Further, I approached each venture via email and then asked for interviews. The 
final sample consists of 14 firms across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Past research suggests 
that this number of cases is ideal for QCA (Ragin, 2000; 2008). It is small enough to allow for an 
in-depth familiarity of each case but large enough to investigate the relationships that emerge 
from the data. These firms belong to different industries and are located in 13 developing nations 
across the world9. They are also of different sizes and founded by entrepreneurs from different 
high-income countries. These differences allow for the inter-firm variance required for QCA. 
Following the practices recommended by QCA scholars, I iterated between findings, case 
knowledge, and literature (Miansgyi et al., 2017; Greckhamer et al., 2018).  
For each organization, I interviewed the RM-founder and at least one other employee. 
Each observation consists of semi-structured interviews with the founder(s) and employee(s) of 
                                                          
9 The sample includes companies in the following countries: Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Russia, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam in Asia; Benin, Cameroon, Kenya, and Uganda in Africa; and Mexico in Latin America  
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each firm, supplemented and triangulated by rich archival data from various other sources such 
as company websites, social media, YouTube videos, and other publicly available sources. For 
most firms, I found several extensive media articles, published research papers, and even 
documentary movies. These archival sources provided rich insights into the explanatory 
variables for the analysis.   
The interviews are the primary data source. I took 21 interviews for the RM-founded 
firms in the sample (with founders, board members, and employees) and two interviews at 
impact investment funds, non-profits, and other related organizations. The interviews lasted 
between 25 and 120 minutes, with an average of 56 minutes. The interviews with RM-founders 
and their employees were semi-structured and followed an interview guide. I modified the 
interview guide to address the themes that emerged during the interview. The interview guide 
and the overall data collection procedure were approved by the Institutional Review Board 
before approaching the respondents. Each interview had four parts: (1) history and purpose of the 
social enterprise, (2) background of the RM-founder(s) and other key persons, (3) direct 
questions related to the resources available at time of firm establishment and present, and (5) 
current financial performance, i.e., revenue. 
To understand the company’s history and purpose, I asked the interviewee to explain why 
the founder chose to establish a social enterprise in the host country. For example, I asked: Why 
did you want to start a venture with a social mission? What brought you to this country? Then, to 
understand the RM-founder’s background, I asked: What is your educational and professional 
background? Did you spend time in this country before starting the venture? 
Further, I asked: What resources did you have when you decided to establish the venture? 
What people or organizations have been especially crucial in your company’s establishment? 
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What were the sources of financial capital? What kinds of social networks and connections were 
useful to you? I concluded by asking the approximate annual revenue of the latest financial year. 
Wherever required, I probed the respondent to provide more details about their responses. I 
sought further information to understand the tangible and intangible resources that played the 
most significant roles in the firm. The follow-up questions focused on specific benefits and 
challenges they faced in the host country and how they used or overcame them. The complete 
interview guide is provided in Appendix 3. These responses provided rich accounts of the events 
that took place over time. Further, recounting these events chronologically helped reduce 
individual informant bias (Huber & Power, 1985). It also allowed for comparability across 
informants (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). 
I also interviewed key people at impact investment funds, RM-founded non-profits, and 
other related organizations to understand the phenomenon of reverse migration in further depth. 
These interviews were also semi-structured and followed an interview guide. To understand the 
phenomenon in the host country, I asked: Can you please describe whether there are social 
enterprises founded by migrant entrepreneurs from high-income countries? Is this phenomenon 
common in your country? To understand the resources available to RM-founded firms, I asked: 
Can you please tell me how your organization (impact investment firm, non-profit, etc.) is 
related to these firms? Do the local governments or other institutions provide any kind of support 
to these firms or any social enterprise? Wherever required, I probed further to understand the 
details. 
Further, to triangulate this retrospective data from interviewees, I collected rich real-time 
data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) through company websites, LinkedIn, media reports, and 
other resources. In most cases, I found extensive archival information (e.g., YouTube videos, 
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published media articles, published case studies, TedX talks, documentary movies, etc.) about 
the firm as well as the RM-founder(s). Table 5 summarizes the sample and data for this study.  
 I iterated between theory and data several times before I finalized the firm sample and 
research question (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Further, I collected data until I reached "theoretical 
saturation," i.e., a point where no new themes emerged upon the collection of additional data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Then, I analyzed the data. 
4.4. Data Analysis 
As the starting point of QCA, I calibrated set membership, i.e., I separated cases into 
meaningful groups (Ragin, 2008). I selected "annual revenue" as the outcome variable and then 
identified conditions that explain the variance in the outcome. Following the procedures of 
fuzzy-set QCA, I assigned values ranging between 0 (indicating absence of the condition) and 1 
(indicating presence of the condition) to the outcome of each case (i.e., to the annual revenue of 
each firm). For calibrating the explanatory condition, I used crisp coding, i.e., assigning binary 
values to denote the presence or absence of the condition in each case. In this section, I explain 
the calibration of the explanatory and outcome conditions and report the chosen thresholds while 
describing the theoretical and case-based rationale for them (Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, & 
Aguilera, 2018) 
4.4.1. Outcome 
QCA specification begins with defining the outcome of interest (Greckhamer et al., 
2018). As suggested in prior literature (e.g., Dencker & Gruber, 2015), I used annual revenue as 
the outcome variable to assess firm performance. Social enterprises pursue both financial and 
social missions and often use commercial methods to address the social issues (Miller et al., 
2012). Therefore, annual revenue is vital to firms’ social and commercial mission. All firms in 
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the sample shared their most recent annual revenue during the interview. Firms in the sample did 
not measure their success through other parameters such as patent approval, market share, or 
investment raised, as often found in studies of new ventures. Therefore, my use of annual 
revenue as a measure of firm performance matched the respondent’s evaluation metric. 
After defining the outcome variable, I calibrated the cases into groups based on 
theoretical and contextual knowledge about the outcome variable as suggested by Greckhamer et 
al (2018). All firms in the sample were in operation for at least three years. However, they had 
attained varying levels of success in terms of revenue. One of the firms had been unable to find 
seed capital and initial customers in the host country. As a result, it had very low revenue (<USD 
50,000) and struggled to survive. I coded this firm as (0) because its performance was 
significantly lower than that of other firms in the data set. Four firms in the sample (i.e., 29% of 
the sample) had successfully found customers and established their position in the host country. 
These firms accounted for over 25% of the sample, and their annual revenue exceeded USD 4 
million. I coded these firms as (1) indicating the highest level of firm performance. I then divided 
the remaining nine firms into three intervals of three firms, each based on their annual revenue. 
In the first interval were the firms that were struggling to establish a customer base. However, 
unlike the firms coded as (0), these firms had begun to create their niche in the market. As a 
result, they had low revenue, i.e., between USD 100,000 and USD 400,000. These firms were 
coded as (0.25). In the second interval were moderately successful firms whose revenue was 
between USD 400,000 and USD 800,000. I coded these firms are (0.5). The remaining firms 
whose revenue fell between USD 800,000 and USD 4 million were coded as (0.75). 
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4.4.2. Explanatory conditions  
The next step in QCA is the identification of factors that might lead to higher (or lower) 
levels of the outcome. I use the term “explanatory conditions” to refer to these factors. I analyzed 
each case in-depth to understand which conditions might be more strongly associated with higher 
levels of the outcome relative to others. As described earlier, I identified the explanatory 
conditions based on theoretical and contextual knowledge, i.e., I used prior studies as well as 
interview and archival data to select the explanatory conditions and assign values to them. I 
studied the challenges each firm faced and the resources that enabled them to overcome these 
challenges. Wherever required, I compared firms with other firms at different performance levels 
to assess the relevance of the explanatory conditions. 
As described by Greckhamer et al (2018), I used for prior literature and case knowledge 
to identify the explanatory variables, and how they combine to produce the outcome of interest. 
Analysis of the interview data and archival information suggested a number of factors that might 
influence firm performance. QCA takes into account all the possible combinations of the 
explanatory conditions. Therefore, the addition of each explanatory condition increases the 
number of combinations exponentially (i.e., 2k, where k is the number of conditions). A very 
large number of explanatory conditions complicates the analysis (Misangyi et al., 2017). Prior 
research on QCA suggests that to avoid this problem, and to make the model parsimonious, 
several explanatory conditions be combined into meaningful higher order concepts (Greckhamer 
et al., 2018; Grandori & Furnari, 2008). Therefore, I identified the most important explanatory 
conditions from existing theory and data using an inductive approach (e.g., Crilly, 2011; Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) by categorizing the factors into broader and related concepts. This 
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approach follows the best practices highlighted by Greckhamer et al. (2018) in that the maximum 
number of explanatory conditions is based on the number of cases and feasibility of the analysis. 
 This inductive approach resulted in seven explanatory conditions whose presence or 
absence appears to be associated with firm performance. Figure 5 displays this inductive process 
of categorization of factors into explanatory conditions. I describe each of the seven explanatory 
conditions below. I calibrated each firm for the presence of these conditions based on a 
combination of theory and contextual knowledge (Greckhamer et al., 2018; Misangyi & 
Acharya, 2014). 
Credibility through foreignness or local connection. As described above, the RM-
founders may lack access to local resources. However, twelve firms in the dataset had one or 
more factors that provided them with a local connection to help overcome these liabilities. These 
factors gave the firms the legitimacy to operate in the host country. For example, in three cases, 
the RM-founder described that the locals were “more trusting of westerners,” which gave him 
credibility. 
 Two RM-founders in the same firm were married to locals, which enabled the firm to 
gain acceptance from the local community. In the case of four other enterprises (i.e., 29% of the 
sample), the RM-founders had lived for several years before starting social enterprises. This 
experience enabled them to “understand the culture” or “speak the local language,” which helped 
them in venture establishment. In three cases (i.e., 21% of the sample), the local governments 
provided support to the RM-founder by providing a grant or developing the region's 
infrastructure. These conditions helped RM-founders establish a local connection to gain 
legitimacy and access to other resources required for the venture. 
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Self-financing. The importance of financial capital in the venture establishment is well-
understood. Self-financing serves as an effective substitute for capital markets required to start a 
venture (Buera & Shin, 2011). Indeed, RM-founders of three firms (i.e., 21% of the sample) used 
their personal savings to start their enterprise. In two cases (i.e., 14% of the sample), the 
interviewee described that they “will not pay dividends to its shareholders” to reinvest their 
profits to grow the firm. In three firms (i.e., 21% of the sample), “the margins are immense,” 
which allows the “firm to grow exponentially” by itself. Thus, these eight RM-founded firms 
(i.e., 57% of the sample) were self-financed. 
External funding.  Scholars describe the association of external funding with the high 
financial performance of firms (e.g., Watson, 2006; Wang, Li, & Furman, 2017; Campello, 
2006). For nine (i.e., 64% of the sample) firms, external funding served as a key source of 
financial capital. In one case, the RM-founder described that they received “a grant from a US-
based non-profit,” while another firm described that they “won many startup competitions” 
through which they obtained the required financial capital. Other forms of external funding 
included “government funding,” “crowdfunding,” as well as “overseas investors,” which were 
available to two (14% of the sample), one (7% of the sample), and four (29% of the sample) 
firms respectively.  
Resource Provider. In 12 cases (i.e., 85% of the sample), the RM-founders shared that 
they received support from several people while starting their ventures. For example, one RM-
founder shared that he “had some very good teachers along the way,” such as “an incredible 
boss” who helped him as a mentor. In two cases (i.e., 14% of the sample), the RM-founders had 
co-founders with complementary skills. For example, one interviewee shared that the RM-
founder had another RM-co-founder who was “a technical expert in water systems who 
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complemented the finance background of [the RM-founder].” Two firms (i.e., 14% of the 
sample) had benefactors that provided different resources such as an “office” or a “shed.” These 
spaces served as workplaces for RM-founders. One sample firms (7% of the sample) had a local 
co-founder, three firms (21% of the sample) had local core employees (i.e., a key employee who 
was at the firm from the beginning), and two firms (14% of the sample) local partners that 
provided valuable resources to the social enterprise. In these cases, the local resource provider 
also served as a source of credibility through local connection. However, I considered this factor 
as a ‘resource provider’ because they provide more than just local connection and legitimacy. 
They provided significant human capital such as “IT skills” and “understanding of the [host 
country].” Wherever local co-founders, core employees, or partners were present, I accounted for 
the ‘credibility through local connection’ provided by the firm. 
Related human capital of the founder.  Human capital plays an essential role in the 
financial performance of firms (e.g., Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Marimuthi, Arokiasamy, & Ismail, 
2009). In 13 cases (i.e., 93% of the sample), the RM-founder built the human capital required for 
the venture through his/her educational background or work experience. For example, one of the 
RM-founders shared that she “didn't really have a formal background in textiles […] but had a 
lot of experience in textiles,” which helped her start the apparel manufacturing firm. Another 
RM-founder had been an “Olympic champion” and “innovator” in water sports. He used his 
knowledge "to develop eco-friendly water-sports equipment.” Out of these 13 cases, in four 
cases (i.e., 29% of the total sample), RM-founders’ skills in other fields helped them in venture 
establishment. For example, one RM-founder shared that his “background in writing and 
journalism […] helped communicate to people in a way that people could understand.” Other 
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forms of experience, such as experience in non-profit organizations and working in other low- / 
low-middle-income countries, also helped RM-founders understand the host country better. 
Networking assistance. Social networks are associated with firms’ financial 
performance in several ways (Pratono, 2018; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Eight RM-founded firms in 
the sample (i.e., 57% of the sample) had different forms of networking assistance that allowed 
them to obtain the required social capital for their ventures. In four cases (i.e., 29% of the 
sample), the RM-founders’ university or other educational program allowed them to connect 
with customers and future partners. For example, one of the firm founders graduated from a 
leading business school that also provided the office space in the “largest techno-park in Europe 
[…] and a lot of support.” Further, one of the sample firms was incubated at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, from where the RM-founders “received funding to travel to [the host 
country] to build contacts early on.” The remaining four firms (29% of the sample) had support 
from local and overseas incubators, accelerators, and investors to build their networks. 
Innovation. In five cases (i.e., 36% of the sample), the use of an innovative product or an 
innovative operating model allowed the firms to circumvent their need for financial capital. Two 
firms (i.e., 14% of the sample) used innovative products, and three firms (i.e., 21% of the 
sample) adopted pre-existing innovative technologies to improve their business models. In these 
cases, innovation helped firms perform well financially. For example, one of the firms had a 
“very low startup cost” because they “came up with an innovative product prototype” that used 
significantly cheaper parts. Another firm used “mobile money and apps to connect directly with 
the farmers.” These technological innovations allowed them to “obtain products at the best price 
without involving the traditional man-with-the-van who got a huge share of the price.” 
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In two cases (14% of the sample), firms used a different operating model, which at times, 
created a change in the habits and practices of the people. For example, one of the firms that 
provided affordable transportation in sub-Saharan Africa “had to incentivize people to be on time 
for the buses so that [they] could operate efficiently.” So, they “provided free Wi-Fi in the 
waiting rooms because of which people came on time.” These factors also contributed to firm 
performance. Another firm adopted “mobile money and apps,” which reduced the “security risk 
associated with money,” thus encouraging women to join the workforce and making the firm 
more efficient. 
For each firm, I assessed if the explanatory condition was present or absent. The presence 
of one or more factors, described as the broader category in Figure 5, served as an indicator of 
the presence of the explanatory condition. Therefore, I coded each explanatory condition as (0) if 
none of the factors contributing to the condition were present in the firm. If any of the factors 
were present, I coded the explanatory condition as (1).  
4.4.3. Truth-Table 
After coding all the explanatory conditions and the outcome, I created the “truth table” 
using the fsQCA software10. The “truth table,” displayed as Table 6, describes all the possible 
combinations of the explanatory conditions, using which one can identify the configurations that 
may be associated with the outcome (Ragin, 2000; 2008; Greckhamer et al, 2018). Following 
past scholars (e.g., Bell et al., 2014; Mellewigt et al., 2018), I delete all combinations that are not 
associated with at least one case. 
I apply the fsQCA algorithm to the truth table to find the intermediate and parsimonious 
combinations of explanatory conditions that are associated with high and low firm performance. 
                                                          
10 Available on: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml)   
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In keeping with conventional practice (e.g., Crilly et al., 2012; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), I 
report both the intermediate11 and parsimonious12 solutions. 
4.5. Results 
Three configurations are associated with high performance. Table 7 displays these 
configurations, along with the configurations associated with low performance. Here, I use the 
consistency13 threshold of 0.80 as done in prior studies (Ragin, 2008; Misangyi & Acharya, 
2014). Each column represents a distinct configuration. These configurations can be interpreted 
as a path to a specified outcome, in this case, high performance or low performance. As 
described by Greckhamer et al (2018), I analyze the configurations separately for the presence 
and absence of the outcomes in the two sub-sections names “Pathways Leading to High 
Performance” and “Pathways Leading to Low Performance.” With the help of the interview 
responses, I explain each configuration or ‘path to the outcome’ below. I also evaluate the key 
findings vis-à-vis the existing theories and constructs described in prior literature (Greckhamer et 
al, 2018) on resource mobilization. Additionally, I analyzed the configurations obtained from 
fsQCA analysis taking into account the causal patterns that occurred within each configurations 
(Greckhamer, Misangyi, & Fiss, 2013; Greckhamer et al., 2018).  
4.5.1. Pathways Leading to High Performance 
 (1) Legacy network pathway. The first pathway to high performance is consistent with 
prior literature that having a resource provider can enable entrepreneurs to overcome liabilities 
                                                          
11 Intermediate solution includes only those caseless rows that survive counterfactual analysis using theoretical and 
substantive knowledge (input by the researcher). This solution yields both core and peripheral (i.e., contributing 
conditions (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Ragin, 2000).   
12 Parsimonious solution uses only those caseless rows in the truth table that yield simpler or fewer configurations. 
This solution helps to identify the ‘core conditions’ (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Ragin, 2000).   
13 Consistency measures the degree to which a combination of causal conditions is reliably associated with the 
outcome of interest   
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and mobilize the required resources (Wasserman, 2012) even in the absence of personal sources 
of finance and external funding. I found evidence for this in my interview data. In fact, having a 
resource provider and related human capital, external networking support, and innovative 
product or practice can help firms overcome the liability of foreignness and financial constraints 
without having a local connection or funding sources. For example, one of the interviewees said, 
“I didn't have the background or the education or the resume [for starting a firm in the host 
country]. I decided I would go back to school. I studied my MBA at Kellogg in Chicago. I put a 
lot of focus into exposing myself to international development.” This founder did not have any 
strong local connection nor credibility through foreignness in the host country but was able to 
“connect with a lot of people through networks […] and by speaking at a lot of events.” A US-
based accelerator supported this firm. Thus, a large set of resources came directly or indirectly 
from the RM-founders legacy prior to founding the enterprise.  
In the case of another firm that became successful without having credibility through 
foreignness or local connection, or funding sources, the founder was able to leverage the 
innovative nature of his products, expertise in the industry, and his overseas network. This firm 
was founded by a “windsurfing world champion and an Olympic participant” who “had support 
from his fellow athletes in the Olympics and coaches.” Further, the founder was also “the 
innovator of bringing paddle-boarding into the world of water-sports.” With extensive 
knowledge and experience in the industry, this firm founder was able to partner with 
organizations like the “Worldview International Foundation” and “a whole bunch of friends 
around the world who love to play in the ocean and protect it.” Thus, the founder did not have 
any prior connection with the host country, nor any local resource provider or source of funding. 
However, the firm has generated high revenue for several years, showing that Configuration 1 
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(Legacy Network Pathway) displayed in Table 7 is a pathway to high-performance even without 
credibility through foreignness or local connection to the host country and funding sources. 
Thus, two firms in the dataset showed resource configurations largely resembling this pathway.  
(2) Host country networking pathway. The presence of strong local connections and 
resources drawn through them characterize this configuration. These resources include external 
funding, the presence of resource providers, and the related human capital of the RM-founder. 
These explanatory conditions enable the firms to be successful even in the absence of networking 
assistance and innovation. Typically, the firms in these configurations can leverage their local 
connections in the host country to make up for the limitations in obtaining social capital through 
networking assistance (from incubation/acceleration support, investor network, overseas 
partners, and educational institute's network). The local connection and the presence of a 
resource provider enable the firms to acquire the required social capital without an incubator, 
overseas partner, or their educational network. In one case, the RM-founder’s husband was born 
and raised in the host country. Thus, RM-founder’s daughter was able to leverage this familial 
connection. Moreover, the RM-founder knew many ex-pats and refugees from the host country, 
who’s family members still lived in the host region. These forms of local connections allowed 
them to understand what “[the host region] really needed.” The RM-founder shared:  
“We came there because we were accepted. We couldn’t have come if we weren’t 
welcome. You know, you have to go in a place you have to negotiate a spot to build on, so 
you have to lease, rent from the village. You have to have the village participation 100%, 
know how to hire people. We couldn’t just pry ourselves there and hope to be welcome 
[…] it was a very business-like transaction. We came. We offered jobs. So yes, people 
wanted the jobs. It was like a deal.”  
 
Further, the RM-founder had several resource providers, including her daughter and a 
core employee who was part of the organization from its founding. To add to these resources, the 
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RM-founder had “a lot of experience in textiles” and “grant from a US-based foundation.” This 
combination of resources allowed her to establish a successful venture.  
In another case, the RM-founder had lived in the host country for 10 years while working 
for a non-profit. He had been extensively involved in “building libraries and community health 
educational programs” before he started to establish the venture with his “friend for 14 years.” 
He also shared that:  
“We really fell in love with the community and got quite close to the farmers who make 
up that community, and they happen to be coffee and cocoa farmers. And, through that 
process of really becoming almost local and making this region in Cameroon are our 
second home, it became clear that the potential that agriculture has to create sustainable 
jobs in these communities is significant.” 
 
This extensive experience in the host country served as a source of credibility through 
local connection as well as related human capital. Further, with the help of “agronomists, 
agricultural technicians, and a mechanical engineer” serving as resource providers, the RM-
founder was able to “get a farm in the most rural parts of Cameroon up and running.” The firm 
also won an overseas grant and received support from a non-profit to provide the required 
financial capital.  
Thus, two firms in the dataset showed these configurations most closely. Their resources 
helped them achieve success without networking assistance and innovation. 
(3) Self-financing dependent pathways. In this configuration, RM-founders used 
personal funds or reinvested profits. Self-financing, along with innovation, served as key 
conditions contributing to these firms' success, along with local connection, resource providers, 
and related human capital serving as the contributing conditions.  
In one case, the RM-founder had lived in the host country for several years and spoke the 
local language. Additionally, he shared that the local people “more trusting of Westerners” and 
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that “being a foreigner is somewhat helpful” towards the acceptance and success of his firm. In 
another firm, the RM-founder and his team were able to self-finance the firm as they developed 
innovative new products that had very low costs. The RM-founder shared:  
“We didn't have to pay much […] to manufacture 10,000 products first and then start 
selling them. It has very low startup costs, very low. It basically started by buying […] 50 
or 150 or 100 fans filters all that stuff. Starting a website was […] essentially free. So we 
basically just use our own money, and then it kind of scaled itself.” 
 
Additionally, the RM-founder had a local co-founder who “put in her own money and 
probably some money from her friends” and another co-founder who “designed the website.” I 
confirmed that these were cofounders based on their ownership of equity, presence during the 
founding of the firm, and their title. Further, the RM-founder shared that his “background in 
writing and journalism” helped him “translate scientific research into something that people 
understand and care about.” These skills enabled him to “communicate to the people” and create 
awareness about their product, which led them to be successful.  
In another case, the founder used his personal savings to establish the firm. Additionally, 
the firm received endorsement and recognition from the government that helped them obtain 
local legitimacy and connection. The RM-founder’s daughter and shareholder of the firm 
described:  
“The government really understood us […] that we wanted to be locally rooted and from 
day one, this is where we were […] The government is trying to have us as an example 
“Look, thanks to them, the farmers are really wealthy and they stayed in the villages.””  
Another key condition contributing to the success of the firms in this configuration is 
innovation. The interviewee shared that they communicated with farmers and trained them using 
a mobile app:  
“We provide the phone for every farmer, so basically, it’s a mobile app, and it’s 
expensive, so we go step by step. I think now we should have around 100 farmers on it. 
It’s growing every month. And, […] we do training at the farm itself using the app.” 
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The RM-founder also had extensive related human capital developed through “20 years 
of experience working for the UN FAO, the European Union, and developing countries in 
Africa, South America, and Russia.” This firm also had a local core employee who contributed to 
the firm as “the deputy general manager – salesman.” The firm “built on and invested in people 
within the company and outside.” Thus, the firm invested in key forms of human capital. 
Two firms in the dataset had resource configurations represented by this pathway. Thus, 
for firms with this configuration, self-financing and innovation play a key role in contributing to 
high-performing, along with local connection, resource providers, and related human capital in 
the absence of networking assistance and external funding.  
4.5.2. Pathways Leading to Low Performance 
(1) Resource impoverished pathway. The firms showing configuration 4 lacked local 
connection, self-financing, resource providers, and also innovation. Despite the presence of other 
resources such as external funding, related human capital, and networking assistance, their 
revenue was limited.  
In one case, an RM-co-founder shared that the “difference in culture was very big” and 
that they had “traveled to [host country] several times.” However, they did not live in the 
country, speak the local language, or obtain any support from the local institutions. Further, they 
had limited personal savings to self-finance the firm. The absence of local resource providers and 
innovation further placed the firm in the Resource Impoverished Pathway. Similarly, another 
firm lacked local connection and credibility through foreignness, self-financing options, and 
resource provider. Thus, one firm in the dataset had the resource configuration represented by the 
Resource Impoverished Pathway, and another had the resource configuration closely resembling 
it. These resource limitations are associated with the low performance of the firm. 
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(2) External funding and innovation deficit pathway. Configuration 5 suggests that the 
absence of external funding and innovation depressed performance, regardless of the presence or 
absence of other resources. In one case, both RM-founders had family connections (i.e., spouses) 
from the host country, of which one was also a core employee of the firm. The RM-founders 
lived in the host country “for more than 10 years and never wanted to go back.” Describing the 
related human capital of one of the RM-founders, the interviewee from this firm shared that: 
“He lived in Korea, in China in the States, in the UK. He has been involved in all the 
different areas of water purification systems, from setting up production plants all the way 
through to leading sales teams in the UK, and realizing the purchase of potential 
businesses to grow. The main business selling, logistics, you name it.” 
Moreover, they had access to networking assistance through a local university and an 
acceleration program. They also had access to funds from “friends and family, and angel 
investments.” However, they were unable to raise additional funds “because of [their] small 
size.” The interviewee shared that “growing the business […] doesn't give us any, any, any 
benefit [in terms of attracting investments].” One firm in the dataset showed this resource 
configuration which lacked external funding and innovation. Despite the presence of other 
resources, this firm had a low financial performance. 
 
The organizations in Configuration 3 (Self-financing dependent pathway) and 
Configuration 4 (Local resources, own financing, and innovation deficit pathway) showed the 
starkest contrast both in the way they mobilized resources as well as in their financial 
performance. For example, the organization CCC in Taiwan had access to all the seven 
explanatory conditions. Thus, it was very resource-rich, and its revenue exceeded USD 4 million. 
A key factor that favored this organization was that the RM-entrepreneur had lived in Taiwan for 
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over 17 years and had become a prominent lawyer, activist, and a political figure there before he 
started this social venture. Thus, the firm had access to all resources it needed.  
Organization  KKK in Vietnam had the same configurations represented by the Self-
Financing Dependent pathway. The RM-founder had extensive experience in Asia and had 
worked for international institutions. Further, the local government had given several awards to 
the organization, which were publicized in media sources. Such endorsement helped the 
organization obtain access to suppliers and customers. Further, the use of technology (mobile 
phone apps to connect with farmers) helped them be efficient. Thus, even in the absence of 
external funding and networking assistance such as accelerators, incubators, etc., KKK was able 
to perform financially very well and earn an annual revenue between USD 800,000 and 4 
million.  
In contrast to these firms, organizations in configuration 4 (Local resources, own 
financing, and innovation deficit pathway) showed very low financial performance. For example, 
organization LLL in Myanmar lacked local connection and self-financing. The co-founders had 
visited the country several times, and used their personal savings to live in the country. But the 
savings were not sufficient for starting the venture. Access to external funding was limited. 
Moreover, they did not adopt any innovation nor had any resource provider. Despite the co-
founders’ strong relevant human capital, their firm had a low financial performance with annual 
revenue between USD 100,000 and USD 400,000.  
Overall, the analysis revealed the key configurations that favored high financial 
performance and the ones that led to low financial performance. These configurations were 
supported by cases from the data as described above.  
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4.6. Discussion 
I began this study by discussing reverse migration and its growth and its relevance for 
low- / low-middle-income countries. Then, I described the different resources available to RM-
founders for potential mobilization with a description of the challenges in low- / low-middle-
income countries. Using in-depth qualitative data on 14 RM-founded social enterprises across 
the world, I address the question, “Under what resource conditions do RM-founded social 
enterprises perform successfully in their respective host countries?” In sum, my findings 
describe the different resource configurations that allow RM-founded social enterprises to 
perform well financially and the configurations that lead to low performance. Further, I offer 
some additional insight into some key resources present in each of the configurations from Table 
3, leading to high performance. 
From prior literature, we know that new ventures typically face significant difficulties 
due to their limitations in human, social, and financial capital. Entrepreneurs use a variety of 
approaches to mobilize resources to address these limitations. RM-entrepreneurs in low- / low-
middle-income countries may face severe resource constraints because they have experience in 
developing economic environments they operate in (Cunha et al., 2013) and because they are not 
native to the country (Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990; Zaheer, 1995). Yet, several RM-founded 
social enterprises in host countries have been successful (Peacock & Mungai, 2019). My analysis 
shows the resource configurations that can explain this success. In particular, I found that the 
presence of two sources of capital, (i) resource providers and (ii) related human capital, were 
present in each successful firm configuration. I elaborate on these further.  
Resource Provider(s). One of the common ways for entrepreneurs to mobilize resources 
is by teaming up with a co-founder (Wasserman, 2012). This finding is aligned with prior 
research (Greckhamer et al., 2018) which shows that larger founding teams perform better in 
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comparison to smaller founding teams (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). This better 
performance is because the co-founders contribute to firms with their own human, financial, and 
social capital. Many RM-entrepreneurs founded their social enterprises with co-founders. Apart 
from co-founders, RM-entrepreneurs had a range of other resource providers who provided 
valuable services. These resource providers were in the form of benefactors, mentors, core 
employees, and local partners. This resource was present in each firm configuration that showed 
high performance. This finding signifies the importance of having resource providers for RM-
entrepreneurs.  
Related Human Capital. Apart from resource providers, another common feature that 
all high-performing firm configurations shared was that the RM-founder entered the business 
with possessed significant and relevant personal human capital. This finding concurs with prior 
literature linking educational background and past professional experience with founding success 
(Segal, Borgia, & Schoenfeld, 2010). Chandler & Hanks (1998) argue that the founder's human 
capital can serve as a substitute for financial capital. The Legacy Network pathway (i.e., pathway 
to high-performance #1) illustrates this substitution effect. However, RM-founders had high 
related human capital required self-financing or external finding. When evaluated against prior 
research, my findings qualify the findings of Chandler and Hanks (1998). RM-founders of social 
enterprises need to complement their skill by mobilizing resources from networks (either 
institutional or personal), key employees, and stakeholders and use innovation to establish a 
high-performing enterprise.  
In sum, the link of personal human capital with skilled and networked associates (inside 
and outside the firm) appears to be the most critical and non-substitutable resources for RM-
founded social enterprises. These resources create the conditions for effective use of self-
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financing or external funding. Innovation is an important accelerant to success in that the 
innovation lowers cost, which provides easier access to customers and an opportunity for 
reinvesting in the business. Further research should investigate how founders can best use their 
legacy resource base to attract and mobilize resources that complement that base. These results 
seem to support the logic of effectuation articulated by Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, and Wiltbank 
(2008) and Sarasvathy (2001; 2009), in which founders move in a series of sequential steps from 
an initial resource base to leverage nearby resources.  
This study also brings to light certain other forms of resources that have not been 
adequately studied in the resource mobilization literature. For example, intangible resources like 
‘credibility through foreignness’ have not been studied in sufficient depth. While Lan (2011) 
describes the ‘white privilege’ available to western entrepreneurs, there is limited understanding 
of how such benefits connect with other resources.  Similarly, although innovation has been 
studied as a resource in prior literature (Sen & Tauman, 2007; Rotheroe & Miller, 2008), there 
are gaps in understanding the conditions under which it can substitute for other forms of capital. 
RM-entrepreneurs can and do bring different forms of innovation to their host countries, as well 
as social capital from their educational and professional background.  The presence of these 
resources and their relationship with firm performance and venture establishment highlights the 
theoretical significance of reverse migration in resource mobilization and entrepreneurship 
literature. Further studies can identify how the resources available to RM-entrepreneurs differ 
from those available to local entrepreneurs, and how they relate to firm survival and 
performance. 
While this study introduces the phenomenon of RM-social entrepreneurship and the 
resources that enable the success of RM-founded hybrid firms, more research opportunities 
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remain for further insight into this phenomenon.  Why do entrepreneurs migrate from high-
income to low- / low-middle-income countries? What factors explain why RM’s dominance in 
impact investment funding (as described by Peacock & Mungai, 2019) in low- / low-middle-
income countries? How do RM-founded social enterprises differ from the ones founded by local 
founders? This phenomenon is intuitively interesting because of its novelty, but a more important 
reason for increased research is its potential impact on host regions' development. While there is 
a general presumption among RMs and their champions that these investments will positively 
impact the host countries, the investment by RMs could have perverse impacts on the 
development of native solutions. Because of the impact that RM-founded social ventures can 
have on the local economy, this phenomenon should be of interest to scholars in several fields 
such as International Development, Public Policy, Economics, Sociology, and other fields. The 
multiple lenses used by scholars from various backgrounds can provide an increased 
understanding of where and how RM social entrepreneurs can supplement other forms of private 
and public actions to vitalize less developed regions.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
I began this dissertation by discussing how some profit-seeking business organizations 
attempt to address grand challenges such as poverty, climate change, and others. Battilana and 
Lee (2014) refer to these organizations that aim to pursue both social and financial missions 
simultaneously as “social enterprises.” I described the challenges these enterprises face in 
addressing dual missions and the literature that studies these challenges. Then, drawing attention 
to low- / low-middle-income countries, I explained the importance of social entrepreneurship in 
these contexts and the challenges inherent in these contexts. Specifically, I focused on two broad 
challenges: (i) ambiguity arising due to the lack of a well-defined category of standard practices 
for dual mission organizations and (ii) the dearth of establishment and limited prevalence of 
social entrepreneurship in low- / low-middle-income countries. Focusing on how ventures 
address these challenges in developing countries, I studied (i) how the processes of certification 
help resolve the ambiguity of the dual missions and (ii) the phenomenon of reverse migration as 
a means for establishing social enterprises in developing contexts. With these studies, I provide 
insights into how firms and founders manage their dual missions in developing economy 
contexts. While the results and conclusions from the individual studies have been described in 
the two previous chapters, I discuss the theoretical contributions of this dissertation in this 
section. I then present the limitations of my studies and the opportunities for future research. I 
conclude with the practical implications of my research and findings.
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5.1. Theoretical contributions 
With regard to category ambiguity in social enterprises, several scholars describe how the 
pursuit of dual goals can be a source of several internal and external tensions (Dobrev, Kim & 
Hannan, 2001; Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Hsu, 2006; Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007; Whetten, 
2006). Drawing from prior literature on organizational certification and its benefits (Gehman & 
Grimes, 2017; Terlaak & King, 2006; Vergne & Wry, 2014; Wade et al., 2006), I studied 
whether and how undergoing B-Corp certification can help to address the issues created due to 
category ambiguity. My findings and conclusions identify how certification increases clarity 
(decreases ambiguity) for internal and external stakeholders in these firms.  
In my study of B-Certified firms, I found that the firms continued to be category spanners 
yet avoided the challenges associated with dual missions. This study makes multiple 
contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to social entrepreneurship research by 
describing the mechanisms that enable the simultaneous fulfillment of their dual logics. Prior 
literature suggests that amid tensions between dual logics, one logic may dominate another and 
cause mission drift (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Jones et al., 2012), and consequently, a social 
enterprise may lose its hybrid nature over time (Scott & Meyer, 1991; Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
My findings suggest that the certification process can delay or prevent this by helping firms 
identify metrics that assess synergies between the goals, which then increases the confidence and 
commitment of internal and external stakeholders. Thus, this study demonstrates social 
enterprises need not suffer mission drift or goals conflict. The certification process provides a 
means to identify strategies that meet both goals, as well as a form of credible evaluation of goal 
attainment.  
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Second, my study adds to the literature on organizational categories. Durand and Paolella 
(2013) state that actors might have little interest in belonging to fuzzy categories such as that of 
social enterprises. They add that blurry category boundaries cause a decrease in the firms’ 
market appeal. My analysis shows how hybrid organizations clarify their “fuzzy” category and 
thus resolve the tensions. The development of independent certification agencies helps explain 
the recent increase in the number of firms that identify as social enterprises (Bersin, 2018; 
Deloitte, 2018). By studying organizational changes that take place due to third-party 
endorsement, I explain one of the ways by which firms can clarify their category. 
Third, my findings suggest that external endorsement from a third party, such as the B 
Lab, can initiate a positively reinforcing loop, by which a firm can improve its commitment to 
social and commercial goals, as well as increase the level of organizational identification among 
its employees. While some scholars describe the possibility of complementary and synergy 
between dual goals (e.g., Alberti and Garrido, 2017; Santos, Pache, and Birkholz, 2015; Haigh et 
al., 2015), we know little about the mechanisms that firms use to identify or create the synergy. I 
highlight how the creation of metrics and processes of evaluation and feedback lead to goal 
synergy. 
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature by studying firms that are “born hybrid” in 
the sense that their original founders created the businesses with the social mission in mind. This 
initial focus could have directed their attention to types of businesses that are more likely to 
support dual missions. Given the relatively young age of these firms, the liabilities of 
adolescence or maturity had not yet developed. Older firms, and firms in highly institutionalized 
markets, suffer these liabilities and may face more inertial forces than the firms in this sample. 
The differences between firms that start as hybrids and those which change their initial form into 
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a hybrid deserve more attention (e.g., Kurland, 2008). The young firms in my sample may be the 
first of a new category of organizations, which avoid goal conflict and mission drift problems.     
 In my field study on reverse migrants and their ventures, I reveal a phenomenon that 
contributes to the spread of social enterprises. I describe how non-native entrepreneurs mobilize 
resources in a way that enables high financial performance in their firms. This paper makes 
several contributions to business literature, the first one being the identification and exploration 
of the phenomenon of reverse migration. This migration can play a key role in the host country's 
social development through the positive impact generated by RM-founded social enterprises. As 
mentioned above, these forms of firms are gaining prevalence with increasing globalization. 
Moreover, RM-founded firms have been successful in securing a significant share of impact 
investment funds as well (Peacock & Mungai, 2019). However, financial capital alone is not 
sufficient for the survival and success of an enterprise. By describing the other resources that 
RM-founders need and their different combinations, I show three different pathways to firm 
success.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature on adoption of business forms in 
lower/lower-middle income countries, innovation, and managerial practices across the globe, 
which may have implications in several fields beyond business strategy. RM-founded firms use 
institutional resources from their home country and host country. Therefore, scholars in the field 
of public policy, economics, public administration, etc., might consider how their home country 
institutions help founders counteract institutional voids in the host country. Scholars across other 
disciplines and fields such as sociology, strategy, and organizational behavior also need to 
understand whether the RM-founded firms enhance or depress the presence of native social 
enterprises.  
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Third, this study contributes to the literature on resource mobilization, a central feature of 
research in strategy and entrepreneurship. Most prior studies focus on the acquisition of financial 
resources, mainly venture capital (Clough et al., 2019). However, this shifts the focus to more 
mature firms as well as to one specific form of capital. There has been limited focus on the 
strategies used to mobilize other key resources, i.e., human and social capital, which can 
substitute for a low level of financial capital and generate future cash flows. This study 
contributes to our understanding of social entrepreneurship by demonstrating how innovation or 
local connections provide a path to firm founding.  These are unique illustrations of bricolage 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005; Baker, 2007) and effectuation (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 
2008; Sarasvathy, 2009) used as paths to social entrepreneurship.  
Fourth, this study explains how founders of social enterprises work under resource-
constrained conditions with limited institutional means, such as those in low- / low-middle-
income countries. Thus, the study can help practitioners in social entrepreneurship and social 
mission advocates involved in related activities such as incubation and impact investing. 
By addressing key questions about category ambiguity and establishment in low- / low-
middle-income countries, I identify how social enterprises fulfill dual missions, reduce 
perceptions of ambiguity in their business, facilitate global acceptance of this organizational 
form and mobilize resources.  While the findings address several gaps in the literature, several 
avenues for future research remain. I propose some directions for future research in the next sub-
section. 
5.2. Future Research 
 The role of businesses in addressing grand challenges is a complicated subject area in 
that the grand challenges are complex (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015) and may require inter-
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disciplinary solutions (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016). Thus, the study of 
organizations that seek to address certain societal issues is also complex and required attention 
from several different theoretical and methodological lenses. In this dissertation, I studied 
aspects of social entrepreneurship using the categories literature (a social psychology 
perspective), resource mobilization framework (drawn primarily from entrepreneurship studies), 
and qualitative research methods. However, there are limitations to these studies. I describe the 
limitations of my study below while highlighting the areas for future research.  
One of the limitations of these studies is the evidence from the interviews is mostly self-
reported. Wherever possible, I triangulated the data with external archival sources such as media 
articles. Future research should use data from external sources to verify the findings from my 
study. For example, one could study direct evidence of improvement in category clarification in 
firms’ communication after certification. Data sources such as social media announcements, 
press releases and news articles, annual reports, etc., can be used to compare the level of 
category ambiguity before and after certification. Similarly, for the reverse migration study, one 
can use data from incubators, accelerators, or investors that support RM-founded social ventures 
to study their access to resources vis-à-vis their financial performance.  
With regard to organizational category, many factors affect how the internal and external 
audiences of a social enterprise interpret the category.  By design, I studied firms in an area of 
the world where the category of “social enterprises” is not well defined. I ensured that the firms' 
certification had happened within a relatively brief span of three years (i.e., between 2016 and 
2018). No major event took place in this region that might have made a significant difference in 
the understanding of hybrid organizations. I confirmed this through discussions with several non-
certified social enterprises and other actors like venture capital investment firms, accelerators, 
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incubators, and academicians. However, major events such as recognition of social 
entrepreneurship through awards, major investments, celebrity endorsement, etc., can spread 
awareness of social entrepreneurship and, as a result, increase its category clarity among internal 
and external audiences. Future studies should investigate the role of other channels (e.g., major 
international investments) in clarifying the category of social entrepreneurships. In turn, 
certification and/or reverse migration may become less important in the growth and presence of 
this organization form over time. As mentioned in Chapter 3, observing an organization while it 
undergoes B-Impact Assessment and B-Corp Certification can help address where and when 
certification plays an important role.   
 With regard to the occurrence of mission drift, my study suggests that certification can 
delay or prevent it by reinforcing the creation and assessment of synergy between the dual goals.  
My findings confirm the presence of goals synergies and interdependence between the goals 
described by Smith and Besharov (2019) while challenging the prior literature that assumes that 
the social and financial logics are competing (e.g., Pache and Santos, 2013). I find that although 
dual goals do result in category ambiguity, external certification is a means to overcome this 
challenge. The notion of “goals conflict” or “incompatibility” may not be relevant for certain 
firms that have created and demonstrated synergy between their diverse goals. An important 
consideration, though, is that the existence of goals synergy might differ by both type of industry 
and type of social issue. Certain organizations might find it easier to ‘synergize their social 
mission and financial mission’ as compared to others. For example, an organization aiming to 
generate rural employment may clearly see the low costs of being located in rural regions, which 
also contributes to profitability. For other organizations, such synergies may be relatively harder 
to recognize. Future research can take these differences into account and study the extent of 
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goals synergies by considering whether the synergies come directly from the social missions or 
the nature of the industry, or other goals adopted because of certification.   
One could argue that goals synergy need not necessarily result from B Corp certification 
and might be present even in non-certified hybrid firms. While this is possible, our respondents 
described a clear disconnection between the goals before the certification among the sample 
firms. Further study on other social enterprises can reveal other antecedents to the identification 
of goals synergy. Also, B Corp certification may not be effective for all adopting firms. Future 
research should provide more nuanced insight into social enterprises’ success in addressing dual 
missions. 
With regard to the phenomenon of reverse migration, my study relied on small sample 
size and three geographical contexts. Several developing parts of the world require direct 
attention. These regions may present founders with different challenges because of the level of 
development of their local economy. The range of social enterprise opportunities will vary based 
both on the form of social problems in the region and the level of government attention to the 
problems. Moreover, there can be country-level differences in terms of the acceptance of RM-
entrepreneurs as well as in the ease of doing business. In the study presented in Chapter 4, I used 
the respondents' information to assess their acceptance and connections within the host countries. 
However, the problems and solutions to social challenges form a complex web that requires 
much more in-depth study. Future research can study the feasibility and success of RM-
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship using country-level and regional indicators.  
Another limitation of the reverse migration study is related to the small sample size, 
which leads to limited diversity of the sample. Limited diversity refers to the presence of the 
combinations of conditions that have not occurred in the sample but are logically possible. This 
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can be seen from the truth table that I provided to transparently report the data (Greckhamer et 
al., 2018). To address this limitation, future research can expand the sample size and study more 
RM-founded social enterprises. Once can use purposive sampling to identify firms that are 
diverse in terms of their resource combinations. This can help addresss the concern of limited 
diversity, and also reveal other insights about the resources required for establishing social 
ventures in low/lower-middle income countries.  
An interesting insight revealed by the reverse migration study is that each RM-founder 
had a strong prosocial motivation that served as an antecedent to the entrepreneurial efforts. 
Although this paper does not study the precursors to reverse migration or the establishment of 
social enterprises, this insight points out another important area of investigation for scholars 
studying social entrepreneurship. Future researchers can study the different drivers of social 
entrepreneurship and the factors that limit it. For example, what conditions favor or hinder the 
migration of socially-minded entrepreneurial individuals to low- / low-middle-income countries? 
What individual attributes affect firm survival and success? Is there a difference between factors 
enabling or hindering social and conventional (i.e., for-profit) entrepreneurship? 
Further, the reverse migration study only assesses firms for the resource configurations 
that lead to high financial performance. For social enterprises, both social performance and 
financial performance are important to ensure the sustenance of their hybrid nature (Mersland 
and Strøm, 2010; Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012). All the firms in my sample 
pursued different social missions and measured their impact differently. For example, one firm 
measured the number of trees they planted in deforested regions, another firm measured the 
amount of plastic waste they recovered from the ocean, and another firm measured the number of 
farmers to whom they provided market access. Hence comparing their impact was not feasible at 
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this point. In the future, scholars can identify suitable impact assessment metrics using which one 
can compare the social impact generated by firms in different areas. Using QCA or other 
qualitative and quantitative methods, one can find the different firm configurations that enable 
higher social performance.  
 I undertook my field studies in contexts where the institutional infrastructure for both 
social enterprises and purely for-profit firms is not well-formed. The weak institutional 
infrastructure may contribute to the firm’s ability to find synergies between the social mission 
and the financial mission. Later entrants may find fewer opportunities for resolving the tensions 
between the two missions and may need to resolve those tensions by some form of sequential 
attention and satisficing. Future research can do a comparative study to understand how the stage 
of development in a country affects the feasibility and effectiveness of social enterprises.  
Both the studies in this dissertation are qualitative. Like all qualitative research, there are 
limitations on the generalizability as per the boundary conditions defined by the sample firms' 
context and characteristics. While these studies show the mechanisms that explain category 
clarification and resource configurations for social venture establishments, there is a need to 
conduct quantitative research to validate these mechanisms and resource mechanisms. For 
example, further research can reveal whether, and to what extent, certain resource combinations 
and strategies lead to higher financial or social performance. There is also a need for long-term 
studies using longitudinal datasets to understand whether certification has a long-term impact on 
category clarity. 
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5.3. Practical Implications 
Practitioners describe the rise in the number of socially impactful hybrid organizations 
(e.g., Bersin, 2018; Deloitte, 2018; Peacock & Mungai, 2019; Dalai, 2015).  This dissertation 
offers insight into potential paths to success for these firms.  
First, founders should recognize that not all social missions can create profits. Further, 
the ability to develop metrics to both assess the level of social impact and demonstrate positive 
relationships between the social practices and the creation of profits will be a key to generating 
support for the firm.   
Second, the formal process of certification can help managers create and/or identify 
positively reinforcing loops that demonstrate the firm’s commitment to social and commercial 
goals. In turn, these reinforcing loops can help managers avoid mission drift (Ebrahim, Battilana, 
& Mair, 2014) and internal conflicts (Pache & Santos, 2010). Similarly, organizational activities 
such as adopting HR processes related to employee interests (e.g., a week of paid volunteering, 
flexible working hours, training), improving organizational communication (e.g., regular town-
halls, sharing information about the generated social impact), and broadening the social action 
(e.g., adopting environmentally friendly practices) helped reinforce the notion of synergy 
between goals and overall understanding of the firm’s actions. Managers can attempt to adopt 
such practices to strengthen their dual missions across different levels within the firms, 
especially to help their employees recognize the firm’s category.  
Third, for reverse migrants, self-financing options and innovation play a crucial role in 
helping a firm perform well. These resources can reduce the need and dependence on external 
funding and networking assistance in the form of local connections, co-creator(s), and related 
human capital. In contrast, in the absence of self-financing, local connections, external funding, 
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and skilled human capital become crucial components of success. Without self-financing, the 
business should be one that can generate margins quickly for purposes of reinvestment in the 
business.  
  In sum, scholars and practitioners have noted the role as well as the need for business 
ventures to address causes relevant to present and future societal needs (e.g., Williams and 
Shepherd, 2016; Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonnenshein, 2016; George et al., 2016; Bersin, 2018). 
The significance and relevance of my studies lies in their use of case-based studies to understand 
how and when firms can be successful in addressing dual goals simultaneously. This dissertation 
provides a direct path to related research questions which I aim to study in the future. I hope 







TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Sample Description 








Impact investment firm that invests in debt and 
equity capital. Their key investments are in micro-
financing firms & SMEs 
Venture 
capital 
~40 2004 2017 
Beta 
Micro-finance organization that aims to enhance the 
livelihoods of underserved low-income women in 
rural areas, through financial services and training. 
Financial 
services 
~1600 2014 2018 
Gamma  
Agricultural infrastructure firm providing affordable 
communication solutions implemented at 







Rural area-based business process outsourcing center 






Advisory firm providing CSR and regulatory 
consulting services to other firms.  
Consulting 4 2015 2018 
Zeta 
Joint venture between a French multinational food 
manufacturer and a microfinance firm.  
Food 312 2006 2018 
Eta 
Consultancy offering transparency and 
sustainability reporting solutions to local firms.  
Consulting 
 
6 2016 2018 
 
Table 2: Data Sources 
Firm Interviewee (designation) Notes Archival sources 
Alpha 
Head, Investment Director 
(AL-ID) - led B-Corp 
certification; Business 
Analyst (AL-BA); Senior 
Associate (AL-SA); 
Underwriter (AL-AU) 





Firm presentation; Firm website; 
Twitter, LinkedIn pages; Job 
postings (3); Media articles (e.g., 
Grassroots, AVPN Asia; GIIN 
2020 report); Founding team and 
employee videos: 16 minutes 
Beta  
Vice President (BE-VP) 
led B-Corp certification 
HR manager (BE-HR) 
Introductory emails + 
phone conversation 
(BE-HR); Discussions 
with recent recruits; 
Field notes 
YouTube videos of the founder 
(BE-FO): 40 minutes; Company 
website, B-Corp directory page; 
Twitter, LinkedIn pages; Media 
articles (e.g., Find Glocal, 2018) 
Gamma 
Founder (GA-FD); Exec. 
Director (GA-ED) Impact 
Head (GA-IH) led 
certification; Impact 
Associate (GA-IA); 









shared); Field notes 
Company website; B-Corp 
directory page; Twitter, LinkedIn 
pages; Media articles (e.g., Next 





Social Impact Manager 
(DE-IM) - led B-Corp 
certification; Intern (DE-IN) 
Introductory emails 
(DE-CE, DE-IM) + 
phone calls (DE-IM); 
Field notes 
Founder’s YouTube videos (DE-
FO): 70 minutes; Website, B-Corp 
directory page; Twitter, LinkedIn 
pages; Media articles (e.g., 
Entrepreneurs’ organizations Inc.) 
Epsilon 
Founder-CEO (EP-FC)  





talk (EP-FC, EP-SC) 
Company website; B-Corp 





HR Manager (ZE-HR) 
led B-Corp certification 
Introductory emails 
(ZE-HR); Field visit 
to farms, factory, and 
farmer training center 
with (ZE-HR) 
YouTube videos of co-founders 
(ZE-CF1, ZE-CF2): 57 minutes; 
Company website, blogs; Page on 
B-Corp directory; Twitter, 
Linkedin pages; Media articles 
(e.g., blog, ESSEC article) 
Eta 
Co-founder 1 (ET-CF1) 
Co-founder 2 (ET-CF2) 
led B-Corp certification 
Analyst 1 (ET-AN1) 
Analyst 2  (ET-AN2) 
Introductory emails 
(ET-CF2); Informal 
talk  (ET-CF1, ET-
CF2) 
Company website; Page on B-Corp 
directory; Twitter, Linkedin pages; 
Company’s sustainability report; 
Media articles (e.g., Myanmar 
Insider, 2019; CCI France) 
Total 
Duration: 36.3 hours; 
Transcripts: 623 pages  
Notes, observations: 
97 pages 
Webpages: 203 pages 
Videos: 183 minutes 
 
Table 3: Category Ambiguity and Organizational Changes at Different Levels 











Alpha Expansion of 
impact areas 





 Recognition from 
external audience 
Beta Expansion of 
impact areas 





















Delta Expansion of 
impact areas 

















Zeta Expansion of 
impact areas 





















Table 4: Post-Certification Firm Characteristics 
 Founder/Leader Organization/Employee External Audience 
     Goals Synergy  Mission Communication   External Category Promotion 
Alpha Financial benefits from social 
mission 
Goals alignment;  
Understanding about firm 
Recognition from external audience 
Beta Financial benefits from social 
mission;  
Social impact from financial 
mission 
Structural changes;  
Internal communication 
Communication to other 
organizations 
Gamma Financial benefits from social 
mission 
Internal communication Recognition from external audience; 
Communication to other 
organizations 
Delta Financial benefits from social 
mission;  
Social impact from financial 
mission 
Internal communication; 
Understanding about the firm 
Recognition from external audience 
Epsilon Financial benefits from social 
mission 
Understanding about the firm; 
Organizational identification 
Recognition from external audience; 
Communication to other 
organizations 




Recognition from external audience; 
Communication to other 
organizations 
Eta No specific evidence No significant evidence Communication to other 
organizations (limited) 
 
Table 5: Sample and Data Description 









Other archival sources 
AAA (China) Apparel; sustainable clothing 2 140 1 published 
journal article; 
1 book 
2 documentary movies; 
Videos (65 minutes) 
BBB (China) Home appliances; affordable air 
purification 
2 150 Written responses 
to questions; 
13 media articles 
Videos (84 minutes) 
CCC (Taiwan) Legal Services; support for social 
initiatives 
2 204 1 internal 
document;  
9 media articles 
Videos (52 minutes) 
DDD (Russia14) Solar-powered battery; renewable 
energy 
2 95 5 media articles Videos (105 minutes) 
                                                          
14 According to the World Bank Country and Lending Groups classification, Russian Federation falls under the 
category “upper-middle-income.” However, I incorporated it in the firm, DDD in this study, because this enterprise 
is established by an entrepreneur from a high-income country. Therefore, it is still a form of reverse migration.  
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EEE (Benin) Sustainable logistics; rural 
employment 
1 66 2 media articles Videos (82 minutes) 
FFF (Thailand) Water Sports; eco-friendly 
equipment 
2 30 3 media articles Videos (80 minutes) 
GGG (Uganda) Financial inclusion of farmers 1 85 2 media articles; 1 
published journal 
article 
Videos (16 minutes) 
HHH (Kenya) Low-cost sanitation solutions 1 24 2 published 
journal articles; 
Videos (67 minutes) 
III (Cameroon) Sustainable cocoa and coffee 
cultivation 
1 40 8 media articles Videos (83 minutes) 
JJJ (Mexico) Affordable clean water 1 108 1 media article Videos (10 minutes) 
KKK (Vietnam) Sustainable agriculture, fruit 
processing 
 
1 56 7 media articles 1 documentary movie; 
Videos (14 minutes) 
LLL (Myanmar) Management; 
sustainability consulting 




MMM (Bhutan) Agriculture; habitat rehabilitation, 
land sequestration 
1 37 13 media articles; 
4 published cases 
2 documentary movies; 
Videos (25 minutes) 
NNN (India) Agriculture; farmer support and 
ownership 
1 50 18 media articles Videos (14 minutes) 
Other data 
Alpha Impact investment fund, accelerator 1 48 Each of these organization is associated with 
one or more RM-founded social enterprise  Beta Networking support and incubation 1 15 
Gamma RM-founded non-profit Informal 
discussion 
Total 
No. of interviews 23 No. of published journal articles 8 Duration of videos ~10.5 hours 
Duration of 
interviews 
~22 hours No. of media articles 89 No. of documentary 
movies  
5 
Others: book, internal documents 3 
 




and Local  
connection  

















1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.75 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.625 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.5 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.25 
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1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.25 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.25 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.5 
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Table 7: Configurations Leading to High and Low Performance 
Explanatory 
conditions 
Configurations leading to high performance  Configurations leading to low 
performance 


























     
Self-financing      
External 
funding 
     
Resource 
provider 
     
Related 
human capital 
     
Networking 
assistance 
     
Innovation      
Consistency 1 1 0.833 0.944 0.977 
Raw coverage 0.111 0.111 0.278 0.553 0.350 
Unique 
coverage 
0.111 0.111 0.278 0.236 0.033 
 Solution consistency: 0.917 
Solution coverage: 0.611 
Solution consistency: 0.875 
Solution coverage: 0.618  
 NOTES: Black circles  indicate the presence of a condition, and open  circles indicate its 
absence. Blank spaces indicate that the condition is not relevant to that particular configuration (i.e., 
it may be either present or absent).   
Table 7 reports measures of consistency and coverage for each individual configuration. Consistency 
refers to the degree to which cases in that configuration exhibit the outcome. Raw coverage shows 
the total percentage of cases that are members of that particular configuration. Given that some cases 
can be members of multiple configurations, we also show unique coverage which represents the 
percentage of cases that are exclusively a member of that particular configuration.  
The overall solution that explains high performance has a consistency of 0.917, and the solution that 
explains low performance has an overall consistency of 0.947. These are above the 0.80 consistency 
threshold that past research deems acceptable (Fiss, 2011). Coverage, which measures the extent to 
which the solution explain all of the cases exhibiting the outcome, is 0.611 for the high-performance 














Figure 3: Temporal Depiction of Organizational Changes 
 
 




Figure 5: Inductive Process to Find Explanatory Conditions 
 
Note: I have put ‘local co-founder’ and ‘local core employee’ in the ‘co-creator’ and not ‘local 
connection’. This is because local co-founders and local core employees are involved in co-creating the 
firm, rather than merely conferring legitimacy due to their nativity. For the cases that had local core 
employees and/or local co-founder, the local legitimacy due to these co-creators was also taken into 
account.   
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE  
Introduction  
Thank you for taking out time for me.  
My name is <<first author>>. I am working on a research project with <<second author>>. As 
business researchers, we are interested in understanding B-Corps and how they can fulfil their 
social impact goals while also being a for-profit organization. This research is purely for 
academic purposes at this point. Your identity and the firm’s name will be kept confidential. As 
the founder/CEO/recruiter/employee at ____ firm, your inputs and views will be very valuable. 
Please feel free to go beyond the questions I ask. Also, this is a semi-structured interview i.e. I 
will frame additional questions as we proceed with the answers.  
If you have any questions or concerns at any point, feel free to ask me right away; or interrupt 
me as we go ahead. Before I start, do you have any questions? Thank you.  
Questions  
1. Can you please tell me about the organization?  
2. Please walk me through the history of the organization.  
3. Why did you choose to be a hybrid organization/social enterprise? OR Why are you pursuing 
both profit and social mission? What is the role of each of these missions?  
4. Why did the organization undergo B-Corp certification? How were you involved in the 
certification?  
5. Please walk me through the time-line of B-Corp certification.  
6. Did your organization undergo any change in relation to B-Corp certification of the Impact 
Assessment exercise?  
7. Does the assessment and declaration of the impact as a B-Corp make any difference to your 
activities practices?  
8. Have the firm’s practices changed in any way because of being a B-Corp now?  
9. Does being B-Corp make a different to your external audience, for example to the investors, 
clients, customer, partners or prospective employees?  
10. Anything else that you’d like to share about your organization or about being a B-Corp?  
 
APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATIVE QUOTATIONS 
Appendix 2.1: Quotations for Attributes before Certification 
Founder level 
Founder characteristics  
“Taxi drivers or maids or vegetable vendors would not get loan from other banks […] Because 
they don't have proof of income. Now, through our debt business lending to companies, we are 
working with small farmers.” (AL-ID)  
“We help create or support new for-profit industries that can help the society or the 
environment. […] We have created large number of microfinance institutions. […] We were 
the early or first investors in a lot of the small finance banks of today.” (AL-ID)  
“[Alpha] is basically a fund management company. […] Our basic objective is to solve the 
problems of the bottom of the pyramid. […] We have incubated companies which we have 
been able to take the market and be successful.” (Senior advisor, YouTube video, 2018)  
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Firm leader (AL-ID) has prior experience in rural and social development. (Field notes, 2019)  
“Healthcare is great. Education is great. But what we really need is money. If you put a dollar 
in our hands, we know how to make it two. We know how to run small businesses and we can 
help ourselves. […] I believe that the private sector can stimulate financial inclusion […] and 
growth.” (YouTube video, BE-FO, 2016);  
“On one particular day, a […] poor woman came […]. Emaciated, torn saree, no chappals 
[i.e., footwear]. She had clearly walked from quite a distance to ask me this question. Like 
many poor people she had that spark and you knew that if you give her a chance, then really 
she could do something. But again, I had to say “No, we don't have funds.” Unlike the other 
woman who simply walked away disappointed, she looked me in the eye and she said 
something I will never forget. “Am I not poor too? Do I not deserve a chance to get my family 
out of poverty.” I saw how much money they were making in their small businesses. So my 
idea was - if you charge them a market rate interest, set it up as a for-profit, borrow money 
from banks at market rates, tap equity markets, and give the kind of return that an investor 
expects, […] you can do this at hundreds of thousands of villages. That was my idea - to 
unleash that capital and put in into the hands of the poor.” (YouTube video of BE-FO, 2018)  
“Our founder, our promoter has a track record of promoting one of the pioneering 
microfinance institutions in the country.” (BE-VP)  
“[As a development banker] I found that […] even if we're investing a lot of resources, the 
impact is not coming up […] It's because there is no transparency, no IT penetration […] 
Then, I came up with the innovation called the social business with the participatory IT-
enabled enterprise model.” (GA-FD)  
“[Delta] started in the founder’s native village. Our purpose of setting up [Delta] was to see 
how much the organization can do to move progress into the rural sector. […] So, we started 
off with a small BPO setup, […] IT has got a lot of low end jobs into India in the IT sector, 
which can quite easily be moved to any area where there is an internet connection. So, [Delta] 
set up operations in 2009, brought in some of the educated youth on trial basis. We started 
doing transcription, and medical transcription was one of the things that was happening at that 
point […]. Our vision is enabling the economic empowerment to the youth and women. And 
our mission is to be able to provide to at least 10,000 people actively” (DE-CE)  
“So far […] the focus has been for various reasons in the urban sector. But, there is a 
mismatch of how much educated youth are coming out of the rural parts of India and what is 
available as employment in the rural parts of India. Obviously, the employment opportunities 
tend to exist more for educated youth in urban areas. And this is what we set out to do - to see 
how can we move rural India along the development agenda in India.” (DE-CE)  
“[DE-FO], an Entrepreneurs' Organization (EO) member […], founded [Delta] - an innovative 
model for empowering rural women and youth that introduces balance to India's system where 
cities grow uncontrollably while rural villages have few economic opportunities.” 
(Entrepreneurs’ Organization Inc. – Media article, 2019)  
The founder of Epsilon was the founder of an NGO before starting Epsilon. She has prior 
experience in business sustainability consulting. (Field notes, 2019)  
Co-founder1 paraphrasing his explanation to Co-founder2: “I said, it will be a social business. 
[…]You can take all your investment back. But after you've taken back the last penny, it stops. 
The company continues to earn profit, but it's not your profit. The company continues to 
expand and reach out to more children, because it is driven by the social objective. He shook 
hands and said "I agree." This time I thought he doesn't understand my English, but later on I 
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exchanged emails explaining everything. He gladly sent it back saying he understood every 
word of it. […] And we created the company. […] We have a special program for beggars. So 
she might be a member of that group as a beggar. She joined [another firm] to take a loan and 
start the business. Instead of begging around now she sells around. So there’s transformation 
by itself. […] She knows where she can sell this stuff, and people support her because she 
used to beg. Now she is selling something!” (YouTube video of ZE-CF1, 2010)  
“The initial design was that they will build 50 small factories to distribute our goods door to 
door with ladies, all around each of the factory. They would sell it to the villagers and the kids 
in the villages around the factory and this way they will bring a huge impact on nutrition in 
[the region].” (ZE-MD)  
Organization level 
Goals Disconnect 
An article on the foundation of Beta describes only its financial mission suggesting the 
disconnection between the firm’s mission: “A group of corporate professionals from diverse 
backgrounds--micro financiers like [BE-FO], technocrats, bankers and management experts--
started [Beta] in 2014 as a tech-enabled banking correspondent company. In 2017, the 
company became a non-banking finance.” (Business Standard – media article, 2019).  
Managing Director of Zeta paraphrasing the conversation between the co-founders: “‘We 
should do something together to address the malnutrition, and on top of that we want to be 
social business meaning that you're never gonna get your money back. […] You're not going 
to get any profits’ and [ZE-CF1] was not sure that [ZE-CF2] has understood really what he 
meant. So he said it again by an email and then [ZE-CF2] said ‘Yeah, yeah I understood your 
point’.” (ZE-MD)  
Zeta was pricing the product based on the raw material which was not allowing them to be 
profitable:  
“Earlier, the product price was set based on the price of milk [i.e., main raw material]. We 
didn't know what is the income level [of customers], what should be the price of our product. 
[…] The consumer group is average or below average [in terms of] our poverty level. Even 
they cannot afford [former product price] for their kids every day. 95% [of the people] are not 
rich people. [To] this 95% we were selling, and we were not profiting. Sometimes we're 
selling them in a breakeven point. That's why our profit margin was not too much.” (ZE-HR).  
This suggests that in an attempt to maximize their social impact, Zeta was not unable to be 
profitable. Thus, the goals were seen as disconnected.  
Internal Needs 
“When we started adding support to the firm, when we started hiring people, […] to make sure 
that there is the same level of agreement in terms of what [about] our mandate is, what our 
work and what our mission is, […] We wanted to make sure that whatever we do, […] there's 
an alignment to the core principles.” (AL-ID)  
“When we started adding support to the firm, when we started hiring people, […] to make sure 
that there is the same level of agreement in terms of what [about] our mandate is, what our 
work and what our mission is, […] We wanted to make sure that whatever we do, […] there's 
an alignment to the core principles.” (AL-ID)  
“So, [our promoter] was very keen to keep the purpose in center and to ensure that the vision 
is preserved. […] We wanted a platform to see how the entity can preserve its mission” (BE-
VP)  
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“A huge multinational corporation is super complicated to change. […] You're spending too 
much time just to manage the organization itself, and […] not to achieve its purpose.” (ET-
CF2)  
Environment level 
External Audience Ambiguity 
“I think when it comes to people in mid-management, slightly above, maybe it [i.e., social 
mission] does help. […] But at the field level, I'm not too sure […] It might not be the case.” 
(BE-VP)  
“Claiming it to be a social mission may not be the right way to think of it. […] There is a 
difference between investing that money for yourself versus redistributing that money for 
community driven growth.” (GA-ED)  
“The social mission did not matter to all the employees. […] We didn’t consciously go in and 
said [about the social mission], because there is still a mindset of charity – that we are 
extending help, and that is not what we want to do. […] They need a job and we're fulfilling 
that need.” (DE-CE).  
“[…] the challenge for B Corps to grow in India has been the lack of awareness of such 
standard and also many businesses would require hand holding to lead up to certification. To 
bridge this, some organizations offer a basic assessment to help understand the certification 
process better.” (Blog article on Epsilon’s website, 2018).  
“Sustainability is considered peripheral to the organization. […] This is not a high priority area 
for our clients. […] When we work with any client, sustainability is not highly important for 
them.” (EP-FC)  
“All those things [i.e., strategy, planning, and social impact] are super advanced, and 
sometimes they [i.e., job seekers and clients] don't really understand what you're talking 
about.” (ET-CF1)  
 
Appendix 2.2: Quotations for Organizational Changes during Certification. 
Process Changes  
“I think there are certain components that we have incorporated into our employee assessment 
[like] volunteer hours by employees […] There are certain things that you can incorporate as 
an organization just from doing the B Corp assessment. […] I think it helps in incorporating 
certain practices in your organization which you otherwise might not have thought of. Then 
there were questions around […]  
training which are not always work related. […] We have internal sessions - how do we make 
sense of the GST? […] There are questions around the policies, related to gender safety and 
security practices, and insurance. […] Not all companies have policies around how do you 
treat an intern, on maternity leave, paternity leave, and other things which are not so 
mainstream. B Corp gave us some insight on them. I think from the exercise [i.e., B Impact 
Assessment] that I was doing last year we went back and started to raise our performance. 
Now we are doing better on certain parameters. So, it's a self-evaluation exercise. […] 
otherwise in the day-to-day practices where you're busy doing business, you might not sit 
down and reflect specifically on certain parameters. But B Corps gives pushes you to take the 
time out and like sit back and see that these scores have moved this way in governance, 
workers, etc. And then, […] the first step is, you perform better. You see how you can improve 
your score in the next quarter.” (AL-SA)  
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“There is a committee which tries to figure out where they can reduce usage. Then, they try to 
figure out how the waste should be dealt with. […] There are pipelines running under the 
floors. It circulates the AC coolant […] so that we consume less electricity for cooling. […] 
The vehicle [i.e., B-Corp] actually helps us to figure out if we can improve our policies.” (AL-
ID)  
“So there's constant recall [through B Corp certification]. I'm sure that have been lot of 
changes. When we were going through the process itself, there were a lot of practices which 
we thought are good to have, which we have made a must-to-have […]We did get a lot of cues 
[about organizational process] and we fine-tune them. […] Sometimes you're so blind-sighted 
with your own internal stuff that you don't see the other things. It tells us about a lot of newer 
things which you can do. […]The loan which used to take seven days in the past […]. Our 
systems are capable of delivering a loan now in seven minutes - straight! So these things be 
gradually take shape.” (BE-VP)  
“My sense is - this industry has loan officers. There will be a lakh [i.e., 100,000] of employees 
on the field, who would be doing every anywhere between 10 to 50 lakh kilometres every day. 
Every day, right 50 kilometers per person, one lakh loan officers are going on the field. 
Imagine if all the two wheelers are kind of replaced by an electric, what is the carbon credit 
that you will be able to achieve? That's phenomenal, you know. So, there is there is there is a 
lot of scope. But seriously where is the infrastructure to support this. It's an idea of ahead of its 
time. But it will happen. B Corp gives these ideas” (BE-VP)  
“The company keeps on trying to promote [B-Corp]. […] We had a special event in the office, 
wherein the head of learning and development made everyone aware of what is actually B 
Corp. And how we got the certification, what was the score, for how many years the 
certification has been given, to whom is it given. There were different types of like social 
media postings. Before the certification, we didn't have a new department like ‘learning and 
development’. ‘Project and Purpose’, ‘Data Analytics’ were not there. When the certification 
has come, all these things started coming up. The company has become more concerned about 
their own employees as well as industry norms.” (BE-HR)  
“We have started recruiting the physically disadvantaged employees, fitting to the 
requirements. We didn’t know about it until we saw the questionnaire. Also, environment 
protection - that is big opportunity for us to improve.” (GA-FD)  
“Since we adhere to the B Corp rules and processes it helps us continue to our goals. […]” 
(DE-CE)  
“We're actively trying to get more women because it's the need. And we are a women focused 
organization, we realized that the numbers weren't showing up because we were recruiting a 
lot of women but they weren't staying with us because of familial challenges and other social 
conditions so that we're trying to rectify that. […] We're also being more and more transparent 
about the larger vision of the organization in that we're trying to make the employees feel part 
of the activities.” (DE-IA)  
“B-Corp grounded us. […] It definitely has a lot of structural reference for us. Everybody's in 
sync on the practices that we must have. For example, we have a week of [paid] voluntary 
work [per year]. […] Earlier, we were making an impact, but we were not documenting it. […] 
Now, we have metrics so, we are documenting the impact we created. So, I think that 
definitely has changed. […] After each project is closed, we see whether it created the desired 
environmental and social impact, or any other impact like other human capital impact. In fact, 
we are going to strengthen it even more.” (EP-FC)  
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“Sometimes if there is no rule of law, we take it for granted. Like, say "It's OK, this time. Let's 
print on a normal paper". But then if you have to keep insisting that you need to change. There 
should be some motivation. Like, “Okay, I haven't aligned to B Corp, so I have to print it in a 
recycled paper.” It just gives you more obedience and structure. […]” (EP-SC)  
“When we go for impact assessment, B Corp certification is also asking about environmental 
accountability. Are we accountable for social environment? B Corp is also asking do you have 
transparency with internal employees and external authorities also? And, we work on these 
aspects. […] B Corp helps us because now our hiring process is completely bias-free and 
transparent. […] To our distributor, we started giving attendance bonus that means if they 
work with us on 28 days per month, minimum 26 days month, so they can get [a certain 
amount] as a bonus. This was not mandatory […] but we are doing because they're in low 
income level. We started this during certification because - this helped us. We keep this 
process. We did not stop this.” (ZE-HR)  
ZE-MD shared that they became a B Corp “Because the managers [of the parent company] 
asked for it.” She added, “There is no value to our customers”. However, she shared:  
“It forced us into some processes and improving on some points. […] It's helping to improve 
efficiency with social impact. We know that we didn't perform so well on the environment. 
Now every time that we have the opportunity, we do something oriented towards that […] 
With the farmers - the way we set the price of the milk - we try to improve and consolidate.”  
Perception Changes  
“Paid volunteering policy [was inspired from B Corp]. I really like it because it is bringing in 
very officially that people are more than their jobs. […] Other thing is, they actually encourage 
you to go and take a vacation. […] I think that's great. We are multifaceted people, positive 
people and [B-Corp] very much recognizes how people are psychologically.” (AL-BA)  
“I think to get a certification that recognizes was a source of validation for your practices. 
Yeah, it was.” (AL-SA)  
“People are trying to say that - Do we really do that [i.e., conserving energy, recycling paper]? 
Or are we just talking about it? I think it [B Corp certification] does [make employees more 
connected to the company]. Because these are the small ways in which you can really have 
some kind of a positive influence. . If you look at our annual reports or whatever, you'll not 
find a mention of the fact that we're trying to be energy efficient, and all of that was so obvious 
to us.” (AL-ID)  
“It not only validates, it reinforces [our missions]. It reminds you constantly about your social 
alignment. […] That entire process is a beautiful platform introspect. […] You have 
discussions with department heads and ideas come up. […] We never thought we will use 
tablet on the field. But now we are doing that! […] The framework also gives you each of the 
areas - governance, how do you get customers, where do you source from, what kind of 
sourcing you do? […] So that gives a good platform for you to introspect.” (BE-VP).  
“[At Gamma] there is the entire ecosystem-based innovation, where an ICT product delivered 
to the farmers directly. And one of the social recognition and validation of their entire model is 
through B Corporation. [B Lab] has the credibility to validate this model.” (GA-IH)  
“Before I interned at this company, it was already B Corp certified. And that was one of the 
attractive things for me, because every company doesn’t get certified easily. It’s a long process 
to get this certification. […] very few companies are having B Corp.” (GA-RM)  
“Social impact space is a huge market opportunity” (GA-ED)  
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“[B Corp certification] is a recognition that we are part of a community which has strong 
impact. […] [Following B Corp certification] instant perceptual differentiation happens 
[among employees]” (GA-FD)  
“Our [i.e., Delta’s] recent B-Corp certification validates both our efforts in community 
development and our focus that goes beyond economic returns.” (Entrepreneurs’ Organization 
Inc. – Media article, 2019)  
“We can claim all we want but there is nothing that says you are doing what you're doing until 
there is some official certification.” (DE-CE)  
“The ones [i.e., employees] who look deeper into it, are able to understand what B Corp 
certification. They definitely start valuing it” (DE-IM)  
“B-Corp gives us a comprehensive evaluation framework” (EP-FC)  
“B Corp is satisfying someone who really works for the social, environment, transparency, and 
employee welfare. They [i.e., employees] felt that [they] were contributing to all this. 
Motivation is increasing as we did very good.” (ZE-HR)  
“[certification] helps to create consciousness about […] about the missions” (ZE-MD)  
 
Appendix 2.3: Additional representative quotations for Post-Certification Firm Attributes 
Goals Synergy  
“In the long run, [social impact] is what will get you the good returns. The community has to 
benefit. The vendors have to benefit. The employees have to benefit.” (AL-ID)  
“The pursuit of these community entrepreneurship programs, has done a world of good to my 
family business. In 2004, when I returned to my family business we had two businesses. 
Today we have eight.” (YouTube video of DE-FO, 2019)  
“[Financial mission] is bringing professionalism into the lives of people who have never 
worked or had the opportunity to work in a professional setting. […] The reason we're doing 
that is because the impact is creating the job opportunities [in rural areas].” (DE-CE)  
“Certified B Corp needs overall third party verified social and environmental performance. 
Through additional transparency B Corps help consumers/investors/workers with more 
information that help them take an organic decision based on their interests. B Corp certified 
companies attract new customers/employees/investors/PR etc. along with the capacity to 
inspire other businesses to adopt sustainable practices.” (Blog article on Epsilon’s website, 
2018).  
“The benefits that businesses derive by being a part of the exclusive B Corp Club are: It helps 
you to take more environmentally convincing decisions; It increases access to private 
investment capital; Helps you to build a more socially responsible business; B-Corp label 
creates a positive reputation among stakeholders; B-Corp businesses attract like-minded 
people who collaborate and achieve greater heights” (Blog article on Epsilon’s website, 2018).  
“We did not know what is the income level [of customers], and what should be the price of our 
product. These are very important things that we learned from B Corp when we started B 
Impact Assessment. At the time we understand these should be our considering points. That 
way, we were able to make the organization more socially effective, and also more financially 
effective. […] B Corp can also scale up our reputation. So that's the benefit we're getting from 
B Corporation.” (ZE-HR)  
The respondent from Zeta described their decision making following B Corp certification:  
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“You always have to balance between what is your mission and what you're supposed to 
achieve to reach the key performance indicators from your mission. You need to take into 
account the impact and it has to be profitable. So I would say it's a positive tension. Yes, it's 
contradictory, but that's gives you the constraints to think differently.” (ZE-MD)  
Successful Mission Communication  
“Impact is integral to everything that [Alpha] does. But not everybody in the team has an 
opportunity to see the achievements on the ground. […] We decided that the team Caspian 
should have an opportunity to visit [a village] in Orissa and see for themselves what happens 
on the ground based on the work they do at their office. […]” (YouTube video of Alpha’s 
Senior Advisor, 2018)  
“When I came back, I was overwhelmed […] the way they conduct themselves, It reminded 
me of Mahatma Gandhi who once said that the real India lives in the villages […] The way 
they struggle in their day to day life, the way they explore and take benefit out of our schemes 
is amazing.” (YouTube video of Assistant Vice-President, Legal Affairs, 2018)  
“For us, investors, or as urban people in general, it may be well and good that we have notions 
such as creating an impact. […] But the first and most basic question is “What are the people 
like? What do they want” It's good to be reminded now and again.” (Associate Analytics, 
YouTube video, 2018)  
“If you try to describe what we do for the employees, it's not possible to have tell everybody, 
to every new person. But, if you say that we are a B Corp, they connect all of this. […] One 
single phrase, that we are a B Corp, essentially enables us to convey to people that there are 
certain things that are important for us. B Corp certification essentially gives an indication - 
whatever you do, make sure that there's alignment to the core principles.” (AL-ID)  
“a certification like this, it is a constant reminder to us, as to how we are aligning with our 
mission and vision. And are you taking a shareholder approach, or are you taking your 
stakeholder approach? That's a constant reminder, top-down, bottom-up, however you look at 
it. So in that sense, I think it's very important. It's a good way of assessing yourself. It gives 
you a lot of cues also - Maybe this area, you still need to fine tune. It's a good way to 
introspect. […] It helps to keep the purpose in center and to ensure that the vision is 
preserved” (BE-VP)  
“To maintain that benchmark [of B Impact score] you need to really work hard. And to 
support that score, you have to get on with people like this. That maintains our goals.” (BE-
HR)  
Delta has helped set up a school, a water treatment facility, and a hospital in Yemmiganur 
village. When these facilities were inaugurated, all employees were invited to the village and 
see the operations. Employees are encouraged to participate in community activities through 
these initiatives. (Notes from field observations, 2019)  
“As a certified B Corp, I think the access to a framework that keeps you perpetually looking 
for more and more improvement focused towards more and more inclusivity, transparency and 
impact is one of the key benefits. […] Now, everybody's in sync on the practices that we must 
have” (EP-FC).  
Presently, Zeta organizes weekly training session with the farmers. Women farmers participate 
in the training as well. The training involves discussion of best practices for cattle rearing, 
organization’s goals, and social impact. The farmers also receive loans through Zeta to 
purchase cattle. Firm’s top management and leaders also attend the training sessions from time 
to time. (Notes from field observations, 2019)  
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“One of the things they [i.e., van drivers] are proud of is because they're bringing nutrition to 
the kids of their friends and families.” (ZE-MD)  
“Incentives are now aligned with both, social impact and financial return of the company.” 
(ZE-MD)  
“After B Corp certification, [we found] there is scope to think about the daily income level [of 
customers]. Why this is important? We are selling a product. We don't know what is the 
income level, and what should be the price of our product. But this is a very important thing 
that we learned from B Corp when we started [B Impact Assessment].” (ZE-HR).  
External Category Promotion  
One of Alpha’s investee companies is a B Corp. Beta is Alpha’s investee. (Field notes, 2019)  
“What we've started recognizing is that a lot of the Indian potential employees also have 
become aware of B Corp. They ask questions about B Corp. We've had people who 
specifically said, “We reached out to us because you're a B Corp.” […] We have not really 
raised a new round of funds from a new set of investors [since our B Corp certification]. But it 
does give additional credibility.” (AL-ID)  
“[Alpha] is a Certified B Corporation, or ‘B Corp’. B Corps are for-profit companies that use 
the power of business to solve social and environmental problems in an ethical and transparent 
manner.” (GSG Driving Real Impact – Media article)  
“[Alpha] notes that it is also looking forward to seeing what comes of B-Lab’s current work in 
developing an India branch.” (AVPN Asia – Media article)  
“For our investors and for people who we borrow from, it adds some value. I'm guessing it 
helps in raising funds from development financial institutions.” (AL-SA)  
“[09/20/18] [Beta] is now B Corp Certified Company, It has been evaluated on the following 
Parameters #Customers #Community #Employees #Governance #Environment #Employees.” 
(Find Glocal – Media article)  
“We have different social media highlights and all. The company keeps on trying to promote 
company based on […] things like B Corp. When the communication [about B Corp 
certification] was gone, we received a lot of the responses from people, also from people in 
other industries. One [major benefit] is obviously attracting the talent. One other major point is 
that the lenders and investors coming to the company are impressed to see that a growing 
company like ours getting the certification.” (BE-HR)  
“[Gamma] is […] the first Indian company to become a “certified B Corp” and has been 
recognized globally for its world-leading information and communication technology (ICT) 
applications, its development of entrepreneurial eco-systems in India, the partnership with 
Grameen-Intel Social Business to replicate in Bangladesh and Cambodia, as well as projects in 
Eastern Europe, helping over 70,000 smallholder farmers increase incomes and access 
markets.” (F6S – Media article)  
As a B Corp, [Gamma] seeks to further “reinforce [their] philosophy to do good for [their] 
customers, clients, and community, whilst challenging and pushing the status quo to creating 
equitable lives for people in low-income markets.” (Sustainable Brands – Media article citing 
GA-ED, 2018)  
“I was also trying to evangelize how we can spread this across employees and their friends, 
relatives and family that they really becomes ambassadors of [Gamma] as a B Corp.” (GA-
ED)  
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“B lab does offer a B Corp market place to all certified B corps. […] A marketplace for 
companies like [Gamma] that engage with small farmers […] that are doing fair trade and 
organic sourcing. [The certification] is strategic and intrinsic to the company. […]” (GA-ED)  
“I will continue to not only have [Gamma] maintain its B Corp status, but also with [Gamma’s 
subsidiary] which is a Swiss Corporation to become a B Corp in Europe. […] B corps have led 
as a bandwagon. That is something that can pick up a revolutionary mass effect as we proceed 
to the new era. It can have a ripple effect if the ecosystem starts at adopting certified B corps.” 
(GA-ED)  
“It must be in the back of their mind. […] There are some social impact investors who would 
want to only invest in the B Corp, because some of the due diligence is already done.” (GA-
FD)  
“If you look at investors, we do have a couple investors. Obviously, they do their ground 
work. They just don't blindly start investing on your enterprises. So we give them all the 
credentials. Which includes B Corp certification.” (GA-HE)  
“B corps have led as a bandwagon. […] It can have a ripple effect as the ecosystem starts at 
adopting certified B corps.” (GA-ED)  
“And I think I think it's important that B Corporation in India has started as a new movement 
in recent years. It's not even touched even one decade, […] [and Gamma] is one of the I think 
the first B Corps here.” (GA-IH)  
“B Lab gives some ratings, […] and according to that we can get partnership with big 
companies. So it’s very helpful.” (GA-RM)  
“We see some benefit in our discussions with customers and potential customers. With more 
attention and weightage in future [B Corp certification] can help more.” (DE-IA)  
Between December 2018 and May 2020, Epsilon published six blogs on their website 
informing readers and potential clients about what are B Corp certification and B Lab. They 
describe B Corp certification as “Best way to showcase, if you are an Impact Organization.” 
Below are some excerpts from the blogs:  
“It is important to understand that if you think you are an IMPACT organization, then you 
may have to explain that again and again to your stakeholders, clients and vendors/partners. 
Would it not be better if you have a logo and that is identified with an impact organization that 
believes in inclusivity, transparency and balancing profit and purpose. As a first, morally, only 
those organizations who are open for scrutiny for their overall business and not a product or a 
service can look for getting B Corp certified. So any business, no matter what industry, where 
purpose and profit converge is an opportunity for a B Corp. […] Globally, there are 3301 
Companies from 71 countries representing 150 industries with just one unifying goal. […] 
[Epsilon] is a Certified B Corp, focused on consulting, advisory and communications solely 
focused on Sustainability and Gender. [Epsilon] would like to see Sustainability at the core of 
every business.” (Blog article on Epsilon’s website, 2020)  
“In April 2017, [Zeta’s parent company] announced its ambition to become a global certified 
B Corporation. [Zeta’s parent company] is the first large publicly listed multinational wanting 
to achieve this certification paving the way for other multinationals to become B Corps.” The 
CEO announced, “I went to the Shareholders General Meeting in last April, to say that we 
commit as a company to become a B Corp.” (Video on Zeta’s parent company’s YouTube 
channel, 2017)  
“By aiming to obtain a global B Corp certification, we will be making sustainable business 
mainstream. Our certification will be a symbol to the world that we are committed to making 
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our business a force for good.” (Video description on Zeta’s parent company’s YouTube 
channel, 2017)  
“After becoming a B CorpTM in 2018, [Zeta] became B CorpTM “Best for the world” in 
2019, in the Community category. This recognizes the positive impact towards a shared, 
sustainable prosperity for all.” (Integrated Annual Report by Zeta’s parent company, 2020; 
Idealist – Media article, 2019)  
“Still people are not aware about B Corp. So that's why we incorporate our B Corp logo with 
our product.” (ZE-HR)  
 
APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHAPTER 4 (REVERSE 
MIGRATION FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP) 
<<Acknowledgement, ‘Thank you’, Self-introduction and Confidentiality terms>> 
I have been through the website of your organization, but I would still like to hear things from 
your perspective. That will make the study more comprehensive. Some questions may seem 
repetitive, but that’s because I do not want to make any assumption that I already know 
<<XYZ>> about your organization.   
If you have any questions or concerns at any point, feel free to ask me right away; or interrupt 
me as we go ahead. You can skip any question if you want. Before I start, do you have any 
questions or concerns? Thank you.  
1. Can you please tell me a little bit about your organization? 
2. Can you please tell me about the origin of the organization and its history?  
3. When was the company formed?  
4. Approximately how many employees at present? 
5. Could you please tell me a bit about your role and responsibilities at the early stages of 
the venture’s establishment? 
6. What brought you to <<host country>>? 
7. Why did you decide to start a venture there? Why a socially conscious firm? 
FOUNDER-SPECIFIC 
8. What resources did you have when you started with this venture? 
a. Financial capital – prior savings, loans, investment etc. Where did you get it from? 
b. Human capital – skills from past experience, education etc. Where did you get it 
from? 
c. Social capital – information from social contacts, network, employees. Where did 
you get it from? 
d. Other capital – sources of legitimacy/acceptance in the community, cultural 
understanding, intellectual property, narratives/your story to share. Where did you 
get it from? 
9. What resources did you NEED or WANT when you started your venture? 
a. Where did you get them from?   
10. Why did you choose to start a venture in this country? Do you have any personal ties 
(e.g. family, ethnic ties, friends from prior visit, previous professional connections)? 
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Clarify: I ask this because these may be related to the company’s functioning in some 
way.  
11. Do you think there are any connections between the resource that you had in your 
<<previous country>> and the ones you had in the host country?  
12. Did the resources from your <<previous country>> help you in <<host country>>? How? 
13. Did your family play any role in the venture establishment? 
14. Did you have to unlearn or give up on any resources in the <<host country>>?  Why? 
15. Did your prior experience in <<previous country>> help you in your venture 
establishment process here? If yes, how? If no, why not? 
16. Did you encounter (or do you still see) any challenges in new venture establishment here? 
How did you (or how do you) overcome these challenges? 
17. Did you receive any support/benefits from the local institutions in the <<host country>> 
e.g. from the local governments, regulatory authorities, people? 
18. Did you face any pressures from the local institutions in the <<host country>> e.g. from 
the local governments, regulatory authorities, people? 
19. Did you feel the need to have a local person on the founding team, or as a key employee 
to be able to survive or perform better or simply to understand the local culture?  
20. What skills did you look for when you looked for a co-founder? (e.g. complementary 
skills, local network, financial capital) 
21. If no co-founder, did you have any early-stage core employees? What skills did you look 
for? (e.g. complementary skills, local network, financial capital) 
22. Did you receive any mentorship about the context? (e.g. incubation centers, local 
government support etc.) 
23. Any challenges due to the nationalist sentiments/local cultural norms or those due to 
western influence or dominance? 
24. Any challenges related to understanding the local culture? Note: In some cases, extended 
prior experience may circumvent these issues. Reframe question to: How did you adapt to 
the local culture? What did you learn from your prior experience in <<host country>> 
that enabled you to adapt? 
25. Any specific advantages of being in <<host country>>? 
26. Any challenges of being in <<host country>>?   
GENERAL (Ask only if not understood from previous interview or archival info) 
27. As a social enterprise, what are your key missions? How do you pursue them?  
28. Any immediate goals? 
29. Why did the organization choose to become a B-Corp? Do you see any benefits through 
this certification?  
SOCIAL MISSIONS and LEGITIMACY 
30. Do you encounter any challenges related to pursuing social missions? If yes, how does 
your firm overcome them?  
31. Does your firm obtain any advantage in being a social enterprise (e.g. legitimacy, 
acceptance, reputation etc.) 
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32. Does your firm face any disadvantage because of being a social enterprise (e.g. conflict 
between the social mission and financial goals)? 
FINANCIALS (remind about confidentiality and anonymity; check if he/she is willing to share) 
1. Have you received any external funding? What form – debt, equity, venture capital? How 
many rounds of VC investment? What amount of funding? 
2. Did you consider crowdfunding? 
3. Can you share some information about the revenue? ROI?  
4. Any plans of going public, through an IPO?  
OTHERS 
5. Is there anything else that you would like to share about your firm? 
6. Do you have any questions or concerns for me? 
7. I’d also like to interview one of the co-founders/ other people who may be able to answer 
my questions. Can you connect me with them?  
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